People v. Carter

• Decision Date: 16 November 1983
• Docket Number: 63916,Docket Nos. 63904
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie Ward CARTER, Defendant-Appellant. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Lee WOODWARD, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 128

341 N.W.2d 128

128 Mich.App. 541

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Willie Ward CARTER, Defendant-Appellant.

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Lee WOODWARD, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket Nos. 63904, 63916.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 14, 1983.

Decided Aug. 5, 1983.

Released for Publication Nov. 16, 1983.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Deputy Chief, Appellate Asst. Pros. Atty., Civil and Appeals, and Rosemary A. Gordon, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Michael J. Brady, Southfield, for Willie Carter.

Thomas H. O'Connor, Troy, for William Woodward.

Before J.H. GILLIS, P.J., and HOLBROOK and GRIBBS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants were charged with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2), one count of armed robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797, and one count of felony-firearm, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). Following a joint jury trial, both defendants were acquitted of all CSC charges. Defendant Woodward was convicted of armed robbery and felony-firearm. Defendant Carter was convicted of the lesser included offense of larceny from a person, M.C.L. Sec. 750.357; M.S.A. Sec. 28.589, and was acquitted of the felony-firearm charge. Woodward was sentenced to consecutive prison terms of 2 years on the felony-firearm conviction and 8 to 15 years on the armed robbery conviction. Carter was sentenced to 6 years and 8 months to 10 years imprisonment. Defendants appeal as of right. The appeals were consolidated.

Complainant testified that shortly after midnight on August 29, 1981, she was abducted by the defendants and driven to the Eastern Market area of Detroit, where she was forced at gunpoint to engage in sexual intercourse, first with Woodward, then with Carter and then again with Woodward. According to complainant, Woodward then took $9 and a vial of prescription medicine from her.

Woodward testified that the complainant had asked him to help her inject drugs into her groin area, and that the intercourse had been consensual. Carter did not testify or produce any witnesses. A statement given by Carter to the police shortly after he was arrested was read into evidence.

We first address an issue raised by both defendants and find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in finding that the prosecutor had exercised due diligence in attempting to produce two police officers who, as conceded by all parties, were res gestae witnesses. The two officers had walked up to the car while defendant Woodward was having sexual intercourse with the complainant on the back seat. The officer in charge of the case testified that, although she had made an investigation, she was unable to locate or identify the two officers.

We next address the issues raised only by defendant Woodward, none of which require reversal.

One of the items allegedly taken from complainant was a vial containing prescription medicine. An empty vial matching the description of the one taken from complainant was seized from defendant Woodward at the time of his arrest. Woodward moved to suppress evidence of the vial on the ground that the arrest and resulting seizure of the vial were unconstitutional.

At a hearing on the motion, testimony established that defendant Woodward was arrested without a warrant on August 29, 1981, by four officers at the apartment of Constance Brown, where Ms. Brown lived with her father, son and boyfriend. Although Brown consented to the entry, she claimed that the consent was coerced. Brown admitted the officers and directed them to the bathroom where they opened the door and found Woodward in front of the sink with the vial beside him in plain view.

The prosecutor opposed the motion to suppress on the ground that Woodward did not have standing to challenge the search and seizure. On this issue, Brown testified that while defendant Woodward did not live at her apartment, he did stay there sometimes, including four nights out of the month previous to his arrest.

The trial court ruled that Brown's consent was coerced and that the entry was unlawful, but denied the motion to suppress on the ground that Woodward did not live at the apartment and therefore did not have standing to challenge the search and seizure. The vial was admitted into evidence and complainant testified that it was the one which defendant had taken from her.

Standing to challenge a search and seizure does not depend on a person's ownership interest or residence in the premises searched. Rather, a defendant has standing to challenge a search and seizure if he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched area. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978); People v. Wagner, 114 Mich.App. 541, 547, 320 N.W.2d 251 (1982); People v. Nabers, 103 Mich.App. 354, 373-374, 303 N.W.2d 205 (1981); People v. Mack, 100 Mich.App. 45, 47, 298 N.W.2d 657 (1980).

Upon an examination of the record, we find that defendant Woodward did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in Brown's apartment. Woodward was merely a transient visitor on the premises. Although he had Brown's permission to stay at the apartment, he only occasionally spent the night there. We cannot conclude that Woodward thought of Brown's apartment as a place of refuge from public scrutiny nor can we conclude that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy therein. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.

Defendant Woodward contends that the trial court should have granted his motion for separate trials because a statement that Carter had given to the police, which was admitted at trial, placed culpability for any armed robbery squarely on the shoulders of defendant Woodward. We disagree. Although defendant Woodward did move for separate trials, that motion was based on defendant Woodward's fear that he would be prejudiced if defendant Carter's criminal record became known to the jury. This motion was denied and defendant Carter never took the stand, thus, the jury was never apprised of defendant Carter's record. Since defendant Woodward never moved to sever on the basis that defendant Carter's statement to the police would implicate him, we do not review this issue. People v. Kramer, 108 Mich.App. 240, 310 N.W.2d 347 (1981).

Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling precluding him from impeaching the complainant with evidence of her alleged history of drug use and psychiatric problems. The court excluded this evidence on grounds of relevancy and we find no abuse of discretion in that decision. MRE 401, 403; People v. O'Brien, 113 Mich.App. 183, 203, 317 N.W.2d 570 (1982); People v. Strickland, 78 Mich.App. 40, 54, 259 N.W.2d 232 (1977).

Prior to trial the prosecutor moved to suppress evidence of all of complainant's prior convictions. The trial court weighed the appropriate factors and exercised his discretion in admitting evidence of some of the convictions while excluding others. However, the court suppressed evidence of the complainant's 1964 and 1965 convictions without exercising its discretion, presumably because these convictions fell outside the ten-year period provided in MRE 609(b).

Relying on People v. Redmon, 112 Mich.App. 246, 315 N.W.2d 909 (1982), defendant contends that the automatic exclusion of evidence of convictions more than ten years old violates his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment. We disagree with the reasoning of the majority opinion in the Redmon decision, and agree with the dissent therein. We find, therefore, that the trial court properly excluded evidence of complainant's 1964 and 1965 convictions. MRE 609(b).

Defendant raises as error two instances of noncompliance by the prosecutor with a continuing discovery order. People v. Pace, 102 Mich.App. 522, 302 N.W.2d 216 (1980).

We find that in the first instance, involving a statement by John Wayne, there was no violation of the discovery order. Mr. Wayne was not endorsed until shortly before trial and, at that time, defense counsel was allowed to see Wayne's "statement", which consisted of some notes taken by a police officer during a telephone conversation with Wayne. In addition, eight days...