People v. Carter
| Decision Date | 16 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 125954 |
| Citation | 2021 IL 125954,190 N.E.3d 224,454 Ill.Dec. 624 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. David CARTER, Appellant. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Douglas R. Hoff, Deputy Defender, and Sean Collins-Stapleton, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Mitchell J. Ness, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.
¶ 1 Defendant, David Carter, was charged in the circuit court of Cook County with several weapons offenses, including being an armed habitual criminal, aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon. Defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him. The circuit court denied the motion. Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of being an armed habitual criminal ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2016)) and sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, his conviction, and his sentence. 2019 IL App (1st) 170803, 443 Ill.Dec. 109, 161 N.E.3d 233. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019). For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the cause for resentencing.
¶ 3 On March 29, 2016, the State charged defendant with one count of being an armed habitual criminal (AHC), alleging that he "knowingly possessed a firearm, after having been convicted of the offense of armed robbery, under case number 10CF-367, and the offense of aggravated battery, under case number 09CF-2251." Defendant was also charged with four counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon and four counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.
¶ 4 Defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence, alleging that the investigatory stop that resulted in his arrest violated the fourth amendment. At a hearing on the motion to suppress, Chicago police officer Robert Luzadder testified that he and his partner, who were in uniform and wearing duty belts with service weapons, were on patrol in a squad car on March 9, 2016, at about 11:36 p.m., when they received an Office of Emergency Management and Communications (OEMC) dispatch The caller said that the group was near the intersection of 33rd and Wallace Streets. Luzadder testified that the anonymous tipster's phone number had been recorded.
¶ 5 Luzadder arrived at the intersection two or three minutes after receiving the call, but he did not see anyone matching the individuals described by the anonymous caller. A second OEMC dispatch relayed additional information from the caller that "the people were now walking near 3100 South Lowe Avenue," approximately two blocks to the north. Luzadder further testified that he and his partner relocated to that area within two to four minutes. At the second location, Luzadder saw defendant, a white male, who was wearing clothing described by the anonymous caller, walking east in the south alley of 31st Street and holding the right side of his waistband. Luzadder did not observe the two women described by the caller, nor did he see defendant violate any laws.
¶ 6 Luzadder explained that, during his 22 years of working as a police officer, his observations of hundreds of individuals carrying firearms in their clothing led him to believe that defendant was "attempting to conceal a firearm underneath his clothing." Luzadder acknowledged that in some instances in which he had observed people holding their waistbands the police had not recovered guns.
¶ 7 After Luzadder got out of the patrol car, with a hand on his service weapon, he ordered defendant to raise his hands, approach the squad car, and place his hands on the car. Because the call concerned a firearm and Luzadder had seen defendant holding his waistband, Luzadder patted down defendant for Luzadder's own safety. Luzadder patted down defendant over his clothes and felt what he believed to be the handle of a handgun. He then lifted defendant's shirt and recovered a nickel-plated revolver from defendant's waistband. Luzadder arrested defendant, at which time defendant made a statement related to the gun. After hearing the testimony and argument on defendant's motion to suppress, the circuit court denied the motion.
¶ 8 Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the State dismissed two of the counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon. At defendant's bench trial, the parties stipulated to Luzadder's testimony from the suppression hearing. Luzadder provided brief, additional testimony regarding the statement made by defendant after the gun was found. According to Luzadder, defendant said, "I'm a 2-6, I'm on parole and I use this for protection against the SDs." Luzadder also testified that a five-shot revolver with one live round was recovered from defendant during the pat-down.
¶ 9 The State placed two exhibits into evidence: a certified copy of defendant's 2010 armed robbery conviction and a certified copy of defendant's 2009 aggravated battery conviction. The parties also stipulated that defendant did not have a valid Firearm Owner's Identification card or a concealed-carry license on the date that Luzadder recovered the firearm from his person. The State rested its case-in-chief. Defendant elected not to testify, and the defense rested without calling any witnesses.
¶ 10 Following closing arguments, the court determined that the State had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and convicted defendant on all remaining counts: one count of AHC, two counts of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon, and four counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The court denied defendant's request for a new trial and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment on the AHC count and merged the other counts.
¶ 11 On appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court erroneously denied his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence because the police officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct the investigatory stop that produced the gun, bullet, and statement that were admitted at trial. See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The appellate court explained that, to justify a Terry stop, an officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, support the conclusion that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. 2019 IL App (1st) 170803, ¶ 20, 443 Ill.Dec. 109, 161 N.E.3d 233. The court recognized that anonymous tips alone seldom provide law enforcement officers with the reasonable suspicion necessary to initiate a lawful investigatory stop because such tips generally fail to demonstrate the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity and, in such cases, an officer's corroboration of information contained in the anonymous tip becomes especially important. Id. ¶ 21.
¶ 12 The court concluded that Luzadder engaged in corroboration of the assertion of illegality provided by the tipster when he observed someone matching the description of the person provided by the caller at the location where the caller said he would be. Moreover, he corroborated the report that the person had a gun when he observed defendant walking in a manner that suggested he was concealing a firearm under his clothing. Id. ¶ 24. Luzadder's reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed further justified a protective pat-down search of his person to ensure Luzadder's own safety and the safety of others. Id. Because the firearm was recovered during a lawful search and seizure, the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Id.
¶ 13 The appellate court next considered defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his AHC conviction. Defendant argued that the State had failed to prove that he had the requisite two qualifying predicate offenses required by the AHC statute. That statute provides:
Armed robbery is not listed as a qualifying offense in either subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3), and the only types of aggravated battery listed are aggravated battery of a child and aggravated battery with a firearm. Thus, the court noted that defendant's convictions qualified only if they were considered " ‘forcible felonies’ " pursuant to subsection (a)(1). 2019 IL App (1st) 170803, ¶ 34, 443 Ill.Dec. 109, 161 N.E.3d 233. Defendant did not dispute that his armed robbery...
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