People v. Carter

• Decision Date: 18 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 2,2
• Citation: 395 Mich. 434,236 N.W.2d 500
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew CARTER, Defendant-Appellant. 395 Mich. 434, 236 N.W.2d 500
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 500

236 N.W.2d 500

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Andrew CARTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2.

395 Mich. 434, 236 N.W.2d 500

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 18, 1975.

William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Atty., Research, Training and Appeals by Ronald P. Weitzman, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Kenneth M. Mogill, Detroit, for defendant-appellant; M. Gerald Schwartzbach, Detroit, of counsel.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

Andrew Carter and his codefendant Andrew Bufkin were charged with first-degree murder, M.C.L.A. § 750.316; M.S.A. § 28.548. They were convicted of second-degree murder. M.C.L.A. § 750.317; M.S.A. § 28.549. The convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 43 Mich.App. 585, 204 N.W.2d 762 (1972). On rehearing the Court of Appeals affirmed its prior decision. 48 Mich.App. 290, 210 N.W.2d 390 (1973). Carter's conviction alone is before the Court. We affirm.

The victim, Edward Koc, a neighborhood insurance man, was shot in an alleged robbery attempt. The testimony of all of the credible witnesses suggests that Carter and three others were driving to Carter's home. One of the group noticed Bufkin walking along and Carter stopped to let Bufkin enter. After a few blocks, Bufkin requested Carter to stop the car. Bufkin existed the car and ran north carrying a brown paper bag with which he had entered the car. After a brief wait, Carter drove a few blocks and again encountered the running Bufkin. Bufkin re-entered the car and stated that he had shot 'the' man. None of the car's occupants called the police.

The prosecution contended that Bufkin and Carter acted in concert, that the killing occurred during the attempted perpetration of an armed robbery. Defendant alleges error in the court's instructions.

The relevant portion of the judge's instructions are as follows:

'Now, if you find that the facts as you have heard them, the testimony indicates to you that there was an attempt to commit a robbery then, I say that you are limited to first-degree murder. As to both or either of the defendants. However, if you find otherwise, then you may consider the lesser included crimes of murder in the second degree and manslaughter.'

When the jury returned asking that the instructions be repeated, the judge again stated '(I)f you find from the facts that no robbery was committed only then may you consider second-degree murder or manslaughter and not guilty. Those are the four verdicts you can arrive at, first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter and not guilty and you may find for either or both of the defendants. This is what you're limited to, is that correct?'

Defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that both Bufkin and Carter could be convicted of second-degree murder, because there was no credible testimony that Carter participated in the killing. Defendant argues that if there was a second-degree murder, if was committed by the shooter and the shooter alone, and it was up to the jury to determine which of the two defendants was the shooter. Thus, Carter could be found guilty of first-degree felony murder or not guilty.

The Court of Appeals held that because the evidence would have been sufficient to convict Carter of first-degree murder, he had no complaint about being convicted of second-degree. However, that Court also held that in future prosecutions for felony murder, the trial judge would be obliged to instruct the jury that its verdict shall be guilty of murder in the first degree or not guilty.

'We adopt this rule because 'felony murder,' so called, is a creature of statute in which the element of premeditation is conclusively presumed by proof of the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a specific felony. As such, neither second-degree murder nor manslaughter can possibly be lesser included offenses. These two latter crimes and felony murder are mutually exclusive offenses.' 43 Mich.App. 589, 204 N.W.2d 763.

A contrary view was expressed by another panel of the Court of Appeals in People v. Wimbush, 45 Mich.App. 42, 49, 205 N.W.2d 890 (1973).

We hold that there ware lesser included offenses to first-degree felony-murder. Second-degree murder is always a lesser included offense of first-degree murder. First-degree murder is second-degree (common-law) murder Plus an element, Viz., either premeditation or the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate an enumerated felony. People v. Allen, 390 Mich. 383, 212 N.W.2d 21 (1973). Conversely, second-degree murder is first-degree murder Minus premeditation or the enumerated felony. The contrary rule of People v. Bufkin is disapproved.

'Homicide is not murder of either degree, * * * unless it amounts to common-law murder. If this is all it is second-degree murder. If it is common law murder plus one or more of the aggravating circumstances mentioned, it is murder of the first degree.' Perkins on Criminal Law, (2d ed.), p. 90.

In People v. Treichel, 229 Mich. 303, 200 N.W. 950 (192...