People v. Casalino

• Decision Date: 07 April 2022
• Docket Number: 110287
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Christopher CASALINO, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

204 A.D.3d 1078
166 N.Y.S.3d 360

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,
v.
Christopher CASALINO, Appellant.

110287

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 9, 2022
Decided and Entered: April 7, 2022

166 N.Y.S.3d 362

Craig S. Leeds, Albany, for appellant.

J. Anthony Jordan, District Attorney, Fort Edward (Taylor Fitzsimmons of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Lynch, J.P., Clark, Aarons, Colangelo and Fisher, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Colangelo, J.

204 A.D.3d 1078

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Washington County (McKeighan, J.), rendered January 5, 2018, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of sexual abuse in the first degree (two counts) and endangering the welfare of a child.

In January 2017, defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree and one count of endangering the welfare of a child, stemming from allegations that he engaged in sexual abuse with a minor child (hereinafter the victim). During the first day of jury selection at the ensuing trial, the People disclosed that, pursuant to a search warrant, the contents of defendant's and the victim's cell phones had been obtained but had not been disclosed to defendant. The People then provided a DVD with the contents of both phones to defendant and to County Court. Defendant moved for a mistrial based upon the People's alleged Brady

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and Rosario violations and, upon the People's consent, County Court declared a mistrial without prejudice. Following a second jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged and thereafter sentenced to concurrent prison terms of seven years, to be followed by 10 years of postrelease supervision, on the sexual abuse convictions and to a lesser concurrent term on the remaining conviction. Defendant appeals.

Defendant contends that his retrial was barred by the prohibitions against double jeopardy set forth in U.S. Constitution, 5th Amendment and N.Y. Constitution, article I, § 6. The People concede that disclosure of the content of the cell phones was late pursuant to CPL 240.20(1)(a). "[I]f the defendant requests or consents to a mistrial, double jeopardy

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will not preclude a retrial, unless the defendant can demonstrate prosecutorial or judicial misconduct intended to provoke a mistrial" ( People v. Ellis, 182 A.D.3d 791, 792, 123 N.Y.S.3d 210 [2020] [citations omitted], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1026, 126 N.Y.S.3d 34, 149 N.E.3d 872 [2020] ; see People v. Haffa, 197 A.D.3d 964, 965, 150 N.Y.S.3d 658 [2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1059, 154 N.Y.S.3d 634, 176 N.E.3d 670 [2021] ). Defendant does not allege that the People intended to provoke a mistrial, but argues that his request for a mistrial was attributable to the People based upon their untimely disclosure of the cell phone records. County Court expressly stated that it was "not finding wrongdoing" by either party. Accordingly, jeopardy did not attach to bar retrial of the indictment (see People v. Ellis, 182 A.D.3d at 792, 123 N.Y.S.3d 210 ).

Defendant next contends that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence. Defendant's legal sufficiency challenge is unpreserved for our review as the record reflects that his trial order of dismissal did not include arguments directed at any specific error in the proof (see People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 [2008] ; People v. Logan, 198 A.D.3d 1181, 1182–1183, 156 N.Y.S.3d 511 [2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1162, 160 N.Y.S.3d 722, 181 N.E.3d 1150 [2022] ). "Nevertheless, as part of our weight of the evidence review, we necessarily determine whether the People proved each element of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v. Walker, 190 A.D.3d 1102, 1103, 140 N.Y.S.3d 307 [2021] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lvs denied 37 N.Y.3d 958, 961, 147 N.Y.S.3d 517, 170 N.E.3d 391 [2021]; see People v. Serrano, 200 A.D.3d 1340, 1341–1342, 158 N.Y.S.3d 389 [2021] ; People v. Barzee, 190 A.D.3d 1016, 1017, 138 N.Y.S.3d 718 [2021], lv denied 36 N.Y.3d 1094, 144 N.Y.S.3d 110, 167 N.E.3d 1245 [2021] ). "In a weight of the evidence analysis, we view the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether a different verdict would have been unreasonable; if a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from

204 A.D.3d 1080

the testimony to determine if the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence" ( People v. Ferguson, 193 A.D.3d 1253, 1254, 147 N.Y.S.3d 204 [2021] [citations omitted], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 964, 148 N.Y.S.3d 763, 171 N.E.3d 239 [2021] ; see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987] ). In conducting this analysis, "[g]reat deference is accorded to the fact-finder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony and observe demeanor" ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d at 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ; see People v. Conway, 179 A.D.3d 1218, 1218, 116 N.Y.S.3d 118 [2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 941, 124 N.Y.S.3d 288, 147 N.E.3d 558 [2020] ; People v. Cubero, 160 A.D.3d 1298, 1300, 75 N.Y.S.3d 658 [2018], affd 34 N.Y.3d 976, 113 N.Y.S.3d 1, 136 N.E.3d 747 [2019] ).

For defendant to be convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree, the People were required to prove that defendant, being 21 years old or older, subjected another person, who was less than 13 years old, to sexual contact (see Penal Law § 130.65[4] ). For defendant to be convicted of endangering the welfare of a child, the People were required to prove that defendant "knowingly act[ed] in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental or moral welfare of a child less than

166 N.Y.S.3d 364

[17] years old or direct[ed] or authoriz[ed] such child to engage in an occupation involving a substantial risk of danger to his or her life or health" ( Penal Law § 260.10[1] ).

The victim testified that, during the week of October 17 to 23, 2016, defendant came into her bed for about an hour or two each night. During this time, defendant touched her "[u]nderneath [her] [night]clothes, [her] private areas ... between [her] legs and [her] chest." The touching started after he got into her bed and continued until he left. From October 24 through 30, 2016, defendant came into her bed nightly and started taking off her clothes and touching her again with his hand between her legs and on her chest. The record established that, at the time of the crimes charged in the indictment, defendant was 33 years old and the victim was 12. The victim further testified that she texted defendant from her cell phone when she was unsure if she was pregnant, and defendant responded that he would buy a pregnancy test.

Frank Hunt Jr., an investigator with the Whitehall Police Department, testified that the police received calls from two of the victim's family members alleging that defendant "had touched [the victim] [and] sexually molested her." Hunt and a Child Protective Services caseworker then interviewed the victim, who disclosed these allegations to them. When defendant was brought to the police station, Hunt read defendant his Miranda rights word by word from the standardized Miranda form on the station's computer. Defendant indicated that he

204 A.D.3d 1081

understood the rights and agreed to speak to Hunt. A recording of this interview was admitted into evidence. Defendant then gave and signed a written statement. In the statement, defendant admitted, among other things, that when his wife went to work, he would lie in bed with the victim and they would "talk and play." Defendant corroborated the...