People v. Casas

Decision Date14 April 2016
Docket NumberNo. 2–15–0456.,2–15–0456.
Citation406 Ill.Dec. 7,59 N.E.3d 785
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Fernando CASAS, Jr., Defendant–Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Eldad Z. Malamuth, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.

Mark H. Kusatzky, of Northfield, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The question presented in this case is whether the offense of violation of bail bond is a continuing offense such that the limitations period on a violation-of-bail-bond prosecution is tolled until an offender is returned to custody. We hold that it is.

¶ 2 At some point in 1996 (the record does not indicate precisely when), defendant, Fernando Casas, Jr., was indicted by the statewide grand jury for the manufacture or delivery of cocaine in excess of 900 grams, a Class X felony. The case was transferred to Du Page County under case number 96–CF–1920. On October 16, 1996, the circuit court admitted defendant to bail in the amount of $750,000; he posted a 10% cash bond of $75,000. Thereafter, defendant regularly appeared in court for the case. On June 9, 1998, however, defendant failed to appear in court and his bond was forfeited. During the next 30 days, defendant did not surrender himself to authorities, and a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Later, defendant was tried in absentia, found guilty, and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment.

¶ 3 On April 5, 2014, roughly 18 years after defendant was first indicted, the police stopped defendant for a traffic offense in Du Page County. During that stop, defendant gave the police a false name and a fake ID. In subsequent conversations with the police, defendant revealed his true identity, admitted that he stopped going to court in the 1996 case, and acknowledged the warrant for his arrest. Defendant also confessed that, because of the arrest warrant, he had used two different false identities, including the one on the fake ID, which he purchased in Mexico, to avoid apprehension while living in the United States.

¶ 4 Based on these facts, in December 2014, defendant was indicted for the violation of his 1996 bail bond. The Criminal Code of 2012 sets forth the offense of violation of bail bond as follows:

“Whoever, having been admitted to bail for appearance before any court of this State, incurs a forfeiture of the bail and knowingly fails to surrender himself or herself within 30 days following the date of the forfeiture, commits, if the bail was given in connection with a charge of [a] felony * * *, a felony of the next lower Class * * *.” 720 ILCS 5/32–10(a) (West 2014).

The State's indictment alleged that defendant forfeited his bond by failing to appear in court on June 9, 1998, and by knowingly failing to surrender himself within 30 days of that date. The offense was charged as a Class 1 felony because defendant's underlying cocaine charge was a Class X felony.

¶ 5 Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that a prosecution for violation of his bail bond was time-barred. 725 ILCS 5/114–1(a)(2) (West 2014). More specifically, defendant claimed that, under the general statute of limitations for felonies, the State had three years to bring the bail-bond charge against him (720 ILCS 5/3–5(b) (West 2014)), or until July 10, 2001. Defendant noted that more than three years had passed, and asserted that the State did not allege any facts in the charging instrument that would toll or extend the three-year limitations period. See generally 720 ILCS 5/3–6 (West 2014) (extending limitations period for certain offenses); 720 ILCS 5/3–7 (West 2014) (excluding certain times from limitations period); 720 ILCS 5/3–8 (West 2014) (providing that for continuing offenses, limitations period is tolled and commences when “last such act” was committed).

¶ 6 In response, the State filed a superseding information, which provided as follows:

[O]n or about July 9, 1998, and continuing through and until April 5, 2014, [defendant] committed the offense of VIOLATION OF BAIL BOND, a Class 1 felony, in that * * * defendant, after being admitted to bail on or about October 16, 1996, for appearance in the Circuit Court of DuPage County * * * in case 96 CF 1920, and on or about June 9, 1998, he incurred a forfeiture of his bail and thereafter knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully failed to surrender himself within 30 days following the date of the forfeiture of the bail, in violation of [section 32–10(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/32–10(a) (West 2014)) ]; and because Violation of Bail Bond should be considered a continuing offense, the statute of limitations did not start running until April 5, 2014, when defendant was apprehended and admitted that he used a false identity to evade prosecution.”

In a footnote in the information, the State asserted that [t]his Court is bound by People v. Grogan, 197 Ill.App.3d 18, 143 Ill.Dec. 730, 554 N.E.2d 665 (1st Dist.1990), which held that violation of a bail bond is not a continuing offense.” (Emphasis in original.) The State then noted that it, with the superseding information, was “mak[ing] a good[-]faith argument that Grogan was improperly decided and should be overruled.”

¶ 7 The State's use of the phrase “continuing offense” was a reference to section 3–8 of the Criminal Code, which tolls the three-year limitations period as follows: “When an offense is based on a series of acts performed at different times, the period of limitation prescribed by this Article starts at the time when the last such act is committed.” 720 ILCS 5/3–8 (West 2014).

¶ 8 The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that pursuant to Grogan defendant's prosecution for violation of a bail bond was time-barred. The State timely appealed.

¶ 9 On appeal, the State primarily contends that violation of bail bond is a continuing offense under section 3–8 of the Criminal Code (id. ) and that Grogan was wrongly decided. Thus, according to the State, the limitations period was tolled when the offense was initially committed, and began to run once defendant was taken into custody. Accordingly, since defendant was charged with the bail-bond offense well within three years from the date of his arrest, the statute of limitations was not violated. In the alternative, the State argues that its reference to defendant's use of a false identification qualifies as an exception to the limitations period for when a criminal defendant “is not usually and publicly resident within this State” (720 ILCS 5/3–7(a) (West 2014)). Because we agree with the State on the first issue, we need not address the second.

¶ 10 Whether violation of bail bond is a continuing offense and whether the superseding information was properly dismissed present questions of law, which we review de novo. People v. Macon, 396 Ill.App.3d 451, 454, 336 Ill.Dec. 634, 920 N.E.2d 1224 (2009). As noted, most felony offenses must be charged “within 3 years after the commission of the offense.” 720 ILCS 5/3–5 (West 2014). A crime is “committed,” and the limitations period begins to run, when the final element of the offense is completed. See generally People v. Blitstein, 192 Ill.App.3d 281, 284, 139 Ill.Dec. 279, 548 N.E.2d 664 (1989) (citing Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970) ); People v. Mudd, 154 Ill.App.3d 808, 815, 107 Ill.Dec. 716, 507 N.E.2d 869 (1987). But, as the Utah Supreme Court has helpfully observed, [i]n the case of a continuing offense, while criminal liability attaches when every element is satisfied, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the perpetrator ceases to satisfy the elements of the crime. At that point, the whole arc of criminal conduct is aggregated into a single criminal violation.” State v. Taylor, 2015 UT 42, ¶ 12, 349 P.3d 696.

¶ 11 As noted above, in Illinois, the continuing-offense exception is codified in section 3–8 of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/3–8 (West 2014) ). Illinois law holds that the continuing-offense exception to the statute of limitations applies in certain instances, such as where the crime is conspiracy (People v. Konkowski, 378 Ill. 616, 621, 39 N.E.2d 13 (1941) ), embezzlement (People v. Adams, 106 Ill.App.2d 396, 405, 245 N.E.2d 904 (1969) ), criminal contempt (People v. Levinson, 75 Ill.App.3d 429, 436, 31 Ill.Dec. 307, 394 N.E.2d 509 (1979) ), failure to maintain records concerning controlled substances (People v. Griffiths, 67 Ill.App.3d 16, 20, 23 Ill.Dec. 734, 384 N.E.2d 528 (1978) ), or escape from custody (People v. Miller, 157 Ill.App.3d 43, 46, 109 Ill.Dec. 146, 509 N.E.2d 807 (1987) ). Since escape and violation of bail bond are similar offenses, we will begin by discussing Miller.

¶ 12 In Miller, the defendant was convicted of escape and appealed on the basis that she had been charged with that offense after the limitations period had expired. Id. at 44–45, 109 Ill.Dec. 146, 509 N.E.2d 807. The First District Appellate Court (relying principally on the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980) (construing federal escape statute)), held that escape was a continuing offense under Illinois law. Miller, 157 Ill.App.3d at 46, 109 Ill.Dec. 146, 509 N.E.2d 807. Specifically, the Miller court determined that “escape encompasses not only the defendant's initial departure but [also] his failure to return to custody.” Id. The court noted that an escaped prisoner “poses a continuing threat to society” and that the consequences of viewing escape as “an isolated occurrence * * * would encourage a convicted felon to remain in hiding until the three-year statute of limitations had expired.” Id. Accordingly, the court found that “once the defendant had escaped, she was under a duty to terminate her status as a...

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2 cases
  • People v. Casas
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • December 5, 2017
    ...bond was a continuing offense pursuant to section 3–8 of the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/3–8 (West 2014) ). 2016 IL App (2d) 150456, 406 Ill.Dec. 7, 59 N.E.3d 785. This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)). For the following......
  • People v. Casas
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 20, 2018
    ...prosecution is tolled until an offender is returned to custody." People v. Casas , 2016 IL App (2d) 150456, ¶ 1, 406 Ill.Dec. 7, 59 N.E.3d 785. We thus held that the charge against defendant, Fernando Casas Jr., was filed within the limitations period and we reversed the trial court's dismi......

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