People v. Castellanos, S064388.

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Writing for the CourtGEORGE, C.J.
Citation88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346,21 Cal.4th 785,982 P.2d 211
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Luis CASTELLANOS, Defendant and Appellant.
Docket NumberNo. S064388.,S064388.
Decision Date30 August 1999

88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346
982 P.2d 211
21 Cal.4th 785

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Luis CASTELLANOS, Defendant and Appellant

No. S064388.

Supreme Court of California.

August 30, 1999.


88 Cal.Rptr.2d 347
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant

Brissman & Schlueter, Peter B. Schlueter and Jon R. Schlueter, San Bernardino, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren and Bill Lockyer, Attorneys General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster, Steven D. Matthews, John R. Gorey and Lawrence M. Daniels, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

Following defendant Luis Castellanos's conviction of a series of criminal offenses, the trial court ordered him to register as a sex offender pursuant to a provision in Penal Code section 290 that became effective after defendant committed those offenses. The Court of Appeal struck the trial court's order, concluding that requiring defendant to register as a sex offender violates the ex post facto clauses of the federal and California Constitutions (U.S. Const, art. I, § 10; Cal. Const, art. I, § 9). We disagree. As explained below, the trial court's order is valid because the requirement that a person register as a sex offender does not constitute punishment for purposes of ex post facto analysis.

I

In April 1994, defendant introduced himself to a member of the women's basketball team at Glendale College and subsequently appeared at her house. She allowed defendant to enter the residence but said she was getting ready to leave (which was not true) and left him in the living room for "a minute or two" while she went upstairs to get her keys. Then both she and defendant left the house. The student went to her automobile and defendant appeared to go to his. She drove around the

88 Cal.Rptr.2d 348
block, parked, and walked back to her house "through the back way" in order to avoid defendant if he still was present. As she approached her house, she saw defendant inside, replacing a screen on a window. She went to her grandmother's house and called the police

The police arrested defendant the following day while he was attending a class at Glendale College. Defendant was carrying twenty-six $100 bills. In his locker, he had a three-month-old sports section of a local newspaper that contained an article that mentioned the student. In his backpack, police found a set of keys that belonged to a teacher at Glendale College, an address book, and a list of names of 14and 15-year-old girls.

Defendant made a detailed confession. He explained that he had determined where the student lived by peering over her shoulder as she filled out a form at the library, and had memorized her address. While he was inside her residence and she was upstairs retrieving her keys, he unlocked a window and opened it a few inches. He left the house and pretended to go to his automobile, but when the student was out of sight he returned to her residence and climbed in through the window he had opened. After entering her bedroom, he stole a pair of her panties "as a memento of his contact" with her.

Defendant admitted that this was not his first burglary and that he had burglarized the homes of many of the girls named on the list found in his backpack. Each time, he took a pair of the girl's panties. Often, he also took money and photographs of the girl. He consented to have the police search the premises where he lived with his mother. At defendant's direction, the police looked inside a crawl space above the closet in defendant's bedroom and found, buried in the insulation, a trashbag that contained 27 pairs of women's panties, numerous photographs of teenage girls, and some pubic hairs in plastic bags with notes identifying their sources.

The police contacted the girls involved. Many had not known that their property had been taken, but identified their underwear and photographs. Others had noticed that money was missing, usually in amounts close to $100, but had not suspected a burglary had occurred. On one occasion, $2,720 had been taken.

Defendant was convicted of 13 counts of first degree burglary in violation of Penal Code section 4591 and 3 counts of receiving stolen property in violation of section 496, subdivision (a). He was sentenced to a term of 14 years in prison and ordered to register as a sex offender, pursuant to section 290, upon his release from custody.

Defendant argued on appeal that requiring him to register as a sex offender violates the ex post facto clauses of the federal and California Constitutions, because the provision in section 290 that requires him to register took effect after he committed the offenses of which he was convicted. The Court of Appeal agreed and modified the judgment of conviction by striking the order requiring defendant to register as a sex offender, stating it was bound by this court's decision in In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914, 191 Cal.Rptr. 658, 663 P.2d 216.

II

At the time defendant committed the present offenses in 1993 and 1994, section 290 required a person convicted of an enumerated sex-related crime to register as a sex offender. The registration requirement is lifelong, and includes furnishing to the chief of police of the city in which the offender resides (or to the sheriff of the county, if the offender resides in an unincorporated area) a written statement, fingerprints, and a photograph, which are forwarded to the California Department of Justice. Failure to register is a criminal offense. "The purpose of section 290 is `to assure that persons compet

88 Cal.Rptr.2d 349
of the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in the future.' [Citations.]" (In re Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914, 919, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 P.2d 216.) The crimes enumerated in former section 290 included rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, but did include the crimes of burglary and cerning, receiving stolen property committed by defendant

On January 1, 1995 (after defendant committed the present offenses, but before he was convicted), an amendment to section 290 took effect that, among other changes, added subdivision (a)(2)(E), which broadened the scope of the statute by requiring registration upon conviction of "any offense ... if the court finds at the time of conviction that the person committed the offense as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification."2 The trial court ordered defendant register as a sex offender pursuant to this provision. As noted above, the Court of Appeal struck the trial court's order, holding that it violated the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state Constitutions.

Article I, section 10, clause 1 of federal Constitution states in pertinent part: "No state shall ... pass any ... ex post facto law...." Article I, section 9 of the California Constitution similarly states that an "ex post facto law ... may not be passed." The California provision is analyzed in the same manner as its federal counterpart. (People v. Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 158, 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 295, 973 P.2d 72; People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 86, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850, 840 P.2d 955; Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 295-296, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434.)

More than 200 years ago, in Calder v. Bull (1798) 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648, the United States Supreme Court discussed the meaning of the fedmerated eral ex post facto clause: "The prohibition, in the letter, is not to pass any law cannot and after the fact; but the plain and obvious meaning and intention of the prohibition is this; that the Legislatures of the several states, shall not pass laws, after a fact done by a subject or citizen which shan have relation to such fact, and shall punish him for having done it The court then listed the type of laws that were ex post facto laws; list Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action, 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punto ishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed...." (Ibid.)

In Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 41, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30, the high court reaffirmed this interpretation of the ex post facto clause: "Although the Latin phrase 'ex post facto' the literally encompasses any law passed `after the fact,' it has long been recognized by this Court that the constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by them." Relying upon the decision in Calder v. Bull, supra, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, the high court restated the prohibition of the ex post facto clause in simple terms: "Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crime or increase the punishment for criminal

88 Cal.Rptr.2d 350
acts." (Collins v. Youngblood, supra, 497 U.S. 37, 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30.)

In the present case, the amendment to section 290 that took effect after defendant committed the charged offenses did not alter the definition of the crimes of which defendant was convicted, but it did require defendant to register as a sex offender. Accordingly, application of this amendment to defendant would violate the ex post facto clauses of the federal and state Constitutions only if the sex offender registration requirement constitutes an increase in the punishment for defendant's criminal acts.3

In People v. McVickers (1992) 4 Cal.4th 81, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 850, 840 P.2d 955, we held that requiring a defendant convicted of certain sex offenses to provide a blood sample for AIDS...

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  • People v. Cowan, A156253
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 2020
    ...question arises.’ " ( People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1108, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714, 417 P.3d 191, citing People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (plur. opn. of George, C. J.) ( Castellanos ).) The conventional approach, which applies in double j......
  • People v. Alcala, No. C037000.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 2004
    ...it serves an important and proper remedial purpose and it is not punitive in either purpose or effect. (People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795-796, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (lead opn. of George, C.J.) and pp. 803-804 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) As noted in Russell......
  • People v. Ansell, No. S079744.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • June 14, 2001
    ...L.Ed.2d 734 (Young); Flemming v. Nestor (1960) 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (Nestor); People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (Castellanos) (lead opn. of George, C. J.); id, at p. 801, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (cone. & ......
  • Johnson v. Dep't of Justice, No. S209167.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • January 29, 2015
    ...be required to register for crimes that were committed before they became offenses subject to registration (People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 788, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (lead opn. of George, C.J.); id. at p. 800, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (conc. & dis. opn. of K......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
190 cases
  • People v. Cowan, A156253
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 27, 2020
    ...question arises.’ " ( People v. Ruiz (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1100, 1108, 232 Cal.Rptr.3d 714, 417 P.3d 191, citing People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (plur. opn. of George, C. J.) ( Castellanos ).) The conventional approach, which applies in double j......
  • People v. Alcala, No. C037000.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 2004
    ...it serves an important and proper remedial purpose and it is not punitive in either purpose or effect. (People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795-796, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (lead opn. of George, C.J.) and pp. 803-804 (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).) As noted in Russell......
  • People v. Ansell, No. S079744.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • June 14, 2001
    ...L.Ed.2d 734 (Young); Flemming v. Nestor (1960) 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (Nestor); People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 795, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (Castellanos) (lead opn. of George, C. J.); id, at p. 801, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (cone. & ......
  • Johnson v. Dep't of Justice, No. S209167.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • January 29, 2015
    ...be required to register for crimes that were committed before they became offenses subject to registration (People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 788, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (lead opn. of George, C.J.); id. at p. 800, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 346, 982 P.2d 211 (conc. & dis. opn. of K......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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