People v. Castelli

• Decision Date: 09 May 1963
• Docket Number: No. 89,89
• Citation: 370 Mich. 147,121 N.W.2d 438
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Rudolph CASTELLI, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 438

121 N.W.2d 438

370 Mich. 147

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Rudolph CASTELLI, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 89.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 9, 1963.

Norman L. Zemke, Monis Schuster, Detroit, for defendant and appellant.

George F. Taylor, Pros. Atty., Robert L. Templin, Senior Asst. Pros. Atty., Pontiac, for the People.

Before the Entire Bench.

DETHMERS, Justice.

On September 9, 1960, a woman, who is the complaining witness in this case, went into a bank in Oakland county, withdrew $6,000 in cash, had it put into a white bag, and walked out of the bank toward her automobile parked nearby. A man came up to her, told her to keep quiet, grabbed for the bag with the money in it, knocked her down, seized the bag and ran off with it.

On October 24, 1960, defendant was arrested by Detroit police on a Wayne county narcotics charge and confined in the Wayne county jail until February 28, 1961. On the latter date he was sentenced in the Recorder's Court of Detroit to serve 1 to 5 years after having entered a plea of guilty to the narcotics charge. On March 3, 1961, he was delivered to State prison to serve said sentence.

On November 2, 1960, as the result of identifications made by the complaining witness from photographs and show ups in the Wayne county jail, a warrant was issued in this case in Oakland county charging defendant with the unarmed robbery. On November 3, 1960, the warrant was sent to the Wayne county sheriff in whose custody defendant then was. On March 21, 1961, the Wayne sheriff returned the Oakland county warrant to authorities there, advising that defendant now was in State prison under sentence on the Wayne county narcotics charge. In April and May of 1961 the Oakland authorities sought to contact the complaining witness in this case for the purpose of arranging to proceed with a preliminary examination herein. They learned that she was ill, first in a hospital and then at home. On August 25, 1961, on a writ of habeas corpus, defendant was brought to Oakland county and the examination in this case was held on August 30, 1961. Defendant was bound over to circuit court for trial and an information was filed in that court on August 31, 1961. On October 19, 1961, defendant moved to quash the information and discharge him for the reason that (1) he had been denied a speedy trial and (2) because, upon issuance of the warrant, he had not been taken forthwith before the magistrate as provided in C.L.1948, § 766.3 (Stat.Ann. § 28.921), and, finally, (3) because the court had lost jurisdiction to try him in that there had not been compliance with the requirements of C.L.1948, § 780.131 et seq. (Stat.Ann.1961 Cum.Supp. § 28.969 et seq. [P.A.1957, No. 177]), that a prison inmate shall be brought to trial, on a pending criminal charge other than that for which he is imprisoned, within 180 days after the department of corrections shall notify the prosecuting attorney of the appropriate county of the fact of the inmate's imprisonment in State prison and request final disposition of the information. The motion was denied. On November 3, 1961, defendant was brought to trial. At the conclusion of the people's proofs, defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that he had been denied the opportunity to confront and cross-examine all of the res gestae witnesses, known to the authorities to be such before trial, as a result of the prosecution's failure to endorse their names on the information and produce them as witnesses at trial. This motion was denied. On November 6th a jury returned a verdict of guilty of robbery unarmed, and defendant thereafter was sentenced to serve a prison term.

Defendant appeals here, seeking reversal on the 4 grounds urged for the 2 motions as above noted and the additional one that prejudicial error was committed by introduction of evidence that defendant had a previous criminal record.

C.L.1948, § 766.3 (Stat.Ann. § 28.921), requires the magistrate, under proper circumstances, to issue a warrant commanding the officer to take the accused forthwith and bring him before the magistrate. The statute does not command the officer to do so. It does not provide that jurisdiction is lost by the officer's failure to do so. In the instant case, defendant indulged conduct which placed a considerable barrier in the way of the officer's doing so by getting himself incarcerated in another county. There is no authority for a holding, on this basis, for reversal, quashing the information, complaint and warrant and dismissing defendant. We decline so to hold. Defendant cites People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738, in this connection. It has no application to this case in which defendant was in jail in another county on another charge when the warrant herein was issued. Neither is there here involved the main question presented in Hamilton, namely, admissibility of a confession.

An accused is entitled to a speedy trial. Michigan Constitution of 1908, art. 2, § 19. Discussion of what constitutes a speedy trial as thus guaranteed may be found in Hicks v. Judge of Recorder's Court of Detroit, 236 Mich. 689, 211 N.W. 35, and People v. Den Uyl, 320 Mich. 477, 31 N.W.2d 699. In Hicks it was said:

'In view of this constitutional provision, it becomes necessary to inquire what a speedy trial means. We apprehend it means such reasonable time under all the attendant circumstances as will give teh people and opportunity to present its case in court. 16 C.J. p. 439. A speedy trial does not mean that the defendant is entitled to have his trial commence immediately after being bound over to the trial court. What would be a reasonable time in one case would be perhaps unreasonable in another. The question might be affected by the gravity of the offense, the number of witnesses involved, the terms of court, and many other circumstances. Owing to this, much must necessarily be left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court must exercise its best judgment upon such applications, keeping in mind, however, the defendant's constitutional rights.'

Defendant was not incarcerated, during the delay, on this charge, but in another county, and ultimately in State prison, on another. Soon after his conviction and imprisonment in the other case, the complaining witness in this case was ill for a time in the hospital and at home. Her testimony was essential to the people's...