People v. Castello

• Citation: 65 Cal.App.4th 1242,77 Cal.Rptr.2d 314
• Decision Date: 31 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. D029126,D029126
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8355 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Angelo Charles CASTELLO, Defendant and Respondent.

Page 314

77 Cal.Rptr.2d 314

65 Cal.App.4th 1242, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8355

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Angelo Charles CASTELLO, Defendant and Respondent.

No. D029126.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

July 31, 1998.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1998.

Review Denied Nov. 4, 1998. ^*

Paul J. Pfingst, District Attorney, Thomas F. McArdle and Josephine A. Kiernan, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Mary C. Hibbs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, San Diego, for Defendant and Respondent.

HUFFMAN, Associate Justice.

Angelo Charles Castello pleaded guilty to nine counts of grand theft of personal property. The trial court initially found true an allegation that Castello suffered a prior conviction in Florida under the three strikes law but, on subsequent motion by Castello, reversed this finding and held the prior did not constitute a valid "conviction." The People appeal the invalidation of the prior conviction, contending: (1) the trial court lacked power to reconsider its finding under CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 1008¹; (2) the prior constituted a conviction as defined by California law, which applies here; and (3) the prior constituted a conviction under Florida law. We hold the court properly exercised its inherent power to reconsider but erred in concluding the Florida prior was not a conviction under California law. We therefore affirm the unchallenged conviction but reverse the judgment as to sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In November 1975, in Florida, Castello pleaded guilty to assault with the intent to commit involuntary sexual battery. On May 2, 1997, in California, Castello pleaded guilty to nine counts of grand theft of personal property in violation of Penal Code section 487, subdivision (a), and admitted that the losses to the victims exceeded $150,000, a special enhancement allegation under Penal Code section 12022.6, subdivision (b).

On April 29, 1997, the trial court, refusing to "[put] the cart before the horse," first denied Castello's motion to invalidate the 1975 prior. Castello had argued the prior did not constitute a conviction under the three strikes law because the court had withheld adjudication of guilt after Castello completed probation, as provided for by Florida law. Then, on May 2, 1997, after Castello's guilty plea and waiver of jury trial as to the strike prior allegation, the court found the prior allegation true.

On June 10, 1997, Castello filed a motion for reconsideration of the validity of the strike prior. On July 17, 1997, the court granted the motion and reversed its prior ruling deeming the Florida prior a strike. The court then sentenced Castello to eight years four months in state prison, with four hundred ten days credit for time spent in custody. The court declined to indicate how it would exercise its discretion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 529-530, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628.

The People appealed the sentence based on the court's invalidation of the prior conviction allegation.

DISCUSSION

1. Reconsideration. ²

In criminal cases there are few limits on a court's power to reconsider interim rulings. (People v. Rose (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 257, 262, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 559; but see, People v. Walker (1904) 142 Cal. 90, 92, 75 P. 658 [limits on repetitive new trial motions]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1205, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 [limits on relief from unfavorable ruling on motion to suppress].) However, the People In general, to decide the proper rule of criminal procedure by reliance upon rules of civil procedure "would be to ignore the underlying rights of the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Belton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 516, 522, 153 Cal.Rptr. 195, 591 P.2d 485.) Gonzales v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 260, 263-264, 44 P.2d 320, concluded that only those parts of the Code of Civil Procedure which are expressly made applicable to penal actions apply to criminal cases. As stated in Smith v. Superior Court (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 285, 291, 171 Cal.Rptr. 387, "[t]he rationale [of Gonzales ] should apply ... to preclude operation of other Code of Civil Procedure sections ..., such as section 1008" since section 1008 is not so incorporated. (Accord, People v. Glimps (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 315, 325, fn. 6, 155 Cal.Rptr. 230.)

contend section 1008 ³ extends to criminal cases to impose such a limit.

The cases cited by the People do not lead us to a different conclusion. In re Kowalski (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 67, 70, 98 Cal.Rptr. 444, reasoned that a motion under Penal Code section 995 should not be renewed unless changed circumstances are shown, using section 1008 by analogy only. (See Cal. Style Manual (3d ed. 1986) § 101, p. 69 [meaning of "cf."].) The court in People v. Locklar (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 224, 230, 148 Cal.Rptr. 322, relying on In re Kowalski, did imply in dicta that section 1008 applied in a criminal case. However, this dicta, based on a misreading of In re Kowalski, does not bind us. (See, e.g., Hart v. Burnett (1860) 15 Cal. 530, 598-599.) Moreover, these cases primarily concern the rule that one trial court judge may not reconsider and overrule a ruling of another judge. (See, e.g., Greene v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1583, 1588-1589, 274 Cal.Rptr. 736.)

The California Supreme Court has often recognized the "inherent powers of the court ... to insure the orderly administration of justice." (Hays v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 260, 264, 105 P.2d 975; see also Bank of America v. Superior Court (1942) 20 Cal.2d 697, 702, 128 P.2d 357 [court has power to change interim rulings]; Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal. 29, 33-34, 293 P. 69.) In criminal cases, the court has acknowledged "the inherent power of every court to develop rules of procedure aimed at facilitating the administration of criminal justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment of the truth." (Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 801-802, 91 Cal.Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26; Powell v. Superior Court (1957) 48 Cal.2d 704, 708, 312 P.2d 698.) In People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th, at page 1205, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, the court made no mention of section 1008 when it held: "Because the People's motion to 'augment and reconsider' the suppression motion was not governed by [Penal Code] section 1538.5, we agree with the People that the trial court's ability to grant relief is instead controlled by Code of Civil Procedure section 128, subdivision (a)(8), which states that every court will have the power to 'amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conform to law and justice.' "

Some of the court's inherent powers are set out by statute, but the inherent powers A court's inherent powers are wide. (See, e.g., Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 19-24, 267 Cal.Rptr. 896, disapproved on other grounds in Kowis v. Howard (1992) 3 Cal.4th 888, 896-897, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 838 P.2d 250; Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1377-1378, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 882.) They include authority to rehear or reconsider rulings: "[T]he power to grant rehearings is inherent,--is an essential ingredient of jurisdiction, and ends only with the loss of jurisdiction." (In re Jessup (1889) 81 Cal. 408, 468, 22 P. 1028; accord, Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams (1942) 19 Cal.2d 463, 469, 122 P.2d 257.) " 'One of the powers which has always been recognized as inherent in courts, which are protected in their existence, their powers and jurisdiction by constitutional provisions, has been the right to control its order of business and to so conduct the same that the rights of all suitors before them may be safeguarded. This power has been recognized as judicial in its nature, and as being a necessary appendage to a court organized to enforce rights and redress wrongs.' " (Lorraine v. McComb (1934) 220 Cal. 753, 756, 32 P.2d 960, quoting Riglander v. Star Co. (1904) 98 App.Div. 101, 104, 90 N.Y.S. 772, italics added.)

                of the courts are derived from the Constitution and are not confined [65 Cal.App.4th 1248] by or dependent on statute.  (Cal. Const., art.  III, § 3; id., art.  VI, § 1; 4  Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 266-267, 279 Cal.Rptr. 576, 807 P.2d 418;  Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v.  Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 272, 287-288, 245 Cal.Rptr. 873.)
                

Moreover, even if section 1008 were deemed applicable to a criminal case, that statute, by its express terms, governs only a litigant's ability to renew a motion or advance an application, not the court's inherent power to reconsider its own interim rulings. ⁵ (Gailing v. Rose, Klein & Marias (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1579, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 381 [section 1008 is not jurisdictional]; accord, Bernstein v. Consolidated American Ins. Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 763, 774, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 817 [court may correct own erroneous ruling]; Nave v. Taggart (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1173, 1177, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 714 [court has complete power to change its decision until entry of judgment]; cf. also, International Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 784, 788, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 849 [court has broad power to define "change of law" within the meaning of section 1008]; Community Memorial Hospital v. County of Ventura (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 199, 205, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 732 [section 1008 inapplicable if same issue of law, but motion different].) ⁶

Indeed, a court has "the power of self-preservation, ... the power to remove all obstructions to its successful ... operation." (Millholen v. Riley, supra, 211 Cal. at p. 33, 293 P. 69.)

A court could not operate successfully under the requirement of infallibility in its interim rulings. Miscarriage of justice results where a court is unable to correct its own perceived legal errors, particularly in criminal cases where life, liberty, and public...