People v. Castillo

• Docket Number: B328791
• Decision Date: 08 October 2024
• Citation: People v. Castillo, B328791 (Cal. App. Oct 08, 2024)
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRITNEY CASTILLO, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals

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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRITNEY CASTILLO, Defendant and Appellant.

B328791

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Eighth Division

October 8, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles CountyNo. TA155907Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge.Affirmed.

Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie A. Miyoshi and David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GRIMES, J.

SUMMARY

DefendantBritney Castillo pled nolo contendere to one count of carrying a concealed, unregistered firearm in her car in violation of Penal Code section 25400, subdivision (a)(1).(Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.)After her plea but before sentencing, the United States Supreme Court decided New York State Rifle &Pistol Assn Inc. v. Bruen(2022)597 U.S. 1(Bruen).Bruen held New York's firearms licensing scheme was constitutionally invalid for requiring an applicant to show "proper cause" to get a concealed carry license; along the way, Bruen noted California's "good cause" requirement was also unconstitutional.The day after the Bruen decision, the California Attorney General issued a legal alert instructing local officials not to require proof of good cause for issuing a concealed carry permit.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the count of which she was convicted on the ground the licensing statute was unconstitutional.The trial court denied her motion.Now she appeals, contending her conviction should be reversed because the statutory scheme upon which her plea was based is facially invalid under the Second Amendment.

We conclude, as other Courts of Appeal have done, that defendant has standing to make a facial challenge to the statutory scheme on which her conviction was based.On the merits, we likewise join other Courts of Appeal that have concluded, in similar circumstances, that the "good cause" requirement is severable, and the statutory scheme then in effect was not otherwise facially unconstitutional by virtue of its use of the term "may issue" a license rather than "shall issue" a license.

Accordingly we affirm defendant's conviction.

FACTS

On October 9, 2021, defendant was a passenger in her car, driven by her companion who brandished and fired a gun at a motorist.During a later search of the car, police found two firearms and ammunition hidden behind the glove compartment.Defendant and her companion were arrested.

On June 10, 2022, defendant pled no contest to a violation of section 25400, subdivision (a)(1), which prohibits carrying a firearm that is capable of being concealed upon the person within a vehicle that is under the person's control or direction.Defendant's sentencing was put over for six months to allow her to satisfy conditions under which the charge would be reduced to a misdemeanor; if she did not complete those requirements, she would be sentenced to two years of formal probation with conditions.

On June 23, 2022, the Bruen decision was issued, and on December 12, 2022, defendant filed her motion to dismiss which the trial court denied.Plaintiff filed a timely appeal from the trial court's January 25, 2023 judgment.

DISCUSSION

We begin by noting that our discussion is directed to the licensing statutes in effect when defendant was convicted.Since that time, the Legislature has amended the statutes in several ways, including use of the term "shall issue" instead of "may issue," and elimination of "good cause" and "good moral character" requirements.(See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 26150, subds. (a)(1)-(2) &(b), as amended byStats. 2023 ch. 249, § 10, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.)

1.Standing

Respondent contends at some length that defendant does not have standing to challenge California's firearm licensing scheme.We disagree.

An extended discussion of respondent's contention is unnecessary.Respondent fails to describe the applicable principle, and likewise fails to cite any California case post-Bruen that finds a defendant lacks standing to bring a facial challenge to California's firearm statutes.Nor does respondent make any effort to explain why the post-Bruen California cases that find defendants have standing to bring facial challenges are mistaken.

The relevant principle was established in a different context in Smith v. Cahoon(1931)283 U.S. 553(Smith).The high court stated: "[T]he principle is well established that when a statute, valid upon its face, requires the issue of a license or certificate as a condition precedent to carrying on a business or following a vocation, one who is within the terms of the statute, but has failed to make the required application, is not at liberty to complain because of his anticipation of improper or invalid action in administration.[Citations.]This principle, however, is not applicable where a statute is invalid upon its face and an attempt is made to enforce its penalties in violation of constitutional right."(Id. at p. 562.)

Defendant brings only a facial challenge to the statutory scheme under which she was convicted.Under the Smith principle, defendant was not required to apply for a license in order to challenge the statutory scheme on its face.California courts deciding the issue post-Bruen agree.(SeeIn re D.L.(2023)93 Cal.App.5th 144, 156(D.L.)[juvenile defendant who did not apply for a public carry license had standing "because he is challenging the facial constitutionality of a criminal statute under which he has been convicted"];see alsoPeople v. Mosqueda(2023)97 Cal.App.5th 399, 403(Mosqueda)["agree[ing] with our judicial peers" that defendants charged with unlawfully carrying a concealed firearm "had standing to raise the defense by demurrer"];In re T.F.-G.(2023)94 Cal.App.5th 893, 902, 912913 &fn. 16[juvenile defendant charged with carrying a loaded firearm not registered to him had standing to raise a facial challenge to the statute under which he was convicted].)For an extended analysis of the standing issue, seeD.L.,at pages 156-161.

2.The Merits

a.Bruen

Several California cases describe the Bruen decision in detail.(See, e.g., D.L., supra,93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 150-153.)We give an abbreviated description here.

Bruen held "that when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct."(Bruen, supra,597 U.S. at p. 17.)"The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.Only then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's 'unqualified command.'"(Id. at p. 24.)

Applying this standard, Bruen concluded New York's "proper cause" requirement was unconstitutional.(Bruen, supra,597 U.S. at p. 39.)The court found the plain text of the Second Amendment"presumptively guarantees petitioners . . . a right to 'bear' arms in public for self-defense."(Bruen,at p. 33.)After an extensive historical analysis, the court found the government did not meet its burden to identify "an American tradition justifying the State's proper-cause requirement.The Second Amendment guaranteed to 'all Americans' the right to bear commonly used arms in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions."(Id. at p. 70.)"Apart from a few late-19th-century outlier jurisdictions, American governments simply have not broadly prohibited the public carry of commonly used firearms for personal defense," or required "law-abiding, responsible citizens" to demonstrate a special need for selfdefense.(Ibid.)

It was clear from Bruen that California's "analogue[]" to the "proper cause" standard-the "good cause" requirement in former section 26150-is also unconstitutional.(Bruen, supra,597 U.S. at p. 15 &fn. 2.)

b. The statutory framework and severability

California's statutory framework regulating firearms is" 'multifaceted' "; the concealed carry licensing scheme in effect at the time is described in detail in D.L., supra,93 Cal.App.5th at pages 153-155.The Mosqueda case provides a brief summary "Carrying a concealed handgun in public, whether loaded or unloaded, is generally prohibited unless the individual obtains a license.[Citation.]The county sheriff or chief of police 'may issue' a license to carry a concealed handgun upon proof that 'good cause' exists for issuing the license.[Citations, including former § 26150.]The applicant must be fingerprinted and pass a background check and must also prove that he or she is of 'good moral character,' resides or works in the issuing county or city, and has completed a firearm safety course."(Mosqueda, supra,97 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)

While Bruen invalidated the "good cause" requirement, California Courts of Appeal have thus far held the good cause requirement is severable from the remainder of the licensing framework.The principles of severability and their application to the concealed carry licensing scheme are described in detail in D.L., supra,93 Cal.App.5th at pages 162-164.Briefly stated, there is a presumption in favor of severability of an unconstitutional provision of a statute.(Id. at p. 162.)In the absence of language confirming or prohibiting severability, the criteria are whether a provision is grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.(Id. at p. 163.)(Volitional separability refers to whether the Legislature would have adopted the remainder of the statute if it had foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute.(Ibid.))

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