People v. Castro

• Court: New York Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: GERALD SHEINDLIN
• Citation: People v. Castro, 144 Misc.2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989)
• Decision Date: 14 August 1989
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Joseph CASTRO, Defendant.

Page 985

545 N.Y.S.2d 985

144 Misc.2d 956

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Joseph CASTRO, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Bronx County Criminal Term, Part 28.

Aug. 14, 1989.

Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Atty., Bronx County by Risa S. Sugarman and Peter D. Coddington, Asst. Dist. Attys., for people.

Peter J. Neufeld, New York City, and Barry C. Scheck, for defendant.

GERALD SHEINDLIN, Justice:

Upon completion of a hearing that some have referred to as the most comprehensive and extensive legal examination of DNA forensic identification tests held to date in the United States, this court is called upon to rule on the admissibility of the DNA identification tests presented in this case.

The defendant stands accused of two counts of murder in the second degree, it being alleged that on February 5, 1987 he stabbed to death twenty-year old Vilma Ponce, who was seven months pregnant at the time, and her two-year old daughter. A wrist watch worn by the defendant at the time of his arrest was seized. What appeared to be bloodstains on the watch were noted by the detectives. The defendant stated that the blood was his own.

The People, intending to prove at trial that the origin of the bloodstains on defendant's wristwatch was the blood of the adult victim, and not the blood of the defendant seek to introduce evidence of DNA identification tests.

This fascinating and novel issue has been dealt with in criminal proceedings on the trial level in this state (See People v. Wesley, 140 Misc.2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 [Sup.Ct. Albany County 1988]; People v. Lopez, NYLJ, (Jan. 6, 1989) pg. 29 col. 1 [Sup.Ct. Queens County 1988] but as no appellate court in this state has yet ruled on the admissibility of said procedures, this court ordered that a pre-trial hearing be held in accordance with the teachings of Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923) and People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581, 429 N.E.2d 100 (1981) to determine the admissibility of new scientific evidence.

This hearing took place over a twelve week period producing a transcript of approximately five thousand pages. It quickly developed into an intense and technical examination of DNA identification tests as applied to forensics and the methods employed by Lifecodes Corp. in this particular case.

Testifying for the prosecution were: Dr. Richard Roberts, Assistant Director of Cold Springs Harbor Laboratory; author of numerous peer review articles; declared to be an expert in molecular biology; Dr. Pablo Rubinstein, head of the immunogenetics laboratory at the New York Blood Center; author of 160 peer review articles; declared to be an expert in population genetics, genetics and conducting DNA procedures; Dr. Michael Baird, Director of Forensic and Paternity Testing, Lifecodes Corp.; author of 60 peer review articles; declared to be an expert in genetics, molecular biology and population genetics; Dr. Carl Dobkin, research scientist in molecular biology for New York State; Associate Professor, Downstate Medical School; author of numerous peer review articles; declared to be an expert in molecular biology; Alan Giusti, physical scientist for the F.B.I.; author of several peer review articles; declared to be an expert in DNA technology and testing procedures.

Testifying for the defense were: Dr. Conrad Gilliam, Chief of Molecular Genetics Unit, New York State Psychiatric Institute; Assistant Professor of Neurogenetics, College of Physicians and Surgeons at Columbia University; author of numerous peer review articles; declared to be an expert in genetics and molecular genetics; Dr. Lorraine Flaherty, Chief of the Wadsworth Center and Director of the Kidney Disease Institute; author of 80 peer review articles; declared to be an expert in molecular genetics and quality control; Dr. Eric Lander, Associate Professor of Math and Statistics, Harvard University; Whitehead Fellow at Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research at MIT: author of numerous peer review articles on DNA; declared to be an expert in genetics and population genetics; Dr. Phillip Green, Human Geneticist, Washington University School of Medicine; author of 40 peer review articles; declared to be an expert in genetics and population genetics; Dr. Howard Cooke, Scientist with Medical Research Council at University of Edinburgh; discoverer of "Cooke's Probe" (also known as C1 and 29C1); author of numerous peer review articles on DNA; declared to be an expert in Cooke's probe.

The Legal Standard of Admissibility

In determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence, New York follows the rule as originally set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 at 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923). There the court held:

Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. ( People v. Middleton, supra, at 49, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581, 429 N.E.2d 100.)

The Court of Appeals has explained the Frye standard as follows: "the test is not whether a particular procedure is unanimously endorsed by the scientific community, but whether it is generally acceptable as reliable." People v. Middleton, supra 54 N.Y.2d at 49, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581, 429 N.E.2d 100.

Of the few reported cases on the issue of DNA identification, this court is unaware of any case which has held the evidence to be inadmissible under Frye.

In New York, three cases have dealt with this question: People v. Wesley, supra, People v. Lopez, supra, Matter of Baby Girl S., 140 Misc.2d 299, 532 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sur.Ct.N.Y.Co.1988). In Wesley the court dealt exclusively with the issue of the Frye standards, while in Lopez and Baby Girl S. the evidence was deemed admissible. (Baby Girl S. did not pass on the Frye issue, but relied on a statute construed by the Court to permit DNA identification evidence to determine paternity).

Additionally, in other states one appellate court found the evidence admissible under both the relevancy and Frye standards, Andrews v. State, 533 So.2d 841 at 847 n. 6 (Fla.App. 5 Dist.1988), another has noted the introduction of this evidence without passing on the Frye issue, Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578, 556 A.2d 230 (Ct. of Appeals Md.1989). An unreported opinion of the Superior Court of Washington, dated January 18, 1989, has ruled the evidence admissible, State v. Richard Cauthron, no. 88-1-1-012533. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama has observed that at least nine states have admitted DNA evidence at trial, Kennedy v. State, 545 So.2d 214 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). Thus, all the available legal precedents agree that DNA forensic evidence is admissible, and none have held that this evidence fails to pass the Frye standard.

Due to the complex issues in this case, which were examined in such exquisite detail, the court will review the major aspects of the evidence presented. Further, the court has advanced the following three prong analysis to aid in the evaluation and resolution of the issues presented:

Prong I. Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scientific community, which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable results?

Prong II. Are there techniques or experiments that currently exist that are capable of producing reliable results in DNA identification and which are generally accepted in the scientific community?

Prong III. Did the testing laboratory perform the accepted scientific techniques in analyzing the forensic samples in this particular case?

In dealing with DNA identification tests, some courts have considered all three questions as part of the inquiry under Frye. (See People v. Lopez, supra; Andrews v. State, supra at 843; Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Columbia Law Review 1197 at 1201 (1980).

Others, in guarding the province of the trier of the facts, have indicated that the third question goes to the weight of the evidence not the admissibility under Frye. (See People v. Wesley, supra 140 Misc.2d at 317, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643; State v. Richard Cauthron, supra; Giannelli, supra notes 23, 24).

It has been observed that: "Perhaps the most important flaw in the Frye test is that by focusing attention on the general acceptance issue, the test obscures critical problems in the use of a particular technique." Giannelli, supra at 1226.

The compelling logic of this observation leads this court to conclude that a different approach is required in this complex area of DNA identification. The focus of this controversy must be shifted. It must be centered around the resolution of the third prong.

It is the view of this court that given the complexity of the DNA multi-system identification tests and the powerful impact that they may have on a jury, passing muster under Frye alone is insufficient to place this type of evidence before a jury without a preliminary, critical examination of the actual testing procedures performed in a particular case. (See Beeler and Wiebe DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, Washington Law Review Vol. 63: 903, 936-937, notes 172-175 [1988].

Accordingly, the first two prongs of the analysis deal strictly and exclusively with the Frye issue. The third prong is the subject of a pre-trial hearing on the question of the admissibility of the particular evidence presented in this case.

Prong I: The Theory

Is there a theory, which is generally accepted in the scientific community, which supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing can produce reliable results? The evidence in this case clearly establishes...