People v. Caton
| Decision Date | 13 July 1872 |
| Citation | 25 Mich. 388 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | The People v. Samuel L. Caton |
Exceptions fro the Recorder's Court of the city of Detroit.
The testimony of Mr. Elwood, referred to in the opinion, was substantially as follows: I am secretary and treasurer of the Wayne county savings bank; I know the respondent; I saw him in said bank on March 8, 1872, when he applied to borrow two thousand dollars and proposed to secure it by mortgage on real estate; I told him I would make the loan provided the title was satisfactory to our board; he said the property was one hundred and sixty acres, well improved, in Plymouth, and owned by Robert Blackwood; I told him we would require an abstract of title; he furnished me one; I asked what use he was going to make of the money; he said Blackwood owed him and was going to give him a mortgage for the amount; he called again once or twice that day; he took one of the bank's mortgage blanks, and at his request I filled up the mortgage blank with the description of the property, the term of years for which the loan was to be made, and the rate of interest; he also took a blank "application for a loan," and the names of two or three parties in Plymouth whom I wished to put a valuation upon the property; the next day, after the bank had closed, he called again, and I let him in.
The prosecuting attorney then asked the witness as follows:
Q. What happened then?
A. He laid on the table, in front of me, this mortgage, executed as it is now; also this blank application I had given him.
The blanks were all filled out, and it was signed.
Q. The next afternoon he came and brought you these papers?
A. Yes sir; he brought also an answer that I gave him to a party in Plymouth.
Q. What is that party's name?
A. Mr. Taft.
Q. Do you know where that letter is?
A. I handed it to the chief of police at the time of his arrest.
Q. Is that the letter (showing witness a letter)?
A. That is the letter he brought back, purporting to come from Mr. Taft.
Q. To you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Then what passed between you after giving you those papers?
A. I said to him that the bank was closed; it was too late to close up this transaction, and requested him to call in the morning; and he called around next morning.
Q. Did he leave the papers with you?
A. No, sir; he did not leave the mortgage. He left the application, I think and this letter, but the mortgage he took with him.
Witness further gave evidence tending to show that when respondent called next morning he was arrested, and that he, witness, had no further conversation with him, and that no papers were produced by the prisoner at that time.
Dwight May, Attorney-general, for the People.
Wilkinson & Post and Henry M Cheever, for the respondent.
The prisoner was convicted on an information, charging that he "did utter and publish as true, a certain false, forged and counterfeited instrument and writing for the payment of money, in the likeness and similitude of a mortgage" of lands. It is objected that the information charges no offense, a mortgage not being among the instruments mentioned in the statute under which it is drawn.
The statute (Comp. L. § 5803) provides that, "Every person who shall utter and publish as true, any false, forged, altered, or counterfeit record, deed, instrument, or other writing mentioned in the preceding section, knowing the same to be false," etc., shall be punished, etc.
It is not disputed that a mortgage, in the legal sense, is a deed; but it is insisted that in common parlance a distinction is taken between the two instruments; the term, deed, being applied to conveyances of land, which, in this State at least, a mortgage is not. And the argument is, that the word deed has been used in the statute in the sense in which it is commonly used and employed; or, at least, that the rules of strict construction applicable to criminal statutes would require us so to hold.
We are not prepared to yield our assent to this argument. The statute employs a general term which covers instruments given for a great variety of purposes, and it gives no indication of an intent to confine its operation to deeds of lands; much less to that class of deeds of lands which convey the legal title. There is abundant reason to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Weaver
...if it be offered or held out as genuine with the intent to defraud some person or persons. People v. Brigham, 2 Mich. 550; People v. Caton, 25 Mich. 388; Smith State, 20 Neb. 284 (29 N.W. 923, 57 Am. Rep. 832); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 90 Ky. 488 (14 S.W. 492); Rex v. Palmer, Russ. & Ryan, ......
-
Guilty Plea Cases (State Report Title: People v. Nicholson), In re
...not an offense. While a forged instrument is uttered when it is offered as genuine without regard to whether it is accepted (People v. Caton, 25 Mich. 388 (1872)), it does not follow that this crime cannot be attempted. A person intent on committing this crime might, for example, enter a ba......
-
People v. Hester
...a gross fraud, does not help his case.' People v. Brigham, (1853), 2 Mich. 550, 551--552. (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, People v. Caton (1872), 25 Mich. 388; see also, People v. Dombrowski (1968), 10 Mich.App. 445, note 1 at 447, 159 N.W.2d 336. To summarize: We hold that the instrument set ......
-
State v. Weaver
...if it be offered or held out as genuine with the intent to defraud some person or persons. People v. Brigham, 2 Mich. 550;People v. Caton, 25 Mich. 388;Smith v. State, 20 Neb. 284, 29 N. W. 923, 57 Am. Rep. 832;Johnson v. Commonwealth, 90 Ky. 488, 14 S. W. 492; Rex v. Palmer, Russ. & Ryan, ......