People v. Caulley
| Decision Date | 07 December 1992 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 129176 |
| Citation | 197 Mich.App. 177,494 N.W.2d 853 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John Franklin CAULLEY, III, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Thomas L. Casey, Sol. Gen., Richard Thompson, Pros. Atty., Michael J. Modelski, Chief, Appellate Div., and Robert C. Williams, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.
Lizza and Mulcahy, P.C. by David M. Lawson, Detroit, for defendant-appellant on appeal.
Before: SAWYER, P.J., and CONNOR and BEST, * JJ.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of one count each of first-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). On April 12, 1990, defendant received the mandatory sentences of life without possibility of parole, and two years, respectively. Defendant appeals as of right. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Defendant shot and killed his wife at an intersection near the marital residence on September 12, 1988, at approximately 6:50 a.m. Defendant had ridden a bicycle to the intersection at about 6 a.m. and waited for his wife to pass by on her way to work. Defendant attempted to secrete himself behind a tree, but persons in the area could readily see defendant, and one neighbor even recognized him although he had his face covered with a nylon stocking. Defendant was still clad in the same dirty and disheveled shirt and shorts he had been observed wearing every day for about a week preceding the shooting.
After the shooting, defendant rode off on his bike and returned to the marital residence. Apparently the gun was buried, and never found. Other potentially incriminating items were also discarded by defendant, including the nylon stocking and a pair of gloves. Defendant washed his clothing and was preparing to go to work when the police arrived and apprehended him. Kathleen Caulley suffered three gunshot wounds and died fifteen days later as a result of those wounds.
At trial, while defendant did not contest the fact that he shot his wife, he did contend that he was either insane or acting with a diminished capacity and, therefore, unable to form the specific intent necessary for first-degree murder. Central to defendant's case was his mental state and the effect the use of the sleeping medication, Halcion, had on his mental condition at the time of the shooting.
Defendant presented evidence at trial that his mother suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that he was often the object of her abuse while growing up. As problems between defendant and his wife began to escalate about 1987, many of the same themes that caused pain for defendant in his childhood as a result of his mother's behavior began to resurface in conflicts with his wife. The relationship became increasingly abrasive, and defendant's mental instability escalated accordingly. He began to suffer a mood and thought disorder marked by cyclical periods of acting out his emotions. On a periodic basis, defendant would lose contact with reality, and, in general, he suffered a stormy emotional life.
Dr. Kenneth Adams, a psychologist who evaluated defendant for purposes of trial, diagnosed his condition as a schizophrenia-type disorder, which would be consistent with a diagnosis of manic-depression. Defendant's changing behavior around the time of the shooting was thought to be indicative that he was suffering from a mental illness. Dr. Adams also opined that at the time of the shooting defendant was acting in a psychotic fashion and there was a high probability that he had a substantial thought or mood disorder that impaired his judgment or behavior. One event in particular, which occurred on the Saturday before the shooting, suggested to Dr. Adams that defendant was suffering a significant thought disorder. After an argument with his wife in which she told him that he would never be close to his children, defendant said to himself that his wife was a dead woman, rationalizing that her death was justified if it meant avoiding separation from his children. Upon rationalizing his wife's demise, defendant then planned her death. He took a gun from his brother's house without his brother's knowledge and concocted the plan to kill his wife, which included hiding behind a tree near the intersection that she passed on her way to work.
Defendant's other expert witness, Dr. Douglas Sargent, a psychiatrist, opined that at the time of the shooting defendant had reached a point where he was psychotic and could not control his actions by the exercise of either judgment or reason. Dr. Sargent concluded that defendant probably suffered for many years from cyclothymic disorder, and eventually defendant's condition evolved into the more serious bipolar mood disorder, which, in turn, can reach psychotic proportions in cyclical changes. Dr. Sargent testified concerning numerous factors and events that contributed to defendant's mental deterioration, the most significant being the exacerbation of defendant's prior mental illness by his ingestion of Halcion at a rate of three to five tablets a day for about a week before the shooting.
Before the shooting, defendant was being treated for depression and also for a stress reaction condition that caused him to pull his hair out. He was being treated with the antidepressant, Elavil, and a tranquilizer, Xanax. Defendant did not appear to respond to this course of treatment, and his problems escalated dramatically with hospitalizations and suicide attempts during the summer of 1988. Defendant's inability to cope with the stresses in his life suggested the need for psychiatric intervention. However, in August 1988, defendant's treating psychiatrist notified him that he no longer could treat defendant, because he believed defendant was not cooperating with the recommended course of treatment. Defendant attempted to engage another professional for treatment, but was unable to make an appointment until September 12, 1988, the date of the shooting.
During one of his hospitalizations, defendant had severe insomnia, which is a common symptom of the manic phase of manic-depression. He was prescribed Halcion, a sleeping aid, in a dosage of 0.25 milligrams to be taken at bedtime. When defendant left the hospital, he was given a prescription for Halcion and also a prescription for one refill. The first prescription was apparently filled and used, because the prescription was refilled on September 7, 1988, for thirty tablets.
Immediately preceding the shooting, defendant was no longer taking his other prescription medications, Xanax and Tegretol, which caused a rebound insomnia and intensified his sleep disturbance. Dr. Sargent opined that defendant was desperate for sleep at this time. According to statements made by defendant, he thought he was taking three to five Halcion tablets a day, although the prescription designated daily dosages of one or two tablets. One of the side effects of Halcion is that it causes memory loss, consequently defendant was not sure about the dosage level when recounting the events to Dr. Sargent. At trial, however, defendant presented the testimony of his father, who, after the shooting, had found the vial of Halcion that had been filled on September 7, 1988, with only a few tablets in it. Dr. Sargent used this testimony to calculate that in the week preceding the shooting, defendant was taking about three to five tablets a day of Halcion, an amount considered to be toxic.
Dr. Sargent testified that studies in this country, as well as in Holland and the United Kingdom, have linked the use of Halcion to psychotic behavior. The doctor explained that Halcion acts as a releasing agent in the mentally ill by facilitating the emergence of impulses that are ordinarily held in control, resulting in disorganized behavior for those taking the medication in far smaller doses than defendant was ingesting before the shooting.
It was Dr. Sargent's opinion that defendant's mental condition fluctuated, depending upon how much support he had. When in the hospital, under medication, and away from the stress in his life, his condition improved. When he was discharged and returned to the environment that caused his stress, his mental stability diminished. Dr. Sargent's opinion was that defendant was psychotic at the time of the shooting. He cited the crime itself as a major symptom of the mental disorder. Defendant's involvement was meant to be hidden, but a child could have done a better job, and, in his deranged and irrational state, he thought the shooting was a reasonable way to prevent his wife from separating him from his children. His actions indicated a gross distortion of reason or reasoning power, and, after the shooting, he thought it was merely a dream and had not really happened. Later, Dr. Sargent thought that the psychotic behavior had disappeared after defendant received some treatment.
The prosecution, in rebuttal, presented expert testimony that defendant merely had a character or personality disorder that did not rise to the level of a thought or mood disorder that would prevent defendant from controlling his actions. In addition, the prosecution also contended that defendant's use of Halcion was voluntary, not unlike the use of alcohol or cocaine.
Defendant's initial issue on appeal concerns the trial court's refusal to read supplemental jury instructions requested by defendant concerning the effects of Halcion and a modified instruction on diminished capacity. In addition, defendant claims error with regard to the court's instructions on both first-degree and second-degree murder.
In reviewing issues related to jury instructions, this Court reviews the instructions in their entirety to determine if error requiring...
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TABLE OF CASES
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