People v. Cawley

• Decision Date: 05 November 1979
• Docket Number: Nos. 78-421,78-480 and 78-481,s. 78-421
• Citation: 33 Ill.Dec. 338,396 N.E.2d 865,77 Ill.App.3d 780
• Parties: , 33 Ill.Dec. 338 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvoil CAWLEY and David Wilson, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 865

396 N.E.2d 865

77 Ill.App.3d 780, 33 Ill.Dec. 338

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alvoil CAWLEY and David Wilson, Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 78-421, 78-480 and 78-481.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

Nov. 5, 1979.

Goldstein, Aiossa & Good, Frederick N. Aiossa and Douglas K. Morrison, Chicago, for defendants-appellants.

J. Michael Fitzsimmons, State's Atty., Robert L. Thompson, Asst. State's Atty., Wheaton, for plaintiff-appellee.

GUILD, Presiding Justice:

After a jury trial, defendants David Wilson and Alvoil Cawley were convicted of murder (Ill.Rev. Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(2)). Defendant Wilson was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 30-100 years and defendant Cawley to a term of 20-100 years. Both defendants appeal.

On the evening of December 9, 1977 defendant Wilson shot and killed one James Duncan. Sheila Johnson, defendant Cawley's girlfriend, testified at trial that Wilson and Cawley had followed Duncan in Wilson's car after discussing a robbery of Duncan. They eventually caused Duncan's car to stop by bumping his car with their own. Wilson then entered Duncan's car, which moved on and then stopped. After the car stopped, Miss Johnson saw Duncan fall out of his car and Wilson return to his own car holding a gun in his right hand.

Wilson's testimony was contrary to Miss Johnson's on a number of points. Most importantly, he testified that he had never intended to rob Duncan and that he and Cawley had not discussed robbing anyone. He claimed that he had arranged to buy a pound of marijuana from a friend of Duncan's named Russ and that when Russ took Wilson's money but did not return with the marijuana as promised, an altercation broke out between Duncan and himself. According to Wilson, Duncan pulled out a gun and, during the resulting struggle, Wilson pulled his own gun and shot Duncan.

Defendant Cawley did not testify at the trial.

Defendants were arrested and a complaint was filed, charging them with murder, on December 10, 1977. On December 16, 1977 they were brought before the court for the first time and demanded that a preliminary hearing be held. The preliminary hearing was scheduled for December 29, 1977 but on that date an indictment against the defendants was returned charging each defendant with two counts of murder and with one count of attempted armed robbery. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 8-4(a).) One of the murder counts against each defendant was based on Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, chapter 38, section 9-1(a)(2) which relates to one who acts with the knowledge "that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." This subsection, (2), is a fairly traditional murder statute. The other murder count against each defendant was based on Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, chapter 38, section 9-1(a)(3), which relates to the killing of someone while "attempting or committing a forcible felony other than voluntary manslaughter." Thus subsection, (3), is what is commonly known as a felony murder statute. Over defendants' objection, a preliminary hearing was never held and the case went to trial on the indictments. Both defendants were convicted of subsection (2) murder but acquitted of subsection (3) felony murder. They were also acquitted of the attempted armed robbery charge.

Defendants contend: (1) that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict either of them of murder pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, chapter 38, section 9-1(a)(2); (2) that defendant Cawley was not legally accountable for the shooting actually done by defendant Wilson; (3) that they were denied due process by the failure to hold a preliminary hearing; and (4) that the sentences imposed were excessive. We disagree and affirm the convictions.

Defendants' first contention, that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient, is based on the argument that the acquittal of each defendant of the felony murder count and of the attempted armed robbery count somehow undercuts his conviction of the other murder count. The crux of this argument is that, since the jury found the defendants not guilty of both felony murder and of the attempted armed robbery, evidence which the State presented in an attempt to prove the felony murder and the attempted armed robbery cannot be considered by our court in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the verdicts in the count of murder for which the defendants stand convicted. This contention is utterly without merit.

It is well established in Illinois that verdicts need not be logically consistent so long as they are not legally inconsistent and that " 'In law there is no inconsistency in verdicts of acquittal and conviction upon charges of crimes composed of different elements but arising out of the same state of facts.' " (People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill.2d 348, 362, 263 N.E.2d 840, 849.) More recently, our Supreme Court in People v. Dawson (1975), 60 Ill.2d 278, 280-81, 326 N.E.2d 755, 757, cited with approval the following from United States v. Carbone (2nd Cir. 1967), 378 F.2d 420, 422:

"The very fact that the jury may have acquitted of one or more counts in a multicount indictment because of a belief that the counts on which it was convicted will provide sufficient punishment (citation) forbids allowing the acquittal to upset or even to affect the simultaneous conviction. We have repeatedly so held, (citations). Indeed, if the rule were otherwise, the Government would be entitled to have the jury warned that an acquittal on some counts might undermine a guilty verdict on others almost the opposite of the standard instruction * * * ."

It is not clear whether Dawson signals the adoption of a new Illinois rule that even legal inconsistencies between verdicts would have no effect. (See, People v. Mullinax (1979) 67 Ill.App.3d 936, 24 Ill.Dec. 214, 384 N.E.2d 1372 (citing the distinction between legal and logical inconsistencies described in Hairston ), and People v. Jayne (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 990, 10 Ill.Dec. 827, 368 N.E.2d 422 (holding that Dawson establishes a new rule.)) For the purposes of the case before us, however, it is irrelevant as to whether Dawson represents a new rule; the inconsistency upon which defendants rely is, at most, merely a logical inconsistency and therefore cannot affect the guilty verdict under either Hairston or Dawson.

Defendants also attack the credibility of the witness Johnson, claiming that "her story does not hold up" and that "her testimony was clearly the result of the pressure placed upon her by the police and the assistant state's attorney who investigated the case." This attack on the credibility of Miss Johnson's story should be, and was, made to the jury rather than to a court of review. The jury was apprised of the facts surrounding Miss Johnson's questioning, heard both Miss Johnson and Wilson testify, heard the other evidence and convicted the defendants. It is the jury's appraisal of the credibility of Miss Johnson's story, not defense counsel's appraisal, that must be given weight and we see no justification for second-guessing the jury's actions herein.

Defendant Cawley argues that the State...