People v. Chamblis

• Decision Date: 18 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 56978,56978
• Citation: 236 N.W.2d 473,395 Mich. 408
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Trent L. CHAMBLIS, Defendant-Appellee. 395 Mich. 408, 236 N.W.2d 473
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 473

236 N.W.2d 473

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Trent L. CHAMBLIS, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 56978.

395 Mich. 408, 236 N.W.2d 473

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Dec. 18, 1975.

Robert A. Reuther, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff-appellant.

Charles T. Burke, Livonia, Mich., for defendant-appellee.

T. G. KAVANAGH, Chief Justice.

The application by plaintiff-appellant for leave to appeal is considered and, in lieu of appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), this Court hereby reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstates defendant's conviction of the crime of larceny from the person.

Defendant was charged with armed robbery ¹ and had a jury trial before Recorder's Court Judge Joseph A. Gillis. Over defense counsel's objection, the jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of unarmed robbery ² and larceny from the person. ³ The jury found defendant guilty of the larceny offense and a sentence of from 1 to 10 years imprisonment was imposed. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that there was no evidence produced to establish the crime for which defendant was convicted, and that the jury should have returned a verdict of either guilty or not guilty of armed robbery. ⁴

The complaining witness testified that during the afternoon of October 24, 1973 he and the defendant had an argument over some 'paraphernalia' that had been brought into complainant's house. Later that evening he saw defendant and two other men approaching his house. Fearful of what they were going to do, he called the police. The men went around to the back of the house and, although the victim tried to hold the door shut, the trio broke it down and forced their way in. Defendant came through the doorway second. The first man through said something to complainant and then struck him across the head with a pistol, knocking him unconscious. The complainant said that when he regained consciousness, he saw the first man counting money in his hand. After complainant ran into the living room, the first individual gave defendant the gun and picked up a cane that was in the room and struck complainant with it. The police then arrived, saw the defendant passing money to the first man, and arrested the men upon the victim's representations that he had just been robbed of some $180 that had been in his pocket.

Defendant took the stand and testified that during the afternoon argument the complainant had hit him with the cane. When defendant told his older brother about the incident, his brother became furious and insisted, over defendant's objection, on going over to the complainant's house. Defendant maintained that he did not want to go, that he did not know his brother had a pistol, and that he did not intend nor expect that anyone would be robbed. He testified that he was still at the front of the house when the other two broke into the back. Defendant did say that he was the one who hit the complainant with the cane and explained his possession of the money by saying that the complainant voluntarily gave it to him.

I.

Defense counsel's objection to the giving of the instruction on lesser included offenses is not controlling. It is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case. M.C.L.A. § 768.29, M.S.A. § 28.1052. Neither the defense nor the prosecution has the option of precluding the court from carrying out this duty in hopes of forcing an 'all or nothing' verdict.

In Hanna v. People, 19 Mich. 316 (1869), defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit murder. Defense counsel requested the trial court to charge the jury: 'That if they should find the said respondent not guilty of the offense charged in said information, they must acquit him.' The court refused this request. The prosecutor requested an instruction on the lesser offense of assault and battery, and the judge so charged. The jury found defendant 'not guilty of assault with intent to kill * * * but guilty of assault and battery.'

This Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute allowing conviction for lesser included offenses (now M.C.L.A. § 768.32, M.S.A. § 28.1055) 'must * * * be construed as extending to all cases in which the statute has substantially, or in effect, recognized and provided for the punishment of offenses of different grades, or degrees of enormity, wherever the charge for the higher grade includes a charge for the less.' Id. at 322.

In People v. Milhem, 350 Mich. 497, 87 N.W.2d 151 (1957), defendant was charged with first degree murder. At trial, testimony was presented which could have substantiated a verdict of guilty on that charge. The trial judge also instructed the jury on second degree murder and manslaughter, as well as justifiable and excusable homicide. Defense counsel took exception to the charge on manslaughter, claiming that no competent testimony upon which a verdict of guilty of manslaughter could be based had been presented. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter, and this Court affirmed after determining that such a verdict was supported by the evidence.

In People v. Phillips, 385 Mich. 30, 36--37, 187 N.W.2d 211, 214 (1971), no requests to charge on lesser offenses were made by defendants Phillips and Lengyel. Defendant Lee did make such a request. Nonetheless, the trial judge instructed as to all three defendants on the lesser included offenses. This Court held:

'This was not error. Where no request to charge has been made but there is evidence during the trial which would support a conviction of a lesser offense, the trial judge may, Sua sponte, instruct on the lesser offense. People v. Milhem * * *. Even though the evidence for the people, if believed, shows the defendant to be guilty of the offense charged, this does not preclude a conviction of a lesser offense. People v. Blanchard (1904), 136 Mich. 146, 98 N.W. 983 * * *.'

We adopt the view expressed by the California Supreme Court in People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal.3d 524, 533, 83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 170, 463 P.2d 390, 394 (1970):

'The requirement of instructions on lesser included offenses is based on the elementary principle that the court should instruct the jury on every material question. * * * The state has no interest in a defendant obtaining an acquittal where he is innocent of the primary offense charged but guilty of a necessarily included offense. Nor has the state any legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of the offense charged where the jury entertains a reasonable doubt of guilt of the charged offense but returns a verdict of guilty of that offense solely because the jury is unwilling to acquit where it is satisfied that the defendant has been guilty of wrongful conduct constituting a necessarily included offense. Likewise, a defendant has no legitimate interest in compelling the jury to adopt an all or nothing approach to the issue of guilt. Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth.'

We do not say here that a trial judge Must instruct Sua sponte on a lesser included offense, ⁵ but simply that he May do so if the evidence adduced at trial would warrant conviction of the lesser charge and defendant has been afforded fair notice of those lesser included offenses. ⁶

There are, of course, no 'fair notice' problems presented in a case such as this, where the lesser offense is one 'necessarily included' within the greater. People v. Jones, Mich., 236 N.W.2d 461 (1975).

Every defendant charged with armed robbery must necessarily be prepared to defend against the included charges of unarmed robbery and larceny from the person.

We can perceive of situations, however, where instructions on lesser included offenses categorized as 'cognate' might violate a defendant's right to be adequately apprised of the charges against which he must defend.

'As a caveat, we note that in a situation where the lesser included offense statute under which a defendant was convicted is relatively remote textually from the greater offense statute under which he was charged or where the logical connection between the statutes is not so obvious or well established, we might well hold that the lesser included offense conviction could not stand for want of proper notice in the indictment. In such a situation, our holding would depend on the precise record of the case and the terms of the specific statutes involved.' United States v. Brewster, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 14, fn. 32, 506 F.2d 62, 75, fn. 32 (1974).

To assure defendant's due-process rights to fair notice, the trial judge may not instruct on lesser included offenses over defendant's objection unless the language of the charging document 'be such as to give to defendant notice that he could at the same time face the lesser included offense charge.' United States v. Whitaker, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 350, 447 F.2d 314, 320 (1971). ⁷

We in no way preclude or limit the Defendant from requesting an instruction on a cognate lesser included offense justified by the evidence adduced at trial, even where the specific language of the charging document does not mention each fact required to convict of the lesser offense.

'The defense ought not to be restricted by the stringent constitutional limits upon the prosecutor's right. If the proof at trial would support a finding of guilt on a lesser included offense * * *, doubt as to whether the prosecutor could rightfully have requested such a charge should not bar the charge being given at the request of the defense. This gives no unfair option to the defense over the prosecution. In most cases the prosecution can foresee whether the proof is likely to develop strongly favoring a verdict on a lesser included offense, in which event the indictment should so charge, which is the prosecutor's option.' United States v. Whitaker, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 351, 447 F.2d 314, 321 (1971).

II

When does the 'evidence adduced at trial' warrant conviction of the...