People v. Chapman, Docket No. 75751

• Decision Date: 06 June 1986
• Docket Number: Docket No. 75751
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Weyman David CHAPMAN, Defendant-Appellee. 425 Mich. 245, 387 N.W.2d 835, 55 U.S.L.W. 2038
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 835

387 N.W.2d 835

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Weyman David CHAPMAN, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 75751.

425 Mich. 245, 387 N.W.2d 835, 55 U.S.L.W. 2038

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 14, 1986.

Decided June 6, 1986.

John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Wayne Co., Timothy A. Baughman, Deputy Chief, Civil and Appeals, Andrea L. Solak, Principal Atty., Appeals, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.

Mark R. Hall, Detroit, for defendant-appellee.

RILEY, Justice.

Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a controlled substance. M.C.L. Sec. 333.7403(2)(b); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7403)(2)(b). Evidence of the controlled substances was suppressed in district court, and the charges were dismissed. The Recorder's Court of Detroit upheld the ruling, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted the prosecution's application for leave to appeal to consider whether the interim bail provisions of the release of misdemeanor prisoners act, 1961 P.A. 44, M.C.L. Sec. 780.581 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 28.872(1) et seq., statutorily circumscribe the otherwise constitutionally permissible scope of searches and seizures without warrants "incident to a lawful arrest" to a limited pat-down search or "protective frisk" (less than a full search), thereby affording greater individual rights against search and seizure than both the Fourth Amendment and the Michigan Constitution's search and seizure provision. ¹ We hold that the release of misdemeanor prisoners act does not limit the permissible scope of searches incident to a full custodial arrest, and, therefore, reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I

Defendant's vehicle was stopped for an equipment violation (a cracked windshield). A check disclosed that defendant was wanted on an outstanding traffic warrant and that his license had been suspended. The officer placed defendant under arrest and proceeded to conduct a pat-down search. During the search a vial was discovered on the left waistband hip area of defendant's trousers. The officer seized the vial which turned out to be a nontransparent brown pill bottle with a white cap, and was labeled with defendant's name and a prescription for "hydroton." The officer opened the vial and discovered that it contained controlled substances. ²

At the preliminary examination the defense objected to the prosecution's motion to bind the defendant over for trial on the charges and moved for dismissal, arguing that the controlled substances were discovered as a result of an illegal search. Citing People v. Dixon, 392 Mich. 691, 222 N.W.2d 749 (1974), the defense argued that the search violated defendant's right to post bond, and that the police are limited to a pat-down search for offensive weapons during an arrest for a misdemeanor until the arrested person is provided an opportunity to post bail under the interim bail statute, M.C.L. Sec. 780.581; M.S.A. Sec. 28.872(1). Alternatively, the defense argued that no exigent circumstances existed to justify the search of the vial without a warrant, and that the officer lacked probable cause to search.

The district court ruled the search of the vial illegal on the ground that the officer lacked probable cause to search, that he would have had an opportunity to obtain a search warrant, and that there were no exigent circumstances to warrant the search. Evidence of the controlled substances was suppressed, and the charges were dismissed.

The district court ruling was affirmed on appeal in the Recorder's Court. Although it is unclear whether the district court ruling was based on federal constitutional law, state constitutional or statutory law, or a combination thereof, the Recorder's Court, in affirming the ruling, expressly limited its decision to Michigan law:

"[A]ccording to Michigan law there was no probable cause or exigent circumstances which gave the officer a reason to open the vial and examine its contents."

After the Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal, this Court remanded the case for consideration as on leave granted. 419 Mich. 891, 349 N.W.2d 512 (1984). In the Court of Appeals, the prosecution argued that the Recorder's Court erred by substituting a state basis for holding the search illegal in order to avoid the force of federal law which permits a full-blown search incident to an arrest and does not require an independent probable cause to search or a showing of exigency. ³ The prosecution argued, furthermore, that People v. Dixon, supra, is not applicable in the instant case because the search which was found to have violated Michigan's interim bail statute in Dixon was an inventory search conducted at the police station at a time when the defendant was entitled to release under the statute, rather than being incarcerated. ⁴

The Court of Appeals rejected the prosecution's arguments and affirmed the decisions of the trial courts, holding that the evidence was properly suppressed because it was discovered in violation of the defendant's statutory rights under the interim bail statute, M.C.L. Sec. 780.581; M.S.A. Sec. 28.872(1). People v. Chapman, 142 Mich.App. 179, 182, 369 N.W.2d 204 (1984). ⁵

II

The parties seem to agree that the search which revealed the controlled substances in the present case was not violative of the search and seizure provisions of either the Fourth Amendment or the Michigan Constitution. ⁶

It is axiomatic that the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures protects people and not things; it is the individual's right to liberty and privacy that is protected. The exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment for searches conducted incident to a lawful custodial arrest, was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). ⁷ The Court, in Robinson, explained that "[i]t is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search," and held that "in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment." Id., 235, 94 S.Ct. 477. The Court reasoned that because the lawful arrest "is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment, ... a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification." Id. The Court emphasized that although "the authority to search [in such situations is] based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, [it] does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect." Id.

In Robinson, the Court held that the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest extends to containers found within the "control area" of the arrestee. See also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 456 (1973). ⁸ In the instant case, no additional probable cause, or exigent circumstance, was necessary to justify the search of the vial.

The search and seizure provision of the Michigan Constitution, Const. 1963, art. 1, Sec. 11, affords defendant no greater rights upon which to support the suppression than the Fourth Amendment. Michigan's search and seizure provision includes an antiexclusionary proviso which precludes suppressing certain classifications of evidence, enumerated in the proviso. ⁹ Michigan, of course, is bound by the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal exclusionary rule mandated by it. ¹⁰ This Court has held, therefore, that art. 1, Sec. 11 may not be interpreted as affording broader protection than the Fourth Amendment, at least inasmuch as the remedy sought is exclusion of evidence enumerated in the proviso. People v. Nash, 418 Mich. 196, 341 N.W.2d 439 (1983); People v. Moore, 391 Mich. 426, 216 N.W.2d 770 (1974). The Michigan Constitution, therefore, does not afford an additional basis upon which to support the suppression in the instant case.

Thus, the only remaining issue would seem to be whether the interim bail statute prohibited the search in question and required suppression of the evidence. Yet, both the prosecution and defendant have sought to focus their arguments, and our attention, on a number of other issues. While these issues are not dispositive, we are persuaded that the reason for their presence is noteworthy, and, therefore, warrants some mention.

In its written opinion affirming the district court's ruling, the Recorder's Court expressed its disapproval of the United States Supreme Court's decisions concerning the Fourth Amendment. The court suggested that greater protection may be afforded under the search and seizure provision of the Michigan Constitution, and expressed its opinion concerning the need to do so. Quoting Const., 1963, art. 1, Sec. 11 (but omitting the antiexclusionary proviso), the court stated that "state courts have the duty to halt the steady erosion" by "the present membership of the United States Supreme Court" of the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Recorder's Court opinion, p. 2, quoting People v. Smith, 118 Mich.App. 366, 377, 325 N.W.2d 429 (1982) (Maher, J., concurring).

The court then embarked on an analysis of the independent state grounds doctrine concerning the scope of federal appellate jurisdiction, citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), and its applicability in the present case. The court did not refer to the interim bail statute (although it did cite Dixon, during its discussion of federal jurisdiction); nor did it state, with any degree of specificity, which independent state ground justified the district court's ruling.

In the...