People v. Chatman

• Decision Date: 30 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 1–15–2395.,1–15–2395.
• Citation: 66 N.E.3d 415,408 Ill.Dec. 623
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Carl CHATMAN, Defendant–Appellee (Susan Riggio, Petitioner–Appellant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

66 N.E.3d 415

408 Ill.Dec. 623

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Carl CHATMAN, Defendant–Appellee (Susan Riggio, Petitioner–Appellant).

No. 1–15–2395.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

Sept. 30, 2016.

Jeremiah P. Connolly, Rachel D. Kiley, Daria A. Porta, and James M. Gale, all of Bollinger Connolly Krause LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and Paul Castiglione, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Debra Loevy–Reyes, Russell Ainsworth, and Elizabeth Wang, all of Loevy & Loevy, of Chicago, for appellee Carl Chatman.

OPINION

Presiding Justice GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This appeal raises a purely legal question: does the complainant in a criminal case have standing to bring a petition, pursuant to section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2014) ),¹ for the purpose of challenging a court's prior grant of a certificate of innocence to a criminal defendant?

¶ 2 In the case at bar, petitioner Susan Riggio filed a section 2–1401 petition on December 29, 2014, seeking to vacate a trial court's order, entered on November 19, 2013. The order granted a certificate of innocence to defendant Carl Chatman, who was petitioner's alleged assailant. On July 20, 2015, the trial court granted the State and defendant's motions to dismiss her petition for lack of standing, and she appealed.

¶ 3 Petitioner argues that she has standing pursuant to the Illinois Constitution and various Illinois statutes² which provide rights to crime victims. However, as we explain below, she does not satisfy the definition of the term "[c]rime victim," provided by our legislature and quoted in her brief. Pub. Act 99–413 (eff. Aug. 20, 2015) (amending 725 ILCS 120/3(a) (West 2014)). In addition, as the State observes, the legislature has authorized only the State's Attorney and the Attorney General to intervene in the civil proceeding for a certificate of innocence. 735 ILCS 5/2–702(e) (West 2012) (expressly providing only the Attorney General and the State's Attorney with "the right to intervene as parties").

¶ 4 We are mindful that our decision today might not leave petitioner with a level playing field in a contemporaneous federal civil action, which was filed by defendant against petitioner and various state entities and officials for damages in connection with his prior conviction and incarceration. At oral argument on this matter, defendant's attorney forthrightly admitted that defendant is seeking to admit his Illinois certificate of innocence as evidence of his innocence, and therefore evidence of petitioner's alleged lies, in that federal action. However, pure speculation about what may or may not be admitted in a federal action does not change the laws governing standing in a state court. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 5 BACKGROUND

¶ 6 Petitioner appeals, stating that this appeal presents a pure question of law, and we agree. Thus, we present here only the few procedural facts needed to understand the legal question at hand.

¶ 7 In September 2013, the State moved to vacate defendant's 2004 rape conviction and sentence in People v. Chatman, No. 02 CR 14572 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.), a case in which petitioner had been the complainant. In its motion, the State asked "that the matter be reinstated and redocketed," so that it could "move to vacate the conviction and sentence and move to nolle pros the conviction" and "request that the defendant, Carl Chatman, be released immediately from the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections."

¶ 8 Petitioner concedes that she received prior notice of the State's decision to move to vacate defendant's conviction and sentence.³ Although the State's attorney had a duty to notify her by first-class mail,⁴ and petitioner was notified by telephone instead, petitioner does not challenge the method of notice here.

¶ 9 On September 10, 2013, the trial court issued a written order granting the State's motion, which stated in full:

"It is Hereby Ordered that pursuant to the State's motion to reinstate the matter, the conviction and sentence in the above-captioned matter are vacated and it is further ordered that Carl Chatman, Inmate Number * * *, be released immediately from the Illinois Department of Corrections."

The appellate record does not contain a transcript or bystander's report for these proceedings, and petitioner does not seek to challenge the order vacating defendant's conviction and releasing defendant.⁵

¶ 10 On October 25, 2013, defendant moved pursuant to section 2–702 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2–702 (West 2012) ) for a certificate of innocence. The State did not oppose it and, on November 19, 2013, the trial court granted it. It is this order that petitioner seeks to challenge in her section 2–1401 petition. She claims that she was not notified of defendant's motion, and neither defendant nor the State claims that she was.

¶ 11 On December 29, 2014, petitioner filed her section 2–1401 petition seeking to vacate the certificate of innocence granted to defendant 14 months earlier. The caption of her petition stated: " "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff, v. Carl Chatman, Defendant. No. 02 CR 14572." Attached as an exhibit to the petition was a complaint filed on April 24, 2014, by defendant against the City of Chicago and 21 other named entities and individuals, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).⁶ The last of the 21 named entities and individuals was petitioner. The complaint alleged that defendant spent 11 years in prison for a crime he did not commit. In addition to the section 1983 claims, the complaint also included state law claims for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy and defamation. The defamation count specifically named petitioner.

¶ 12 On March 4, 2015, the State filed a response to the section 2–1401 petition in which it observed that defendant had already filed a "motion to strike" the section 2–1401 petition on the ground that petitioner lacked the standing to bring it, and the State adopted and joined defendant's motion.⁷ However, defendant's motion is not in the appellate record.⁸ It is this missing motion which is the subject of this appeal.⁹

¶ 13 On July 20, 2015, the trial court granted the State's and defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner lacked standing. The trial court found that "[n]o notice of the petition for the certificate of innocence was given to [petitioner]," but concluded that petitioner was not entitled to notice. Petitioner had argued that she was entitled to notice pursuant to both the Illinois Constitution and various statutes¹⁰ which provide rights to crime victims. In response, the trial court observed in its written order:

"First, how is it established that one is, or is not, a ‘victim’?¹¹ Obviously, Riggio claims that she is and always has been. Curiously, the State once believed and alleged that Riggio was, and now they claim that she is not, or at least that she may not be, as evidenced by their motion to vacate Chatman's conviction, and seek his immediate release. Chatman presumably has always believed that she was not.

Thus, whether [she is] afford[ed] standing in connection with this proceeding would presumably require some type of hearing to determine whether she is a ‘victim.’ That, however, is putting the cart before the horse, if she is then determined to be a ‘victim,’ then Chatman would resultantly be determined to be guilty of having victimized her, and thus not entitled to a certificate of innocence. Standing would thus be conferrable only to those who can ‘prove’ (in some manner not set out by the Constitution or any statute) that they are entitled to the relief they seek.

This is circuitous. The concept of standing relates to the ability to make a claim. Standing is not synonymous with having a successful claim; it is having the ability conferred by our Constitution and the laws of this State to make the claim, whether or not it is thereafter succeeded upon."

¶ 14 The trial court then observed that the law "affords no relief for any claimed violation" of its provisions for crime victims, and that this was "consistent with the well-established precepts regarding responsibility of the maintenance of criminal prosecutions in this State" by the State's Attorney or the Attorney General, but not by individual members of the public. The trial court concluded that petitioner was without standing to maintain her section 2–1401 action.¹²

¶ 15 Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on August 17, 2015, stating: "This is an appeal from an order granting the motions of [defendant] Carl Chatman and the Cook County State's Attorney's Office to dismiss Susan Riggio's petition pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2–1401, holding that appellant, Susan Riggio, does not have standing to challenge the Court's grant of a Certificate of Innocence to Carl Chatman pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2–702 et seq. " This appeal followed.

¶ 16 ANALYSIS

¶ 17 In the case at bar, petitioner filed a section 2–1401 petition seeking to vacate a trial court's prior order, which had granted a certificate of innocence to petitioner's alleged assailant in a criminal case. The trial court granted the State and defendant's motion to dismiss her petition for lack of standing and, for the following reasons, we affirm.

¶ 18 I. Section 2–1401

¶ 19 Petitioner filed her petition pursuant to section 2–1401. 735 ILCS 5/2–1401 (West 2014).

¶ 20 " Section 2–1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure [citation] establishes a comprehensive procedure by which final orders and judgment may be vacated or modified more than 30 days after their entry." Paul v. Gerald Adelman & Associates, Ltd., 223 Ill.2d 85, 94, 306 Ill.Dec. 556, 858 N.E.2d 1 (2006). It provides, in relevant part, that: "Relief from * * * orders and judgments, after 30 days from the entry...