People v. Chatman

• Decision Date: 09 July 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 4-17-0220,4-17-0220
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES J. CHATMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2019 IL App (4th) 170220-U

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES J. CHATMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-17-0220

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

July 9, 2019

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Macon County

No. 13CF345

Honorable James R. Coryell, Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Holder White and Justice Steigmann concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was (1) not barred under the doctrine of invited error and (2) better suited for a collateral proceeding where a record could be adequately developed.

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, the Macon County circuit court found defendant, James J. Chatman, guilty of first degree murder and possession of a weapon by a felon. Defendant appeals, arguing his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by proceeding to trial without first investigating all possible exculpatory evidence. We decline to address defendant's claim as any decision would be advisory based on the record presented. Because defendant has not identified any other claim of error for this court to review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 A. Charges

¶ 5 In March 2013, the State charged defendant with three counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2012); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2012)) for the unlawful killing of James Nathaniel Johnson and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2012)).

¶ 6 B. Prior Counsel

¶ 7 Between March 2013 and December 2015, defendant was represented by at least five different attorneys. One attorney retired, while the others withdrew due to conflicts. For a short period, defendant proceeded pro se. We note between May 2013 and August 2015, defendant sent several pro se letters, pleadings, and motions to either the trial court or the circuit clerk expressing his dissatisfaction with how long he had been in the county jail, his concern with a possible violation of his speedy-trial rights, and his desire that no continuances be granted.

¶ 8 C. Trial Counsel

¶ 9 In December 2015, the trial court appointed Daniel Hassinger to represent defendant. Hassinger represented defendant throughout the remainder of the proceedings below.

¶ 10 D. Motion for Gunshot Residue Testing

¶ 11 In February 2016, defendant, through counsel, filed a motion for gunshot residue testing. The motion alleged Johnson fired a handgun at defendant during the occurrence in which Johnson was fatally wounded and asserted it was "essential" to the defense that various items connected to Johnson be tested for gunshot residue. Specifically, the motion sought testing of (1) items being worn by Johnson on the night he died, including a sweatshirt, long-sleeved T-shirt, T-shirt, sweatpants, pajama pants, boxers, shoes, and socks; (2) nail clippings collectedduring Johnson's autopsy; and (3) brown paper bags placed around Johnson's hands prior to his autopsy.

¶ 12 E. Agreed Order for Gunshot Residue Testing

¶ 13 On April 14, 2016, the trial court entered an agreed order granting defendant's motion for gunshot residue testing.

¶ 14 F. June 2016 Hearing

¶ 15 At a June 2016 hearing, defense counsel appeared without defendant. Counsel informed the trial court and the State:

"[Defendant] informed me last night that he would now like me to withdraw a pretrial motion that we filed recently to have the Illinois State Police test certain evidence collected at the crime scene some three years ago now tested for the presence of gunshot residue. My client was on the record with the understanding these tests take some time, and his case would be continued for pretrial and the time would be charged against him. He has now informed me that due to my recent announcement of running for [state's attorney], he would like to withdraw this prior motion to have said evidence tested and would like to have a sooner trial date."

Without addressing counsel's statement, the court set the matter for further hearing.

¶ 16 Shortly after the hearing, defendant sent to the trial court a pro se motion to set a trial date. In the motion, defendant wrote:

"Now [c]omes [t]he [d]efendant James Chatman and makethe courts aware of that [I am] ready for trial. I am also aware of the motion[]s that [I] have on file and I [am] also aware retesting of the clothes with [Illinois State Police] could take some time. So with that being said I [am] willing to go forward and ask the courts to give me a trial date. I have talked with my lawyer about this matter and he informed me that [I] can't have a trial until my motion[]s on file are heard. I have a right to trial. The motion[]s that are on file can be explained during [j]ury selections. So [I am] asking the courts to grant my request and give me a trial date."

The court later struck defendant's pro se motion because he was represented by counsel.

¶ 17 G. July 8, 2016, E-mails

¶ 18 On July 8, 2016, the State and defense counsel communicated by e-mail concerning a trial date and the gunshot residue testing. The e-mails were later presented to the trial court as an exhibit attached to the State's response to defendant's motion for a new trial.

¶ 19 In the first e-mail, the State suggested an October 31, 2016, trial date as the results from the gunshot residue testing would be available by that date. Defense counsel responded, "I will be on vacation that week until after the election so I am not setting it then." The State sent a second e-mail suggesting an August 29, 2016, trial date.

¶ 20 H. July 8, 2016, Hearing

¶ 21 At a July 8, 2016 hearing, defense counsel appeared with defendant and informed the trial court and the State:

"[W]e previously filed a motion to have evidence collected at thecrime [scene] tested for gunshot residue. [Defendant] would like to—and the [c]ourt did enter an order ordering the State's Attorney's Office to have the evidence tested. However, *** defendant has requested that since I have announced my candidacy in an upcoming election, he wants to make sure that I am, in fact, his trial counsel and exercise his right to counsel of his choice. He would like to select a jury trial date today, and if the test or lab results come back before the trial, great we'll have them. If not, he wants to proceed with jury trial without having had those results back."

¶ 22 The trial court questioned defendant whether "everything Mr. Hassinger just said [was] correct," to which defendant responded, "Not everything, no." Defendant explained:

"I would like to, yeah, go ahead with—I'd like to get a trial date set, but I'd also wait and would like to—if those—if those tests do come back before trial or go to trial, I'd like to hear those results. Also, if they're not back then, I'd like to argue that in front of my jury selections. So still I would like to, you know what I'm saying, speak about that—about the—the testing of the clothing during jury selections."

In response to defendant's explanation, the court stated, "I'm not going to say what we're going to do if they aren't back by the trial date. We'll cross that bridge when and if we get there." Defendant agreed with the court's reservation.

¶ 23 The trial court questioned the State as to the status of the gunshot residue testing. The State stated the crime lab indicated "they're not sure whether testing will be able to be completed based on the age of the case, but if they are able to retest, they need two months to complete it. [Gunshot residue] testing requires a lengthier time to complete than DNA testing due to a backlog." The State also noted it believed it would be "fundamentally unfair for [the defense] to say they want to proceed without the testing and then somehow use that against the State." The court again indicated it was reserving a ruling on that issue.

¶ 24 When scheduling the matter for a jury trial, the State noted a discussion occurred with defense counsel about setting the matter for either "August 29 or October 31, which are both before the election date the defendant seems so concerned about." Upon inquiry by the trial court, the parties confirmed Election Day was on November 8. Defense counsel informed the court he would be on vacation from "October 31 through that next week." The State again noted the discussion about setting the matter for August 29 and stated, "I mean, they're going to have to go without the [gunshot residue] but that's their decision." The court inquired if the defense had any problem with the August 29 date other than the possible absence of gunshot residue results, to which defense counsel responded, "No. We prefer that date." The court set the matter for a jury trial "by agreement" for August 29.

¶ 25 After setting the matter for a jury trial, defense counsel requested the trial court to confirm it was not ruling "on the admissibility of whether or not the defendant can comment on gunshot residue lab results or the fact that the lab results are not back yet until the time of trial." Counsel stated:

"[Defendant's] concern is, is this case is over three yearsold, the police messed up and didn't send it all to get tested at the lab, and now he's running up against spending three and a half years locked up in jail and still no test results."

The court made clear it was reserving "the issue of whether the defense be allowed to comment on the lack of [a gunshot residue] report in the event the crime lab has not finished its testing by [the] trial date."

¶ 26 I. Motion to Waive Possible Conflicts

¶ 27 On August 3, 2016, the State filed a motion for defendant to waive possible conflicts with his counsel's representation. In part, the State sought a waiver of any conflict concerning counsel's candidacy for...