People v. Chavez, S238929
Citation | 4 Cal.5th 771,231 Cal.Rptr.3d 634,415 P.3d 707 |
Decision Date | 26 April 2018 |
Docket Number | S238929 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Lorenzo CHAVEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
Matthew A. Siroka, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Janet Neeley, David Andrew Eldridge and Robert C. Nash, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A trial court has broad power to dismiss an action against a criminal defendant in "furtherance of justice" under Penal Code section 1385.1 ( § 1385, subd. (a) [].) A somewhat different kind of relief is available under section 1203.4, which permits eligible defendants to obtain dismissal of accusations after completing probation. (§ 1203.4, subd. (a) [ ].) After pleading no contest to criminal charges in 2005 and completing probation, appellant Lorenzo Chavez now seeks dismissal of his convictions under Penal Code section 1385, but not under section 1203.4. To justify his request for dismissal under section 1385, Chavez claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel and was therefore unaware of the immigration consequences of the plea he entered eight years earlier. He asks the court, in the interests of justice, to remedy this wrong and expunge his record.
Under section 1385, Chavez can make this request at any time before the trial court places him on probation following imposition of a suspended sentence. In this case, however, Chavez's term of probation had expired before he invited the court to provide relief. So we must resolve whether section 1385 confers authority on a trial court to dismiss an action after probation is completed, and whether the authority conferred by section 1385 is circumscribed by section 1203.4.
What we hold is that a trial court exceeds the authority conferred by section 1385 when it dismisses an action after the probation period expires. Under well-established case law, a court may exercise its dismissal power under section 1385 at any time before judgment is pronounced—but not after judgment is final. ( People v. Superior Court (Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 524, fn. 11, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628 ( Romero ).) Yet in the case of a successful probationer, final judgment is never pronounced, and after the expiration of probation, may never be pronounced. To address this situation, we extend Romero by concluding that section 1385's power may be exerciseduntil judgment is pronounced or when the power to pronounce judgment runs out. Because the trial court's authority to render judgment ends with the expiration of probation, the court has no power to dismiss under section 1385 once probation is complete.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, but on a different rationale. We affirm the judgment because—at least under the specific terms of section 1385 —the trial court lacked the power to dismiss the petitioner's convictions after he completed his probation.
In May 2005, Chavez pleaded no contest to charges that he offered to sell a controlled substance and failed to appear after being released on his own recognizance. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Chavez on probation for four years, a term he successfully completed in 2009. Nearly four years later, in March 2013, Chavez—claiming that he received ineffective assistance of counsel—invited the court to exercise its authority under section 1385 to dismiss his previous convictions in the interests of justice. The court refused, stating that it was not aware of "any case holding that section 1385 authorizes a trial court to grant a motion to dismiss after probation has expired." ( People v. Chavez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 110, 114, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 921 ( Chavez ).) The court stated that it had authority to grant Chavez relief under section 1203.4, but as he did not make his request under that section, the request must be denied.
Why he did not seek relief under section 1203.4 is something Chavez sought to explain in his petition for review. Under prevailing interpretations of relevant federal immigration law, dismissal under section 1203.4 is not understood to erase a defendant's conviction—so such a dismissal would not have relieved Chavez of negative immigration consequences. (See Nunez-Reyes v. Holder (9th Cir. 2011) 646 F.3d 684, 689–690 [ ]; People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 803, 156 Cal.Rptr.3d 307, 299 P.3d 1263 [ ]; People v. Vasquez (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1225, 1230, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 25 P.3d 1090 [ ].) Chavez further maintained that to deny him dismissal under section 1385 would deprive him of any avenue for relief.
Chavez is right that certain means for obtaining relief are out of his reach at this time. In People v. Villa (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1063, 1066, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 344, 202 P.3d 427, we held that a defendant who has finished his probation is "ineligible for relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus." Likewise, in People v. Kim (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1078, 1108–1109, 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 355, 202 P.3d 436 ( Kim ), we concluded that the defendant—"at this late date" many years after his conviction—was "procedurally barred from obtaining relief by way of coram nobis ." Chavez stands in similar stead to the defendants in Villa and Kim and cannot pursue relief via either of these writs.
What we question is whether Chavez is correct in claiming he has no avenue of relief other than section 1385. Chavez did not brief the effect of the postconviction remedy afforded by section 1473.7. Section 1473.7, which came into effect January 1, 2017, allows "[a] person no longer imprisoned or restrained" to "prosecute a motion to vacate a conviction" if the conviction was invalid "due to a prejudicial error damaging the moving party's ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere." (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) While we take judicial notice of section 1473.7, we recognize that neither Chavez nor the People briefed the applicability of the statute. So we express no view on the scope of section 1473.7.
Without the benefit of briefing on section 1473.7 and without mentioning that section, the Court of Appeal concluded that "section 1203.4 is the exclusive method for a trial court to dismiss the conviction of a defendant who has successfully completed probation." ( Chavez , supra , 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 113, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 921.) The Court of Appeal reached this conclusion after analyzing the second issue presented for our review—whether section 1203.4 eliminates the trial court's power to dismiss a case pursuant to section 1385 after the period of probation has ended. The court answered that question in the affirmative, reasoning that in enacting—and repeatedly revising—section 1203.4, the Legislature has "provided clear legislative direction that the courts do not have authority under section 1385 to grant the requested relief." ( Chavez , supra , 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 122, 208 Cal.Rptr.3d 921.)
What the Court of Appeal did not address is whether section 1385, by its own terms, applies to probationers who have finished their probation. Nonetheless, if a court is without power to dismiss under section 1385 irrespective of the operation of section 1203.4, then we must affirm the appellate decision. (See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 6, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511 [ ]; McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 784, 802, 71 Cal.Rptr.3d 885 [].) So we begin with this dispositive question.
To resolve whether trial courts have the power under section 1385 to dismiss actions against defendants who have successfully completed probation, we must analyze the interplay between section 1385 and the probation statutes. In so doing, we consider the text of the statutes, "bearing in mind that our fundamental task in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the law's intended purpose." ( Weatherford v. City of San Rafael (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1241, 1246, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 394, 395 P.3d 274 ; accord Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 293, 212 Cal.Rptr.3d 107, 386 P.3d 773.) We assess not only "the ordinary meaning of the language in question" but also "the text of related provisions, terms used in other parts of the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme." ( Larkin v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 62 Cal.4th 152, 157–158, 194 Cal.Rptr.3d 80, 358 P.3d 552 ; accord Winn v. Pioneer Medical Group, Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 148, 155–156, 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 370 P.3d 1011.)
In a system of separated powers, courts observe jurisdictional limits and focus scarce judicial resources on deciding cases within the scope of their authority. (See Lockyer v. City and...
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People v. Chavez, S238929
...4 Cal.5th 771415 P.3d 707231 Cal.Rptr.3d 634 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,v.Lorenzo CHAVEZ, Defendant and Appellant.S238929Supreme Court of CaliforniaFiled April 26, 2018Matthew A. Siroka, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.Kamala D. H......