People v. Christocakos

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: DE YOUNG
• Citation: People v. Christocakos, 357 Ill. 599, 192 N.E. 677 (Ill. 1934)
• Decision Date: 22 October 1934
• Docket Number: No. 22577.,22577.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. CHRISTOCAKOS.

357 Ill. 599

192 N.E. 677

PEOPLE

v.CHRISTOCAKOS.

No. 22577.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 22, 1934.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Grover C. Niemeyer, Judge.

Charles Christocakos was convicted of robbery, and he brings error.

Reversed and remanded.

Thomas J. Johnson, Sr., and Thomas J. Johnson, Jr., both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and J. J. Neiger, of Springfield (Edward E. Wilson, J. Albert Woll, Henry E. Seyfarth, and Amos P. Scruggs, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

DE YOUNG, Justice.

Walter Engel, Alex Kuzna, and Charles Christocakos were indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for robbery. They waived a trial by jury; the court found them guilty and sentenced them to the penitentiary. Christocakos prosecutes this writ of error.

On November 27, 1933, about 10:30 p. m., George Grieshaber was driving an automobile west on Washington boulevard in the city of Chicago. At Damen avenue, while stopping in obedience to a traffic signal, he discovered a person at the bumper of his car. He was about to alight when another person appeared at the door, pressed a blunt instrument against his side, pushed him, and occupied the driver's seat. A third person stood on the running board. The person who pushed Grieshaber aside and took the driver's seat warned him to remain quiet, drove a short distance, entered an alley, and stopped behind a barn at the rear of 2029 Thomas street, the home of Engel. The three persons ejected Grieshaber from the automobile, pushed him into the barn, beat him, took about $5 in money, a watch valued at $50, some keys, a leather jacket worth $3 or $4, and departed in his automobile. Grieshaber immediately reported the robbery to police officers. Five days later, at a police station, he identified the first and second persons he encountered when robbed as Walter Engel and Alex Kuzna, but he was unable to state that Christocakos was the person who stood on the running board. He asserted, however, that the leather jacket which Christocakos wore at the police station was the one taken from him in the robbery. Grieshaber recovered the watch, the jacket, and the automobile.

Three witnesses beside Grieshaber were called by the prosecution. Two police officers, George F. Brewer and James Kerwin, testified that they arrested Engel, Kuzna, and Christocakos; that the officers placed them against a wall in the police station with other prisoners; that Grieshaber identified Engel and Kuzna; that the prisoners denied they were at or near Washington boulevard and Damen avenue on November 27, 1933, or that they participated in the robbery; that they admitted they were in the rear of 2029 Thomas street but denied that they took Grieshaber's automobile; that they asserted Grieshaber came to them to buy automobile tires; that this statement provoked a dispute between Grieshaber and the prisoners and the police were obliged to interfere; that during the resulting confusion the plaintiff in error admitted he took the jacket from Grieshaber; that Kuzna first stated that he delivered the watch to a milkman but afterwards admitted that he sold it to a man in a laundry and that thereafter one Turner, who bought the watch, brought it to the police station. David Turner, driver of a laundry truck, testified that he bought the watch for $1.96 but that the person who sold it to him was not present in the court room.

The defense interposed consisted of the testimony of the three defendants, each of whom was seventeen years of age. The plaintiff in error denied any participation in the robbery or that he had ever seen Grieshaber before they met at the police station. He admitted that he had the leather jacket at the time, but insisted that a Greek boy called Dan whose surname he thought was Carolan had given it to him.

Engel testified that he had been acquainted with Grieshaber about two years and had seen him twice and Kuzna claimed his acquaintance for the period of eighteen months. The defendants Engel and Kuzna denied that they robbed Grieshaber. Engel admitted that he met Grieshaber on the evening of November 27, 1933, at Robey and Superior streets, and that they discovered Kuzna in the vicinity. Both Engel and Kuzna testified that the plaintiff in error was not present and did not accompany them; that Grieshaberdesired to purchase a set of stolen automobile tires and to that end pledged his watch and five dollars; that when he returned, a boy named Danny was present; that a dispute arose because the tires were not delivered and Grieshaber demanded the return of his money; that a fight ensued during which Danny, who was Grieshaber's friend, obtained possession of the latter's leather jacket; and that afterwards he gave it to the plaintiff in error. Kuzna asserted that he retained the watch pledged for the purchase of the automobile tires because Grieshaber refused to accept it and that the witness later sold the watch. On rebuttal, Grieshaber denied that he ever attempted to purchase automobile tires from the plaintiff in error and his codefendants or that he had even seen them prior to the robbery.

To obtain a reversal of the judgment the plaintiff in error contends that his participation in the commission of the crime has not been established and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. The burden rests upon the people, not only to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged, but also to establish by the same degree of proof the perpetration of the crime by the person or persons accused. People v. Grove, 356 Ill. 246, 190 N. E. 253;People v. De Suno, 354 Ill. 387, 188 N. E. 466;People v. Serrielle, 354 Ill. 182, 188 N. E. 375. A conviction cannot be said to be sustained by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt if the testimony of the witnesses shows that their identification of the person accused was vague, doubtful, and uncertain. People v. Fiorita, 339 Ill. 78, 170 N. E. 690;People v. O'Hara, 332 Ill. 436, 458, 163 N. E. 804. Direct evidence, however, either of identification or any other fact is not required, but to warrant a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances proved must be sufficient to establish the guilt of the person accused to a moral certainty and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis. People v. Rischo, 262 Ill. 596, 105 N. E. 8;...