People v. Cipriano, 171.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1927
• Docket Number: No. 171.,171.
• Citation: 213 N.W. 104,238 Mich. 332
• Parties: PEOPLE v. CIPRIANO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

238 Mich. 332

213 N.W. 104

PEOPLE

v.CIPRIANO.

No. 171.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 1, 1927.

Exceptions from Recorder's Court of Detroit; Harry B. Keiden, Judge.

James Cipriano was convicted of manslaughter. On exceptions before sentence. Affirmed.

Argued before the Entire Bench.Wm. F. Connolly and Maurice E. Fitz Gerald, both of Detroit, for appellant.

William W. Potter, Atty. Gen., and Robert M. Toms, Pros. Atty., and Eugene A. Walling. Asst. Pros. Atty., both of Detroit, for the People.

McDONALD, J.

Under an information charging the defendant with murder, he was convicted of manslaughter in the recorder's court of Detroit. He brings the case here for review upon exceptions before sentence.

The proofs produced by the people tended to show that the defendant shot and killed his brother-in-law, one Charles Gentile, on the 30th of October, 1925, in the city of Detroit. Charles Gentile was a young man who lived with his parents at 2210 East Congress street. The defendant and his wife with their infant child lived at the same place. Charles Gentile occupied a back room upstairs in the house. About 1 o'clock of the day in question, a nurse in the Cipriano part of the household heard defendant's wife, Mary Cipriano, scream, followed by shots in the room occupied by Charles Gentile. The nurse, who was downstairs with the baby at the time, went to the door. She saw Cipriano come out of the rear room. He told her to go back in her room, to mind her business, and look after the baby, after which he left the house. Before doing so he tore the telephone from the wall, so that the nurse was unable to use it. She went out upon the street and related what had happened. The police were notified, and when they came to the house they found Charles Gentile and Mary Cipriano dead on the floor of the rear room. Charles was dressed only in a union suit of underwear. His trousers and Mary Cipriano's bloomers were hanging over a radiator. After the shooting the defendant fled and remained in concealment for 12 days, when he surrendered to the authorities. It was the people's claim that the defendant shot and killed his wife and Charles Gentile with malice aforethought, and that he did so because he was angry with Charles and his people over some business matters.

On his part, the defendant claims that he heard his wife's voice in the bedroom occupied by her brother Charles; that he went to the door and found it locked; that he drew himself up and looked through the transom and saw his wife and Charles in bed together. He called them to open the door. Charles came with revolver in his hand and began to shoot. Mary Cipriano screamed and got in between them. The defendant pulled a revolver from his pocket and commenced shooting. It is his claim that, if he shot and killed Charles, he did so in self-defense, and that his wife was shot when she thrust herself between him and her brother.

The first assignment of error presents the question as to the duty of the prosecuting attorney in a murder case to disclose in his opening statement to the jury some definite theory as to the motive for the commission of the crime.

In his opening address to the jury, the prosecutor told them he would show by competent evidence that ‘this killing was pursuant to a motive,’ but did not state what the motive was. No request was made at that time by defendant's counsel for a more definite statement. Such a request first came at the close of the people's case. The court refused it, and counsel for the defendant say that in so ruling he erred for the reason stated in their brief, as follows:

‘We submit (1) that, when the prosecutor stated to the jury in his opening statement that he would prove a motive, it was his duty to state what he claimed the motive was; (2) the testimony as to the motive should have been limited to proof of the motive which the prosecutor stated he would prove as the motive for the claimed homicide; (3) his failure and refusal to state his motive, which he claimed he would prove, even when challenged to do so by the defendant's counsel, did not let down the bars to him to introduce any kind of proof of any kind of a transaction, not proving the res gestae, but purporting to prove some motive.’

It not infrequently happens in murder cases that no motive can be found for the commission of the crime. If capable of being shown, it may have an important...