People v. Cisewski
Decision Date | 05 October 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 63812,63812 |
Citation | 113 Ill.Dec. 58,514 N.E.2d 970,118 Ill.2d 163 |
Parties | , 113 Ill.Dec. 58 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Mary O. CISEWSKI, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for appellee; Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago, Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Kenneth T. McCurry, Maureen O'Brien, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel.
James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago, for appellant; Georgeen M. Carson, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel.
The defendant, Mary Cisewski, was convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Cook County of the voluntary manslaughter of her husband, Donald Cisewski(Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 9-2(b)).She was sentenced to five years' imprisonment.The appellate court, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the conviction (144 Ill.App.3d 597, 98 Ill.Dec. 454, 494 N.E.2d 576), and we granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal.(103 Ill.2d R. 315.)
The issues presented in this appeal are: (1) whether the State's failure to comply with Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(ii)(107 Ill.2d R. 412(a)(ii)) entitles defendant to a new trial; and (2) whether the prosecutor's statements during rebuttal closing argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution( and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution(Ill. Const.1970, art. I, sec. 2).We affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
The record in this case reveals that the defendant had suffered for a number of years from paranoid fears.She falsely believed that she was being harassed by police, tenants, lawyers, and others who she believed were part of a conspiracy against her.In 1979 or 1980, in response to her fears, she purchased a .32 caliber revolver to protect herself.
In late 1980, the defendant met Donald Cisewski and the two were married in November of 1981.The record reveals that Donald was aware of the defendant's "harassment" beliefs at the time of their marriage.Sometime shortly after they were married, the defendant began to suspect that Donald was part of the conspiracy against her.She believed that there was a plot to have her killed and that Donald was "being pushed to carry it out."
On February 9, 1982, the defendant came home from work and discovered that her gun was missing from the location where she kept it.Donald claimed that he did not know where the gun was, but the next evening he inexplicably produced the box of bullets to the gun.The defendant became frightened, believing that if he had taken the bullets he also must have taken the gun.She immediately searched his car and found the loaded gun in the glove compartment.The defendant brought the gun into the house and hid it in a drawer in the dining room.The defendant testified that Donald never admitted that he took the gun and she did not tell him that she had found it in his car.
Over the next few days, the defendant's fear that Donald planned to kill her intensified.She talked to her children and made arrangements to move in with one of them within the next few weeks.The couple's arguing continued.According to the defendant, Donald told her that no matter what he did to her the police would arrange to have her death reported as a suicide.
On Friday, February 12, the defendant came home from work and made several telephone calls to her children.She drank a few beers in an effort to calm her heightened feelings of desperation.When Donald came home from work that evening, he and the defendant began to argue in the kitchen.While they were arguing, Donald got up and went into the living room and sat down.The defendant then took the loaded gun from the drawer in the dining room and went into the living room with the gun in her hand.She showed Donald the gun and asked him if he thought it was funny.She said to him, "Your problem is you think everything is funny."The defendant then shot her husband in the head and abdomen.
The defendant testified in her own behalf at trial.She stated that she had no intention of firing the gun, but only wanted to scare Donald.The defendant testified that she had no memory of firing the shots.She said that she fainted and when she regained consciousness she realized the gun had been fired.The defendant then walked into the kitchen, put the gun down and called the police.
The police officer who responded to the call testified that when he arrived at the Cisewski home, the defendant told him that, following an argument, she shot her husband twice.Another investigating officer, who later interviewed the defendant at the police station, testified that the defendant told him that when she pointed the gun at Donald, he said something to the effect of "No, Mary, no."The defendant told the officer that she shot Donald once, but could not recall having fired the second shot.However, she subsequently told an assistant State's Attorney, in the officer's presence, that she shot her husband twice.
A ballistics expert testified on behalf of the State that the "trigger pull" on the defendant's gun was "heavy."This testimony was put forth by the State to obviate any suggestion advanced by the defendant that the gun went off accidentally.
Dr. Albert Stipes, a psychiatrist called by the defense, testified that upon examining the defendant, he found that she suffered from paranoia and had delusions that there was a conspiracy against her.Dr. Stipes found that the defendant was suspicious of everyone, had felt threatened particularly by her husband, and believed that he was going to kill her.According to Dr. Stipes the defendant did not, however, believe that her husband was attacking her at the time she shot him.Dr. Stipes found the defendant sane and fit to stand trial.
During the trial, the State introduced evidence that sometime after the shooting the defendant had telephoned her husband's employer, Teledyne Corp., to inquire about his paycheck and life insurance proceeds.The record indicates that the State first inquired of this phone call during its cross-examination of the defendant.The defendant objected to this line of questioning on the grounds that the State had not given any information to the defendant prior to trial regarding the substance of any statements allegedly made by the defendant to Teledyne, and that the defendant had no knowledge of any rebuttal witnesses.At a sidebar conference, the State responded that it had, in fact, disclosed, prior to the commencement of trial, the name of Teledyne employee Patricia Stanford as a rebuttal witness on its supplemental answer to discovery.Defense counsel then stated, "[I]f the State will tell us what the conversation [was], we have no problem."In response, the State told defense counsel that the defendant had called Patricia Stanford at Teledyne Corp. asking for the $27,000 insurance money she believed she was owed as the named beneficiary on Donald's policy.Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial on the basis of a discovery violation, which, along with defendant's earlier objection, was denied.The State's cross-examination of the defendant ceased and the trial continued.
On the next day of trial, during the State's presentation of rebuttal evidence, the trial court permitted the State to introduce the testimony of Patricia Stanford.The State indicated that the witness was being called to impeach the defendant's earlier testimony denying that she had called Teledyne after the incident to inquire about her husband's insurance proceeds.Defendant's objection to Patricia Stanford's testimony was again overruled.Ms. Stanford testified that, following Donald's death, a person identifying herself as Mary Cisewski called Teledyne twice and asked about Donald's paycheck and life insurance proceeds.Following this testimony, the defendant was allowed to cross-examine Ms. Stanford, as well as present surrebuttal evidence, which together showed that the defendant was incarcerated at the time of the telephone call, that she could only make collect telephone calls, and that Teledyne Corp. did not accept collect calls.
It was the defendant's defense at trial that she shot her husband in self-defense and out of paranoia.She also maintained, as stated previously, that she did not intend to shoot her husband, and that she could not recall having fired the gun.Instructions on murder, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter were tendered to the jury, and, as stated earlier, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the voluntary manslaughter charge.
The first issue presented in this appeal is whether the State's failure to disclose prior to trial the substance of the defendant's alleged telephone conversation with Patricia Stanford regarding Donald's life insurance proceeds constituted reversible error.A divided appellate court found that any error caused by the introduction of the undisclosed conversation was harmless error because at closing argument the defendant maintained that she was guilty of voluntary manslaughter, not murder, which was precisely the verdict the jury returned.The dissent expressed the opinion that the defendant did not receive a fair trial because the jury was also instructed on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter, and Patricia Stanford's testimony about the defendant's call to Teledyne suggested to the jury that the defendant acted deliberately and not recklessly.
Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(ii)(107 Ill.2d R. 412(a)(ii)) provides in pertinent part:
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 7-day Trial
-
People v. Knade
...were not disclosed to defense counsel prior to trial. Defendant will only be granted a new trial if the discovery violation is prejudicial and if the trial court failed to eliminate the prejudice. (
People v. Cisewski (1987), 118 Ill.2d 163, 172, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970.) The factors used to establish a prejudicial violation are: "the closeness of the evidence, the strength of the undisclosed evidence, and the likelihood that prior notice could have helped the defense discreditfactors used to establish a prejudicial violation are: "the closeness of the evidence, the strength of the undisclosed evidence, and the likelihood that prior notice could have helped the defense discredit the evidence." Cisewski, 118 Ill.2d at 172, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970; see People v. Weaver (1982), 92 Ill.2d 545, 65 Ill.Dec. 944, 442 N.E.2d We do not believe, based on the above standard, that defendant suffered any prejudice. The photographs in question were of the victim's... -
People v. Franklin
...comment. It is well settled that the circuit court can correct an error by sustaining a timely objection and instructing the jury to disregard the comment. (
People v. Cisewski (1987), 118 Ill.2d 163, 178, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970.) The defendant's failure to object to the remaining comments resulted in a waiver of this issue through procedural default. People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 239, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146. Even if the defendant had objected to... -
People v. Burts
...prejudiced (People v. Carr (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 458, 136 Ill.Dec. 203, 544 N.E.2d 978), by explaining how earlier disclosure "would have altered [his] strategy and possibly changed the outcome of the case." (
Cisewski, 118 Ill.2d at 173, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970). A reviewing court determining prejudice may consider, among other factors, "the closeness of the evidence * * * and the likelihood that prior notice could have helped the defense discredit the evidence."N.E.2d 970). A reviewing court determining prejudice may consider, among other factors, "the closeness of the evidence * * * and the likelihood that prior notice could have helped the defense discredit the evidence." Cisewski, 118 Ill.2d at 172, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970. We do not believe any other judgment would have been justified under the evidence. Indeed, the defendant's own testimony established that he beat Armstrong in a jealous rage; and did not establish anynoncompliance with Rule 412 does not require a reversal absent a showing of prejudice" which was not cured by the trial judge. (Patterson, 102 Ill.App.3d at 847, 58 Ill.Dec. 542, 430 N.E.2d 574; see also People v. Cisewski (1987), 118 Ill.2d 163, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 514 N.E.2d 970.) A judge has discretion to fashion a remedy for any discovery violation, but "exclusion of evidence is a last resort, required only where a recess or continuance would be ineffective." (People v. Washington (1989),... -
People v. Buchanan
...discretion of the trial court. (E.g., People v. Simms (1988) 121 Ill.2d 259, 269, 117 Ill.Dec. 147, 151, 520 N.E.2d 308, 312.) In order to amount to reversible error, there must be a showing of substantial prejudice to defendant's rights.
People v. Cisewski (1987), 118 Ill.2d 163, 175, 113 Ill.Dec. 58, 64, 514 N.E.2d 970, 976. Defendant contends that the State attempted to shift the burden of proof by arguing the fact that defendant did not produce witnesses on gunpowder residue...