People v. Clark
| Citation | 137 N.E.2d 820,9 Ill.2d 400 |
| Decision Date | 25 September 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 33968,33968 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Rexford CLARK, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Daniel D. Glasser, Chicago, for appellant.
Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., and John Gutknecht, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leasc, Decatur, Edwin A. Strugala, Irwin D. Block, John T. Gallagher, Rudolph L. Janega, and William L. Carlin, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
The defendant, Rexford Clark, was found guilty in the municipal court of Chicago of unlawfully and knowingly having in his possession a certain writing, paper, document or article, representing or being a record of chance, share or interest in numbers sold, drawn, or to be drawn, in what is commonly called 'policy,' and used in the promoting or playing of said game, in violation of section 2 of an act for the prevention of policy-playing (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 38, par. 413). He was tried and sentenced by the court to serve a term of 30 days in the county jail and appeals from the judgment assigning error in that: (1) the court erred in denving his petition to suppress certain evidence which was allegedly taken from his person in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) the evidence does not establish his guilt of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) venue was not proved as alleged in the information; and (4) the court erred in denying his request to make an offer of proof. The defendant brings the record here for review, constitutional questions being involved. People v. Humphreys, 353 Ill. 340, 187 N.E. 446; People v. McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, 173 N.E. 754.
When the case was called for trial, the defendant presented a written petition to suppress as evidence certain policy slips and sheets. Therein he alleged that said property was unlawfully taken from his person by Chicago police officers Roland, Mitchell and Mullin in the county of Cook and State of Illinois, when defendant was unlawfully arrested on the pretext that he had violated a city parking ordinance. The petition further alleged that the property was now in the possession of the city of Chicago and belonged to the defendant, and requested its return. In support of his petition, the defendant called as his witness officer Mullin, who testified in substance that he was a police officer of the city of Chicago, assigned to the commissioner's office in connection with gambling investigations; that on October 10, 1955, at about 12:15 P.M. he was with officers Roland and Mitchell and they observed the defendant park his car in front of 4508 Forrestville Avenue, after which the defendant got out of the car and was about to cross the street; that the wintess approached the defendant and asked him if he parked his car like that all the time, and defendant asked officer Mullin what was wrong with it; that the witness then directed officer Roland to measure the distance of the wheels from the curb and it was found that the right front wheel was 21 inches from the curb and the rear wheel 18 inches; and that the permissible parking distance from the curb was 12 inches. The witness then testified that he saw a package sticking out of defendant's right rear pocket; that this package protruded about 2 inches and was only partially obscured by a handkerchief; that the witness asked the defendant what he had in the package and the defendant replied, 'policy slips.' Thereupon the witness took possession of the package containing the policy slips without inserting his hand in defendant's pocket; that the officers then searched the defendant's car and found some policy sheets, and forthwith formally charged the defendant with the offense of which he was convicted.
Defendant insists that the seizure of the evidence cannot be justified on the ground that it was taken by the officers in the course of a lawful arrest because no arrest had in fact been made prior to the seizure. It is admitted that the officers had no warrant for defendant's arrest. But an arrest may be made by an officer or private person without a warrant for a criminal offense committed or attempted in his presence. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 38, par. 657.) The term 'criminal offense,' as used in this statute includes misdemeanors as well as felonies. People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 91 N.E.2d 359. If the defendant in fact violated a municipal parking ordinance in the presence of the officers they had the right to arrest him without a warrant for that offense. The guaranty of section 6 of article II of our constitution, S.H.A. is not against all searches and seizures but only against unreasonable search and seizure, and does not extend to immunity from search upon lawful arrest. People v. Barg, 384 Ill. 172, 51 N.E.2d 168. Where the arrest is justified, for whatever cause, the accompanying search is also justified. People v. Tabet, 402 Ill. 93, 83 N.E.2d 329. So in this case a search incident to an arrest for a parking violation would be justified. The fact that the property was taken without the necessity of a search cannot make its seizure unlawful if it could have been lawfully seized upon search. We cannot agree that the evidence fails to show an arrest for unlawful parking. No formal declaration of an arrest on that charge had been made by the officers, but none was necessary. The evidence clearly shows that the violation had been called to the attention of defendant; that he voluntarily submitted to the control of the arresting parties; and that the officers intended to effect the arrest and that the defendant so understood them. The elements of a valid arrest were present. 4 Am.Jur., Arrest, pages 5 and 6; 6 C.J.S., Arrest, § 1, p. 571. It is immaterial whether or not defendant was ever formally charged with the traffic violation, or whether or not that charge was sustained. People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359.
We believe that the seizure of the policy slips and sheets may also be justified on the ground that the event was incident to a lawful arrest for the possession of the contraband in violation of the statute, committed in the presence of the officers. The gist of the offense under the statute is the unlawful possession of the forbidden articles. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1953, chap. 38, par. 413.) The evidence shows that the officer saw the package protruding from defendant's pocket; that he called this to the latter's attention and asked him what he had,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Redd
...so understood them.' " (People v. Wipfler (1977), 68 Ill.2d 158, 165, 11 Ill.Dec. 262, 368 N.E.2d 870, quoting People v. Clark (1956), 9 Ill.2d 400, 404, 137 N.E.2d 820.) The Wipfler court went on to state: "The accepted test of understanding is not what the arrestee thought, but 'what a re......
-
People v. Wipfler
...to tell the truth and not at any earlier point in his interrogation. We agree with the position taken by the State. In People v. Clark (1956), 9 Ill.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820, we indicated that the elements of a valid arrest were present when the police informed defendant of a violation, he su......
-
People v. Watkins
...446; People v. McGowan, 1953, 415 Ill. 375, 114 N.E.2d 407; People v. Shambley, 1954, 4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172; People v. Clark, 1956, 9 Ill.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820; People v. West, 1958, 15 Ill.2d 171, 154 N.E.2d 286) and has refused to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of those issue......
-
People v. Kalpak
...is also justified, and evidence taken from the person as a result of that search is ordinarily admissible against him. People v. Clark, 9 Ill.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820; People v. Roberta, 352 Ill. 189, 185 N.E. 253. Conversely, if the arrest is unlawful, the property taken from the person as t......