People v. Clark

• Decision Date: 30 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-435,80-435
• Citation: 429 N.E.2d 1255,57 Ill.Dec. 892,102 Ill.App.3d 414
• Parties: , 57 Ill.Dec. 892 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1255

429 N.E.2d 1255

102 Ill.App.3d 414, 57 Ill.Dec. 892

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80-435.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

Nov. 30, 1981.

[57 Ill.Dec. 893] Steven Clark, Deputy Defender, Chicago (Karen Michaels, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Richard M. Daley, Chicago (Michael E. Shabat, Dean C. Morask, Paula Carstensen, Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

SULLIVAN, Presiding Justice:

After a bench trial, defendant was convicted of deviate sexual assault and two counts of armed robbery and concurrently sentenced to an extended term of 50 years. On appeal, he contends that: (1) he was not proved sane beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the extended term sentencing statute is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the sentences.

A married couple were the victims of the offenses, and the wife testified that she and her husband were awakened at about 3 a. m. by a light being turned on; that she saw a man, whom she later identified in a lineup as defendant, wearing a knee-length military coat, dark blue ski mask with red trim, and brown gloves; that he was standing at the foot of their bed holding a gun to the head of their infant son; that defendant told them to "do what I say or else;" that he gave her some rope and told her to tie her husband's hands and feet behind his back; that defendant then pointed a gun at her and told her to go into the dining room where he said "Kneel, Bitch" and pushed her down in front of him while holding a gun to her head; that defendant forced his penis into her mouth and, when he had an orgasm, ordered her to "swallow it;" that defendant took her back to the bedroom, where he tied her in the same manner as her husband; and that defendant then took their watches and other belongings.

The husband testified in substance to the same facts and, in addition, that defendant also took their wallets containing a sum of money; that the police recovered his wife's fur coat, some books and magazines, and a mixer but that his camera equipment was never found; and that as he was viewing a lineup, defendant stepped forward, threw up his hands and said, "you can stop. What's the use? I did it." The husband's testimony regarding defendant's admission was corroborated by assistant State's Attorney David Weiner and Investigator John Battistella, both of whom witnessed the lineup.

The victims further testified that they were Ph.D. candidates at the time in question and were trained in the observation of personality disorders; that having observed defendant at close range during the incident, they concluded his behavior was normal. On cross-examination, the wife testified that as she had not previously seen defendant, she could not say whether his eyes, voice and mannerisms were any different than on other occasions. The husband admitted that he and his wife were told defendant would probably assert an insanity defense.

Since no reasonable doubt argument is made on appeal, a detailed statement of the facts will not be necessary and that evidence will be discussed only as relating to the contentions raised.

The trial court found that at the time of the offense, defendant was able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform it to the requirements of the law and that he was guilty of deviate sexual assault and armed robbery as charged.

OPINION

We first consider the question of the insanity defense. Section 6-2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 6-2) provides:

"(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

(b) The terms 'mental disease or mental defect' do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."

The law has long expressed the deep commitment of society to avoid the injustice of convicting a person who is insane. To that end, the criminal law is made to apply only to those who can be held responsible for their conduct. (See G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 835-36 (1978).) Thus, the insanity defense reflects the fundamental principle that a person is not criminally responsible for an involuntary act. People v. Grant (1978), 71 Ill.2d 551, 17 Ill.Dec. 814, 377 N.E.2d 4.

The law presumes all people sane (People v. Martin (1980), 87 Ill.App.3d 77, 42 Ill.Dec. 619, 409 N.E.2d 114), but when evidence is introduced sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of sanity, it is incumbent upon the State to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had capacity to commit the offense at the requisite time (Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 38, par. 3-2; People v. Sutton (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 1008, 2 Ill.Dec. 766, 357 N.E.2d 1209), or as otherwise expressed, that he was sane beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Arndt (1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 744, 42 Ill.Dec. 179, 408 N.E.2d 757). As stated in People v. Spears (1978), 63 Ill.App.3d 510, 516, 20 Ill.Dec. 445, 450, 380 N.E.2d 423, 428:

"(E)ither an impairment of cognition or an impairment of volitional capacity may prevent an individual from conforming his actions to the requirements of the law and therefore give rise to a defense of insanity. * * * Thus, although an accused understood the nature of his conduct and appreciated its wrongfulness, he will be excused from criminal liability if his ability to consciously refrain from the conduct was substantially impaired by a mental defect."

Furthermore, to determine whether the accused was sane at the time of the offense requires not simply that he is able to distinguish right from wrong, but rather that he is able to exercise power to choose between them. (People v. Meeker (1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 162, 41 Ill.Dec. 560, 407 N.E.2d 1058.) Whether the State has met its burden is a question of fact (People v. Jackson (1976), 42 Ill.App.3d 919, 1 Ill.Dec. 697, 356 N.E.2d 979), and the fact finder's decision will not be reversed unless so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant's sanity (People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233) or is so palpably erroneous as to suggest its basis in passion or prejudice (People v. Kuhn (1979), 68 Ill.App.3d 59, 24 Ill.Dec. 476, 385 N.E.2d 388). We conclude on the basis of the record presented herein that the State has met its burden of proving defendant legally responsible at the time of the incident.

Defendant's mother testified as to his family background and solitary childhood and as to his psychiatric history which dated to 1970 when he was first hospitalized while in the army. She also stated that defendant received psychiatric treatment at various times; that when she had last seen him in December of 1977, he was nervous but was not otherwise behaving unusually; and that at the time of his arrest he was not receiving treatment.

Defendant testified that as a child he was often lonely, depressed, very nervous and active; that in the army he began drinking heavily, smoking opium, using various drugs and became depressed, forgot things, felt people were against him and "started missing time;" that because he wasn't eating or sleeping and because he was becoming violent and tried to hurt people, he was hospitalized and treated by army psychiatrists in Germany; that he was honorably discharged in 1970 for medical conditions; that he had difficulty recalling the time he spent at Fitzsimmons Hospital in Denver, Colorado in 1970 or seeing his mother while there; that after next being treated at the Hines Veterans Administration Hospital, he was released as an out-patient and was not treated for about six months but took medication; that he returned to Hines when he was "missing time" and was given medication for about a year; that in 1973 he was readmitted to Hines for the same problems and was hospitalized in 1975 and 1976 because people complained of his violence and because of his having sex with animals and children; that in June of 1977 he had bad feelings about himself but did not want to return to the hospital until after his girlfriend had her baby in January, 1978; that the last thing he remembered before his arrest was being with Van Fitzpatrick and Raymond Meyers, but he could not recall where he had been after leaving them or of seeing the victims before trial; and that he spent two weeks at the Illinois State Psychiatric Institute (ISPI) but did not remember why.

Dr. Jerome Katz, a psychiatrist, testified that he interviewed defendant on February 7, 1979, and used police, army and hospital records for his diagnosis; that the records described a variety of sexual perversions, aggression, and defendant's forcing unknown women to perform sexual acts at knifepoint or gunpoint; that defendant had been diagnosed as schizophrenic in partial remission and as having pedophilia and an attraction to young girls; that defendant complained of blackouts and felt he might lose control and become violent; and that in response to a hypothetical question, Katz found that based on the seven to eight year medical history of the hypothetical subject, he was suffering from schizophrenia on January 17, 1978, the date of the incident, as a result of which he could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.

On cross-examination Katz testified that in making his initial diagnosis he had not considered a psychologist's report that defendant was malingering to avoid trial, but he would not change his opinion; that defendant was a "reactor" who responded to external authority but could not exercise internal control; that the greater the time lapse between the crime and the psychiatric examination, the more difficult it is to...