People v. Clark

Decision Date18 November 1959
Docket NumberNo. 35078,35078
Citation17 Ill.2d 486,162 N.E.2d 413
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. William CLARK, Plaintiff in Error.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Louis W. Levit, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Grenville Beardsley, Atty. Gen., and Benjamin S. Adamowski, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and William H. South, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Francis X. Riley, Asst. State's Atty., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

DAILY, Justice.

Under an indictment returned to the criminal court of Cook County on November 27, 1956, William Clark, Arthur Sammons, Joseph Odum, and Randolph Taylor were jointly charged with the murder of Walter Pennegar and, when arraigned, each entered a plea of not guilty. The public defendant was appointed to represent Clark, Sammons, and Taylor, but, at a preliminary hearing, was allowed to withdraw as Clark's attorney on the ground that the latter's defense was antagonistic to those of Taylor and Sammons. In his stead, the court appointed William Cain, a member of the Chicago Bar Association's prisoners committee, to represent Clark. Thereafter, both Odum and Clark filed motions for severance but only that of the former was allowed. Taylor consented to a bench trial. Clark and Sammons were jointly tried by a jury on April 16, 1957, and both convicted of the crime charged. Clark, who was sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 20 years, now prosecutes this writ of error, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, that the trial court erred in denying him a separated trial, and that he should have been discharged under the so-called four months statute. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, chap. 38, par. 748). Hereinafter, Clark shall be referred to as plaintiff in error.

At the trial of the cause, Robert Parker, a Chicago police officer, testified over plaintiff in error's objection concerning a conversation the witness had with the codefendant, Sammons, upon the occasion of the latter's arrest, wherein Sammons told the witness that he and Odum, and two other men whom he did not know, went to the residence of Pennegar, a narcotics informer who had informed on Odum, with the intention of administering a physical beating. The balance of the conversation was that Sammons remained in the car while the other three men went to the house and that, although Sammons did not actually see the crime committed, he heard shots after which the three men returned to the car and discussed the slaying. Walter T. Gehr, an associate in the crime laboratory, also testified to a similar oral confession made by Sammons in his presence. The testimony of both witnesses was ruled admissible only as to Sammons and the jury was instructed to disregard it when considering the guilt of plaintiff in error.

Charles Younger, another police officer, also testified concerning Sammon's guilt. According to his account, Sammons denied any participation in the crime when first arrested but later signed a written confession which, in substance, coincided with the oral confession testified to by Parker and Gehr. Despite plaintiff in error's strenuous objection that such evidence, which he had neither participated in nor consented to, was inadmissible and highly prejudicial to him, the trial court permitted the written confession, which implicated Odum, Sammons and the two other unidentified men, to be read to the jury with the cautionary instruction that it should not be considered insofar as plaintiff in error's guilt was concerned.

At this point of the trial officer Younger testified to an oral confession allegedly made in his presence by plaintiff in error upon an occasion in October or November, 1956, when the officer had gone to Fayetteville, Tennessee, for the purpose of returning plaintiff in error to Chicago authorities. According to Younger, plaintiff in error admitted that he, Sammons, Odum and a man named Rocky, (later identified as Randolph Taylor,) had gone to Pennegar's house on May 4, 1956, to 'beat up' the informer; that Sammons remained in the car while the other three went to the house; and that after they had reached the house and announced they were police officers, Odum drew a gun and shot Pennegar as he opened the door, despite plaintiff in error's efforts to prevent the shooting. Still continuing with the details of the Tennessee conversation, Younger related that he told plaintiff in error Sammons had identified him from photographs as being one of the accomplices. This phase of the witness's testimony was enlarged and distorted in the eyes of the jurors when the prosecution stated over objection in closing argument: 'A picture was obtained and it was shown to Sammons-the picture was then shown by officer Younger to Sammons and he said, yes, that's the man.'

When officer Younger was cross-examined by plaintiff in error's counsel, it was brought out that although the former customarily made a written report of his investigations to his superiors, he made no such report in this case, made no notations of the conversation, and did not at any time attempt to have plaintiff in error's confession reduced to writing or witnessed by other persons.

In his own behalf, plaintiff in error denied any participation in the crime and denied in toto the oral confession which Younger had attributed to him. When he attempted to call his co-defendant, Sammons, as a witness in order to examine him concerning the identification made by photograph, Sammons declined to testify, on advice of counsel, when the prosecution indicated it would bring out Sammons's prior criminal record if he took the stand.

The general rule is that those indicted jointly for the commission of a crime are to be tried together, and the matter of granting a separate trial is within the sound discretion of the...

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52 cases
  • People v. Cart
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 2, 1981
    ...40 Ill.2d 154, 158, 238 N.E.2d 407, 409, cert. denied (1968), 393 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 401, 21 L.Ed.2d 375; People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill.2d 486, 490, 162 N.E.2d 413, 416; People v. McVay (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 708, 715, 54 Ill.Dec. 172, 176-77, 424 N.E.2d 922, In this case, however, neither ......
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    ...reference to pre-Bruton cases unpersuasive. (People v. Krulewitch (1949) 336 U.S. 440, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790; People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill.2d 486, 162 N.E.2d 413; People v. Johnson (1958), 13 Ill.2d 619, 150 N.E.2d 597; People v. Patris (1935), 360 Ill. 596, 196 N.E. 806; People v. B......
  • People v. Moman
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    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
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    ...the presence of the defendant is hearsay which is not admissible as substantive evidence against the defendant. (People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill.2d 486, 162 N.E.2d 413; People v. Tyner (1964), 30 Ill.2d 101, 195 N.E.2d 675; People v. Bennett (1987), 162 Ill.App.3d 36, 113 Ill.Dec. 855, 515 N......
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    ...v. Young (1970), 46 Ill.2d 82, 84, 263 N.E.2d 72; People v. Rogers (1963), 26 Ill.2d 599, 602, 188 N.E.2d 22; People v. Clark (1959), 17 Ill.2d 486, 492, 162 N.E.2d 413; People v. Richardson (1959), 17 Ill.2d 253, 258, 161 N.E.2d 268; see People v. Benjamin (1966), 34 Ill.2d 183, 185, 215 N......
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