People v. Clark

• Decision Date: 17 January 1991
• Docket Number: No. 4-90-0069,4-90-0069
• Citation: 152 Ill.Dec. 455,565 N.E.2d 1373,207 Ill.App.3d 439
• Parties: , 152 Ill.Dec. 455 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy L. CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1373

565 N.E.2d 1373

207 Ill.App.3d 439, 152 Ill.Dec. 455

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Timothy L. CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-90-0069.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Jan. 17, 1991.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender, Jon McPhee, Asst. Defender, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.

John Turner, State's Atty., Lincoln, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, David E. Mannchen, Staff Atty., Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice SPITZ delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal by defendant Timothy Clark from his conviction for first-degree murder following a jury trial in the circuit court of Logan County. Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of 60 years.

Defendant was convicted of shooting with a revolver and killing Steven Becicka in rural Logan County on January 15, 1989. The State's theory of the case was that defendant shot the victim to obtain money, apparently to support defendant's cocaine usage. Defendant, on the other hand, attempted to persuade the jury that he was forced to kill Becicka by Parrish Westbrook, who threatened defendant's life. According to defendant, Westbrook demanded the death because defendant and the victim had failed to pay a debt incurred for illicit drugs. The defendant argued he believed he was justified in killing Becicka, although that belief was unreasonable and, as a result, he should be convicted of second-degree murder rather than first-degree murder.

Several issues are raised on appeal. The first issue to be considered is whether the first-degree murder statute is unconstitutional as a violation of due process, equal protection, or separation of powers. Initially, the State contends that defendant has waived this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. As in People v. Wade (1989), 131 Ill.2d 370, 137 Ill.Dec. 608, 546 N.E.2d 553, this court need not decide whether a constitutional challenge to a statute which is the basis of a criminal conviction can ever be waived. Even under the plain error doctrine, this court must first determine whether error had in fact occurred. Furthermore, a constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised at any time. People v. Christy (1990), 139 Ill.2d 172, 176, 151 Ill.Dec. 315, 317, 564 N.E.2d 770, 772.

Defendant's challenges to the constitutionality of the first-degree murder statute are three. The first of these is that the statute violates defendant's right to due process.

Defendant's challenge based on a due-process argument is this. The law currently defines two types of murder, first degree and second degree. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, pars. 9-1, 9-2.) According to defendant, because the burden of demonstrating that defendant's conduct falls into second degree rather than first-degree murder rests upon defendant, the Illinois law creates a rebuttable presumption regarding defendant's state of mind for murder and requires defendant to prove the intent necessary for first-degree murder was not present. Defendant recognizes that under the prior statutory definitions, voluntary manslaughter (the equivalent of the current second-degree murder) was an affirmative defense to murder. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1, 9-2; People v. Reddick (1988), 123 Ill.2d 184, 122 Ill.Dec. 1, 526 N.E.2d 141.) However, instead of requiring the State to disprove the elements of second-degree murder in order to establish defendant's guilt of first-degree murder, defendant now must prove the existence of the elements of second-degree murder in order to escape a first-degree murder conviction.

This court has recently determined that the current statutory scheme does not violate a defendant's right to due process. (People v. Buckner (1990), 203 Ill.App.3d 525, 149 Ill.Dec. 57, 561 N.E.2d 335.) Defendant's argument in this case offers no valid reason for a retreat from the holding in Buckner.

Defendant also contends the current statutory scheme violates the equal protection clause of either the United States Constitution or the Illinois Constitution of 1970. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 2) require that no person is to be denied equal protection of the law. However, it is invidious discrimination against a class of individuals, and not simply inequality, which is prohibited by these equal protection clauses. (Village of Cahokia v. Wright (1973), 11 Ill.App.3d 124, 296 N.E.2d 30, aff'd (1974), 57 Ill.2d 166, 311 N.E.2d 153.) There does not appear to be any distinction between the analysis for assessing violations of the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. (See Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 125 Ill.Dec. 822, 531 N.E.2d 1.) Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court analyzed the constitutional question of equal protection provided by the Illinois Constitution as follows:

"[A] person or class of persons is denied equal protection by a State statute when the statute arbitrarily discriminates against that person or class of persons by withholding some benefit or privilege which the State gives to all others. (Bilyk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1988), 125 Ill.2d 230, 237, [125 Ill.Dec. 822, 531 N.E.2d 1]; Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. v. Thompson (1985), 108 Ill.2d 357, 367 [91 Ill.Dec. 610, 483 N.E.2d 1245].) In this case, neither party has argued that section 4 affects a fundamental right or discriminates against a suspect class. In such circumstances, the discrimination created by the classifications imposed by the statute is arbitrary, and therefore unconstitutional, only if there is no reasonable basis for the classification--i.e., if the classification of one group of persons as those to whom a certain privilege is denied is not rationally related to the statute's legitimate goal. (Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 237 [125 Ill.Dec. 822, 531 N.E.2d 1]; Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1986), 111 Ill.2d 350, 371 [95 Ill.Dec. 510, 489 N.E.2d 1374]; Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill.2d at 367 [91 Ill.Dec. 610, 483 N.E.2d 1245]; Illinois Housing Development Authority v. Van Meter (1980), 82 Ill.2d 116, 120-21 [45 Ill.Dec. 18, 412 N.E.2d 151].) In other words, if the statute's legitimate goal can, with comparable facility, be achieved without classifying persons, the classifications created by the statute deny some persons equal protection of the laws and render the statute invalid.

* * * * * *

* * * [T]he standard of review is * * *: Are the classifications created by the statute reasonable because these classifications are rationally related to achievement of the statute's legitimate goals in that the particular condition or attribute upon which the classifications are based constitutes a plausible distinction between the classes in view of the statute's legitimate goals? (See Chicago National League Ball Club, 108 Ill.2d at 368 [91 Ill.Dec. 610, 483 N.E.2d 1245]; Illinois Housing Development Authority, 82 Ill.2d at 124-25 [45 Ill.Dec. 18, 412 N.E.2d 151]; Hamilton Corp. v. Alexander (1972), 53 Ill.2d 175, 179 .) * * *

As additional guidance in ruling on the validity of section 4, we note the presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional (e.g., Bernier v. Burris (1986), 113 Ill.2d 219, 227 [100 Ill.Dec. 585, 497 N.E.2d 763] ); to the same purpose, statutory classifications created by the legislature 'are presumed to be valid' (Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 236 [125 Ill.Dec. 822, 531 N.E.2d 1]; see Illinois Housing Development Authority, 82 Ill.2d at 122 [45 Ill.Dec. 18, 412 N.E.2d 151] ). As a result, it is for the party challenging a statute's constitutionality--here, plaintiffs--to rebut these presumptions and prove the unconstitutional nature of the statute. Bilyk, 125 Ill.2d at 235 [125 Ill.Dec. 822, 531 N.E.2d 1]; People v. Walker (1988), 119 Ill.2d 465 [116 Ill.Dec. 675, 519 N.E.2d 890]; Bernier, 113 Ill.2d at 227 [100 Ill.Dec. 585, 497 N.E.2d 763]." County of Bureau v. Thompson (1990), 139 Ill.2d 323, 335-38, 151 Ill.Dec. 508, 514-16, 564 N.E.2d 1170, 1176-78.

The State argues defendant has failed to identify the class of which he is a member and which is subject to the discrimination. However, the State also argues that first-degree murder defendants are not singled out for a burden unlike those faced by other defendants, apparently assuming that defendant meant to define as a class all persons charged with first-degree murder. Other defendants are required to raise affirmative defenses such as intoxication, justifiable use of force, entrapment, compulsion, or necessity. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, pars. 6-4, 6-3, 7-14, 7-1 through 7-10, 7-12, 7-11, 7-13.) The State also points out the procedural similarities between the case at bar and cases involving an insanity defense. Section 6-2(e) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) provides:

"(e) When the defense of insanity has been presented during the trial, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity. However, the burden of proof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of each of the offenses charged, and, in a jury trial where the insanity defense has been presented, the jury must be instructed that it may not consider whether the defendant has met his burden of proving that he is not guilty by reason of insanity until and unless it has first determined that the State has proven the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense with which he is charged." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 6-2(e).)

The second-degree murder statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-2) sets forth the following definitions and procedure:

"(a) A...