People v. Clark
| Decision Date | 28 May 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-543,80-543 |
| Citation | People v. Clark, 421 N.E.2d 590, 96 Ill.App.3d 491, 51 Ill.Dec. 955 (Ill. App. 1981) |
| Parties | , 51 Ill.Dec. 955 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Peggy CLARK, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Appellate Court of Illinois |
Thomas Lilien, Asst. State Appellate Defender, Robert J. Agostinelli, DeputyState Appellate Defender, Ottawa, for defendant-appellant.
Warren T. McNeill, Asst. State's Atty., Warren County, Monmouth, Gerry R. Arnold, John X. Breslin, State's Attys.Appellate Service Commission, Ottawa, for plaintiff-appellee.
Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Warren County, the defendant, Peggy Clark, was found guilty of the unlawful delivery of a controlled substance (3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA)).The trial was conducted in the defendant's absence pursuant to Illinois Revised Statutes 1979, Chapter 38, Section 115-4.1(a).At a subsequent sentencing hearing, from which the defendant was also absent, the trial court considered a presentence report and then sentenced the defendant to a term of two years imprisonment.
Because a detailed recitation of the facts in the case is not necessary to a resolution of the issues raised on appeal, the following summary of events will suffice.John Linden, an undercover purchasing agent working under the alias "Billy Kern" for the Multi-County Narcotic Enforcement Group, called the defendantat 5 p. m. on November 6, 1979, and asked her if she could obtain an ounce of MDA for him.The defendant said she thought she could obtain the MDA and asked Linden to call her again.When Agent Linden called at 7:30 p. m., arrangements were made to meet the defendant at her house and drive to Rock Island to obtain the MDA.The defendant informed Agent Linden that the ounce would cost $570.
Two surveillance teams followed Linden and Rodney Meyer, a confidential source, to the defendant's home.Rodney Meyer was not subpoenaed for the defendant's trial.
Following a brief discussion in the defendant's home, Agent Linden and Rodney Meyer entered the defendant's vehicle along with David Mathis, whose case was joined with that of the defendant, and the defendant's son, Sean Hendrickson, for the trip to Rock Island.Meyer and Linden sat in the back seat.In the first block of the trip, while still in Warren County, Linden handed $570 over the seat to the defendant.
Upon arriving in Rock Island, the defendant pulled over to the curb at 1202 17th Street.She and Mathis then exited her vehicle.She instructed Sean to drive around for fifteen minutes and then return to pick her up.During this period, surveillance agent Brenkman observed the defendant and Mathis enter a nearby house.Approximately thirty minutes later, Sean and the others returned with the vehicle, and were joined by the defendant and Mathis.The defendant stated that she had the MDA.At this time, the group returned to the defendant's house in Alexis.There Agent Linden obtained the bag of MDA from the defendant and departed with Meyer at 10:30 p. m.
George Whitlach, a forensic scientist with the Illinois Bureau of Scientific Services, testified that, in his opinion, the substance obtained by Agent Linden was 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine or MDA.No evidence was presented on behalf of the defense.
The information originally issued against the defendant charged:
At the close of its case, the State was permitted to amend the information to replace the notation "27.8 grams of" with "3,4".The latter notation is a chemical numbering system for carbon atoms.Defense counsel then moved to strike the information because the evidence did not show that MDA was a narcotic as required by Chapter 561/2, Paragraph 1401(b) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act.Paragraph 1401(b), violation of which is a Class 2 felony, relates to narcotic drugs, while Paragraph 1401(c), a Class 3 felony, encompasses non-narcotic drugs.(Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, Ch. 561/2, Pars. 1401(b) and 1401(c)).The trial court then allowed the State's motion to amend the information a second time to state that the offense was charged under subparagraph (c), rather than subparagraph (b).
Since MDA is not a narcotic substance, a delivery of any amount of MDA less than 300 grams is a Class 3 felony, properly charged under Illinois Revised Statutes 1979, Chapter 561/2, Sections 1401(a)(7)(iv) and 1401(c).It is the trial court's allowance of the State's motion to amend the information from an instrument charging a violation of 1401(b) to one charging a violation of 1401(c), that the defendant raises as her first issue on appeal.Specifically, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in permitting the amendment where the altered information changed the nature and classification of the offense.Relying on the reasoning in People v. Betts(1st Dist., 1979), 78 Ill.App.3d 200, 33 Ill.Dec. 773, 397 N.E.2d 106, the defendant contends that the amendment improperly altered a fundamental defect in the charging instrument.
While it is true that fundamental defects cannot be amended (People v. Heard(1970), 47 Ill.2d 501, 266 N.E.2d 340), mere formal defects in a charging instrument may be amended at any time.(People v. Troutt(5th Dist., 1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 656, 9 Ill.Dec. 113, 366 N.E.2d 370).A variance between the charging instrument and the proof presented at trial is not fatal where the offense charged is sufficiently set forth to enable an accused to properly prepare her defense and raise the judgment as a plea in bar to a later prosecution for the same offense.People v. Taylor(3rd Dist., 1980), 84 Ill.App.3d 467, 39 Ill.Dec. 764, 405 N.E.2d 517.
In the case at bar, we view the substitution of "paragraph 1401(c), a Class 3 felony" for the phrase "paragraph 1401(b), a Class 2 felony" in the information, as a permissible amendment of a mere, formal defect.The offense charged against the defendant, unlawful delivery of MDA, remained the same after the amendment.The only effect of the alteration was to state correctly the applicable sentence.(See, People v. McCarty(4th Dist., 1981), 93 Ill.App.3d 898, 418 N.E.2d 26.)The defendant has shown no prejudice as a result of the reference to paragraph 1401(b), as opposed to paragraph 1401(c) in the information, nor has she demonstrated how the error could result in double jeopardy.In determining that the amendment was permissible in this case, we do not thereby condone the sloppiness and inattention to detail apparent on the part of the state's attorney who prepared the information.Given a modicum of care in the drafting of the charging instrument, no amendments should have been required.
People v. Betts(1st Dist., 1979), 78 Ill.App.3d 200, 33 Ill.Dec. 773, 397 N.E.2d 106, is distinguishable from the instant case.In Betts, the reviewing court reversed the defendant's conviction where the state's attorney had amended an indictment to alter the charged offense from one of delivery of a controlled substance, which is a narcotic under paragraph 1401(b), to one of delivery of a non-narcotic controlled substance under 1401(c).In finding error, the court noted the deference traditionally accorded a grand jury under the common law.The trial court was found to have infringed upon the grand jury's prerogatives by allowing the state's attorney to amend the indictment.The court noted that had the grand jury known the facts warranted only the lesser charge of delivery of a non-narcotic, it might have decided the defendant's conduct did not warrant a criminal prosecution.Likewise, People v. Troutt(5th Dist., 1977), 51 Ill.App.3d 656, 9 Ill.Dec. 113, 366 N.E.2d 370, where reverification was held to be a necessary step in the material alteration of a charging instrument, is not supportive of the defendant's position in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the offense was charged by information and never alleged the delivery of a narcotic.The decision to propose any alterations was clearly within the province of the state's attorney.
The defendant next challenges the constitutionality of Section 115-4.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, which permits trials in absentia where the defendant wilfully avoids trial.(See, Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, Ch. 38, Pars. 113-4(d) and 115-4.1).Specifically, she alleges that the trial-in-absentia statute is unconstitutional as it violates due process of law and her rights to be present, to defend against the charges, to have effective assistance of counsel, and to confront the witnesses against her.She also asserts that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to her, because she was never informed that she could waive her right to confrontation by her absence, and because the State failed to send her notice of the trial date by certified mail, as required by the statute.In addition, she asserts her trial in absentia was an abuse of the trial court's discretion, even if the statute is found to be constitutional.Lastly, she contends the trial court erred in sentencing her in absentia where no notice of the sentencing hearing was sent to her.
As to all issues raised, we affirm.
The defendant was arrested on February 1, 1980, but posted bond on February 4, 1980.She retained counsel and waived preliminary hearing.On March 27, 1980, the defendant was arraigned on the instant charge and three others.She entered a plea of not guilty and demanded a jury trial in each of the cases, which were consolidated over a defense objection.The cases were placed on the jury calendar, and the trial...
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...the defendant of the new trial setting, instead relying on a bondsman to do so. Id. at 800. See People v. Clark, 96 Ill.App.3d 491, 51 Ill.Dec. 955, 421 N.E.2d 590, 594-95 (1981) (distinguishing Evans on this ¶ 26 The dissent also relies on State v. Mahone, 297 N.J.Super. 524, 688 A.2d 658 ......
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