People v. Claudio

Citation466 N.Y.S.2d 271,59 N.Y.2d 556,453 N.E.2d 500
Parties, 453 N.E.2d 500 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Angel CLAUDIO, Appellant.
Decision Date07 July 1983
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

Albert A. Gaudelli, Flushing, for appellant.

John J. Santucci, Dist. Atty., Kew Gardens (Joseph Fisch, Asst. Dist. Atty., Larchmont, Joseph J. Hester and Deborah Carlin Stevens, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Chief Judge.

The question presented by this appeal is whether defendant's confession to police, made in a noncustodial setting before a criminal prosecution had commenced, must be suppressed as the product of the ineffective assistance of defendant's retained counsel. This court concludes that suppression of statements made at such an early stage of an investigation is not required, because defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached.

In the early morning hours of May 15, 1980, a 16-year-old high school student returning from a prom was robbed and fatally shot on a Queens street. Four days later, as the result of an anonymous tip, police went to the home of defendant Angel Claudio, who was also 16 years old. Defendant, accompanied by his stepmother, went to the precinct station house at the officers' request. He stated that he had been at home sleeping at the time of the murder, and was allowed to leave.

On May 21, 1980, defendant called the law firm of Heller & Heller, whose listing he had come across in the telephone directory. Attorney Mark Heller returned the call and met with defendant and defendant's cousin the following morning. Defendant retained Heller to represent him in connection with the shooting. Heller and defendant, after a discussion, determined that defendant would surrender to the Queens County District Attorney. Defendant and Heller offered sharply differing accounts at the suppression hearing of what Heller advised his client to say to the authorities. The finding of the courts below, which is supported by the record, was that Heller did not explain the seriousness of the charges defendant might face or his available defenses. The lawyer told defendant that the best course of action was to surrender, and that the lawyer might be able to obtain probation or parole without jail time if defendant did so.

When defendant and his attorney arrived at the District Attorney's office, the lawyer was told by a prosecutor that there was insufficient evidence to charge defendant unless he confessed. He was also informed that there would be no plea bargain. The lawyer did not ask whether defendant was wanted by the police. The courts below found that, after further conversations with representatives of the District Attorney's office, Heller advised his client to make a statement. With his attorney present, defendant was interviewed by the authorities and made extensive inculpatory admissions, resulting in his arrest.

Heller subsequently made a plea through the media for other persons involved in the murder to come forward, and arranged for another young man, Randolfo Maldonado, to surrender after Maldonado contacted him. Both young men were subsequently indicted for murder in the second degree, attempted robbery in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. This appeal involves only defendant Claudio.

At the suppression hearing, defendant argued that the performance of Heller, who by that point had been replaced by assigned counsel, had denied defendant effective assistance of counsel. The court agreed and ordered defendant's statements suppressed. The Appellate Division, 85 A.D.2d 245, 447 N.Y.S.2d 972, reversed and denied the motion to suppress, holding that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached because formal judicial proceedings had not commenced.

At the outset, it should be noted that all members of this court are in agreement that the performance of defendant's lawyer was woefully inadequate. The issue to be determined, however, is whether the lawyer's conduct, coming before the commencement of a criminal prosecution, violated defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 1

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." With respect to this right, "[i]t has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel" (McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449, n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763; see People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 146, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400). In assessing effective assistance, no distinction is to be drawn between assigned and retained counsel (Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1716, 64 L.Ed.2d 333; People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394, 401, 408 N.Y.S.2d 444, 380 N.E.2d 272).

Furthermore, the right to assistance of counsel in a criminal proceeding attaches well before the opening of the actual trial. Indeed, more than 50 years ago, the Supreme Court based its reversal in a capital case on the "conclusion that during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself" (Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57, 53 S.Ct. 55, 59, 77 L.Ed. 158).

In the long line of cases that followed the Supreme Court's historic decision in Powell, "it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him" (Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 1881, 32 L.Ed.2d 411, plurality opn. of Stewart, J.). The right has been held to attach at arraignment (Powell v. Alabama, supra; see White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114), at a postindictment lineup (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149), at a preliminary hearing after arrest but before indictment (Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387), at a preindictment lineup where defendant's presence was directed by court order (People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57, 371 N.E.2d 819; People v. Banks, 53 N.Y.2d 819, 439 N.Y.S.2d 916, 422 N.E.2d 576), and when an accusatory instrument has been filed (People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 320 N.E.2d 625). The right has been held not to apply to the postarrest, preindictment taking of handwriting exemplars from an accused (Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178).

The guiding principle behind the decisions construing the Federal constitutional right to counsel is "that in addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial" (United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, supra [emphasis added] [nn deleted] ).

It logically follows, therefore, that when no stage, not even an informal one, of a prosecution has been reached, a person has no right to assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. When defendant went to the authorities, they had no intention of arresting him. Indeed, defendant's lawyer was told that there was insufficient evidence to charge defendant, unless he made a statement. 2 Under these circumstances, an indigent person could not have insisted on appointment of an attorney under the authority of the Sixth Amendment. Inasmuch as defendant would have had no right to insist that a lawyer be provided for him when he talked to the authorities, he should not be rewarded by a suppression order merely because he chose to bring a lawyer who proved valueless. 3

Contrary to the dissent's assertion, it is not irrational to draw a line at the commencement of criminal proceedings. It bears emphasis that this line does not blindly decree that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel begins at the courthouse door. From Powell down through the most recent decisions, the courts have remained cognizant of the realities of criminal prosecutions. Yet, all prosecutions must be deemed to start at some time. Unless the Constitution is read to require counsel for all persons--innocent or guilty--at the moment when any crime is committed, a line must be drawn at some later point. The commencement of criminal prosecution is the logical choice. Indeed, before commencement of prosecution, neither law enforcement officials nor the courts have any reason to be aware of the ineffectiveness of a person's lawyer, or any obligation to remedy such ineffectiveness. Moreover, before a criminal prosecution has begun, the State has no means of ensuring that a person has "the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him" (Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed.2d 158, supra ).

People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 156, 464 N.Y.S.2d 399, 451 N.E.2d 157, does not stand for a contrary proposition. In Smith, the defendant alleged that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance by advising him to speak to authorities at a meeting set up with the lawyer's agreement. The meeting was arranged in connection with a prosecution in Schenectady County, on which the defendant had already been indicted. Thus, with respect to the meeting, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. The statements made at this meeting were...

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18 cases
  • Claudio v. Scully, 205
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)
    • December 28, 1992
    ...decision that Claudio's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached prior to his confession. People v. Claudio, 59 N.Y.2d 556, 466 N.Y.S.2d 271, 453 N.E.2d 500 (1983). Claudio's counsel did not raise the Article 1, § 6 New York right to counsel claim on appeal even though it was the s......
  • People v. Grimes
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • October 23, 2018
    ...as "[t]he right to effective assistance of counsel can be no broader than the right to counsel on which it is based" (People v. Claudio , 59 N.Y.2d 556, 561 n 3, 466 N.Y.S.2d 271, 453 N.E.2d 500 [1983] ). As we explained herein, court rules do not translate to statutory rules with constitut......
  • People v. Brooks
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New York)
    • October 10, 1984
    ...action has commenced (People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 221, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344; see, also, People v. Claudio, 59 N.Y.2d 556, 560-561, 466 N.Y.S.2d 271, 453 N.E.2d 500). The right to counsel may also attach where there has been "significant judicial activity" (People v. Samue......
  • Claudio v. Scully, 89 CV 3410 ERK.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of New York)
    • April 30, 1992
    ...the Sixth Amendment had not been violated and that Claudio's confession should not have been suppressed. People v. Claudio, 59 N.Y.2d 556, 466 N.Y.S.2d 271, 453 N.E.2d 500 (1983). Because Claudio failed to raise the issue in either the Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division or in his supp......
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