People v. Clements

• Citation: 37 N.Y.2d 675,376 N.Y.S.2d 480,339 N.E.2d 170
• Parties: , 339 N.E.2d 170 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John CLEMENTS and Mark Metzger, Respondents.
• Decision Date: 28 October 1975
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 480

376 N.Y.S.2d 480

37 N.Y.2d 675, 339 N.E.2d 170

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. John CLEMENTS and Mark Metzger, Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 28, 1975.

Denis Dillon, Dist. Atty. (William C. Donnino and Jules E. Orenstein, Mineola, of counsel), for appellant.

Alan Manning Miller, Massapequa, for respondents.

JONES, Judge.

In the circumstances disclosed in this record we hold that, incident ¹ to the arrest of defendants in their apartment, it was lawful for the police to seize the bricks of marijuana found in a closed dresser drawer as well as the marijuana and drug paraphernalia which were in plain view.

A named informer, apparently previously unknown to the police, but identified and still available, told officers with whom he was conversing that he knew where large quantities of marijuana could be purchased. When asked to do so the informer agreed to make a buy for the police. En route to the specified apartment, the informer further told the officers that bricks of marijuana were kept in the bottom drawer of a dresser in the apartment and described the precise location of that dresser.

On arriving at the apartment house, the officers searched the informer and then supplied him with a marked $5 bill. The informer proceeded to defendants' apartment, returning five to eight minutes later with three marijuana cigarettes. He told the officers that he bought only three cigarettes because the sellers began questioning him. At that he became nervous and when defendants left the room the informer left the apartment.

The police went to the apartment. When defendant Clements opened the door he was forthwith arrested and handcuffed. The arresting officers saw marijuana in a blue bowl, as the informer had told them they would, together with cigarette paper, a scale and various types of pipes, all in plain view. Defendant Metzger was located in a bathroom down the hall, arrested and handcuffed.

The officers then proceeded directly to a rear bedroom and to the dresser which had been described by the informer. On opening its bottom drawer they found 16 bricks of marijuana, again exactly as the informer had predicted, together with various bags of clear plastic containing marijuana. Examination of the top drawer of the same dresser revealed some 20 barbiturates with a few bags of marijuana and more cigarette paper. There was also a balance scale on top of the dresser.

When defendants' motions to suppress were denied, each pleaded guilty. On appeal from the judgments of conviction the Appellate Division reversed, granting the motions to suppress as to the marijuana found in the dresser drawers. On the People's appeal to our court we now reverse, concluding that the motions to suppress were properly denied In toto.

The issue before us is a relatively narrow one--was the seizure here of the marijuana in the closed drawers of the dresser illegal? We conclude that such seizure was lawful in the circumstances confronted by these arresting officers.

At the threshold we note that there was reasonable cause to sustain the warrantless arrests in the circumstances of this case (CPL 140.10). This is essentially a determination of fact, which was made in favor of the People by the suppression court and affirmed at the Appellate Division (44 A.D.2d 572, 353 N.Y.S.2d 34) and is beyond our review, unless such finding was erroneous as a matter of law. (People v. Alexander, 37 N.Y.2d 202, 204, 371 N.Y.S.2d 876, 878, 333 N.E.2d 157, 158; cf. People v. Oden, 36 N.Y.2d 382, 368 N.Y.S.2d 508, 329 N.E.2d 188.) We find no such error of law. Surely in the circumstances described above the police officers had reasonable cause to believe that a crime had just been committed in the apartment, namely, the sale of marijuana cigarettes to the informer. (Cf. People v. Montague, 19 N.Y.2d 121, 125, 278 N.Y.S.2d 372, 376, 224 N.E.2d 873, 875.)

The real issue on this appeal is whether defendants' constitutional rights were infringed when, after the police had legally entered defendants' apartment and had precise and highly reliable information that there was a cache of narcotics in the bottom drawer of a dresser in the rear bedroom, they proceeded without a search warrant to seize the contraband to protect against the risk of its destruction or removal. We hold that under an exigency exception to the normal constitutional proscriptions, defendants' rights were not violated. ²

The arresting officers had been told by the informer exactly where large quantities of marijuana were to be found. Developments prior to the seizure had fully substantiated both the credibility of the informer and the reliability of the information he supplied. (Cf. People v. Montague, supra; United States v. Wilcox, D.C., 357 F.Supp. 514, 518--519.) Thus there was probable cause for the search and consequent seizure (People v. Slaughter, 37 N.Y.2d 596, 376 N.Y.S.2d 114, 338 N.E.2d 622; People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129, 133, 303 N.Y.S.2d 33, 36, 250 N.E.2d 323, 325).

The conclusion that the police officers had probable cause for the search, however, does not end our inquiry. The critical issue is whether, assuming the existence of probable cause, it was lawful to conduct the search without first obtaining a warrant. Several years ago the issue was precisely framed in the United States Supreme Court:

'The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences by drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.

'There are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, it may be contended that a magistrate's warrant for search may be dispensed with. But this is not such a case. No reason is offered for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers and some slight delay necessary to prepare papers and present the evidence to a magistrate. These are never very convincing reasons and, in these circumstances, certainly are not enough to by-pass the constitutional requirement. No suspect was fleeing or likely to take flight. The search was of permanent premises, not of a movable vehicle. No evidence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruction'. (Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13--15, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).)

Crucial then to the legality of the warrantless seizure here is the coexistence of two factors, each significant for itself and more significant in combination. The first is the existence of what are referred to as exigent or exceptional circumstances. (Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474--475, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564.) The second is the fact that this seizure was specifically focused on a predetermined target, the predetermination of which was based on explicit information furnished by a known and still available individual whose reliability the police had currently substantiated (see People v. Montague, supra). Most significant the seizure was conducted to prevent the threatened disappearance of tangible evidence.

We conclude that there is ample proof in this record to support the finding by the suppression court that there were exigent circumstances. In the first place in dealing with narcotics the officers were obviously dealing with potentially readily disposable contraband, even in the quantities ultimately discovered in this case. (Cf. United States v. Davis, 3 Cir., 461 F.2d 1026, 1032.) Secondly, on returning with only three marijuana cigarettes the informer both by his conduct and by his verbal statements to the police revealed his own anxiety and belief, following their questioning of him, that the sellers might have become suspicious of what was afoot. Indeed the informer appears to have been apprehensive for his own safety. Thirdly, but of less significance, the conduct of the officers reflected their own contemporaneous evaluation of the situation--that prompt police action was imperative. The apartment was entered without delay. Defendant Clements was arrested forthwith and promptly handcuffed. On locating defendant Metzger the officer immediately ordered him not to flush the toilet and promptly handcuffed him when he emerged. In sum the situation was sufficient to create, and evidently did create, a perceived likelihood that the marijuana of which the police had been informed might be destroyed.

As to the second factor, the informer, now confirmed as credible, had earlier located the particular dresser, had specifically identified the bottom drawer, and had described its contents. The selection of the target of the search was based on direct evidence; no resort was had to inference. Significantly, we think, in this case there was not a wide-ranging, exploratory, rummaging, or routine search of the character condemned in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685.

Our case should be viewed from the perspective of the police in the circumstances with which they were confronted. Having taken defendants into custody, the officers obviously had responsibility to take some action to prevent destruction or removal of the marijuana and drug paraphernalia. They would have been derelict in the performance of their duty as enforcement officers had they done nothing. Their right, indeed their obligation, to seize the...