People v. Clifton

• Decision Date: 18 January 1951
• Docket Number: No. 31666,31666
• Citation: People v. Clifton, 408 Ill. 475, 97 N.E.2d 298 (Ill. 1951)
• Parties: PEOPLE v. CLIFTON.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 298

97 N.E.2d 298

408 Ill. 475

PEOPLE v. CLIFTON.

No. 31666.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 18, 1951.

Rehearing Denied March 19, 1951.

Daniel Samuel Clifton, pro se.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty. Gen., and John A. Heuer, State's Atty., of Chester (Harry L. Pate, of Tuscola, of counsel), for the People.

WILSON, Justice.

September 3, 1946, the defendant, Daniel Samuel Clifton, was indicted in the circuit court of Randolph County for the murder of his wife, Bertha S. Clifton, on June 1, 1946. When arraigned on the day first named, defendant, represented by an attorney of his own choice, pleaded guilty. The trial judge fully advised and admonished him with respect to the consequences of his plea. Defendant persisted in his plea of guilty, the court accepted his plea, and adjudged him guilty of murder, in manner and form as charged in the indictment. After hearing evidence and the recommendations of the State's Attorney, the court sentenced defendant to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of ninety-nine years. Appearing pro se, defendant prosecutes this writ of error. No bill of exceptions has been filed.

Five of defendant's fourteen assignments of error relate to the sentence, defendant contending that the court erred in entering a sentence not finding facts supporting the indictment; that the sentence is not in conformity with the specific charges of the indictment; that the sentence is void for vagueness, indefiniteness and uncertainty, and that it is insufficient in content to comply with the law applicable to murder cases. The trial judge found defendant guilty, as charged in the indictment. Defendant having pleaded guilty, it was unnecessary to present the facts as would have been necessary had he pleaded not guilty. The common-law record discloses that defendant, represented by counsel, voluntarily pleaded guilty, and that the trial judge accepted his plea only after cautioning him as to its consequences and, after hearing testimony, imposed sentence. Section 142 of division I of the Criminal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 38, par. 360), fixes the punishment for murder. The sentence of ninety-nine years is within the penalty prescribed by law and its term was within the discretion of the court.

The indictment consists of nine counts, each charging murder. No other criminal offense is involved. Without going into detail, the indictment clearly charges defendant with the crime of murder. The judgment order, to the extent relevant, declares, 'whereupon * * * the Court being fully advised in the premises doth find and adjudge the Defendant, Daniel Samuel Clifton Guilty of the crime of Murder, in manner and form as charged in the Indictment.' The indictment, the judgment order and the mittimus are each captioned, 'Indictment for Murder.' Defendant was not charged with the commission of any other crime. We recur to this court's observation in People ex rel. Hutchinson v. Murphy, 188 Ill. 144, 58 N.E. 984, 985, 'We are unable to see upon what ground it can be contended that the verdict fails to specify of what offense or crime the defendant was found guilty. It is in the usual form. The indictment charges him with the crime of murder. The verdict finds him 'guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment.' This * * * is a specific finding of guilty of the crime of murder.' Again, in Donovan v. People, 215 Ill. 520, 74 N.E. 772, 773, this court said, 'Reference may be had to the indictment or the count under which the verdict is found, and, where an indictment charges a crime, a general verdict of guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment is a specific finding of each element of the crime as charged, and is sufficient.' It affirmatively appears from the record that the proceedings from arraignment to sentence complied with the applicable statutory provisions.

Several contentions are to the effect that defendant's plea of guilty was obtained as the result of cruel, inhuman and barbarous treatment, both physical and mental violence, and duress. These contentions find no basis in the common-law record and are predicated solely upon uncorroborated personal statements in his brief. Issues based upon allegations or matters of fact are not open to consideration in the absence of a bill of exceptions. People v. Baldridge, 403 Ill. 606, 87 N.E.2d 782.

Reliance upon authorities to the effect that a confession obtained by fraud, coercion or duress is illegal, People v. Holick, 337 Ill. 333, 169 N.E. 169; People v. Heide, 302 Ill. 624, 135 N.E. 77, cannot avail defendant. The common-law record does not disclose whether a confession was proffered or admitted in evidence. Upon a plea of guilty, as here, introduction in evidence of a written confession would be unnecessary. If, in fact, a statement was introduced in evidence, it would have...