People v. Cline
| Decision Date | 02 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-17-2631,1-17-2631 |
| Citation | 2020 IL App (1st) 172631,441 Ill.Dec. 166,156 N.E.3d 501 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John CLINE, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
¶ 1 John Cline's conviction for residential burglary hangs on the thread of testimony by a fingerprint expert about an incomplete analysis of a partial print. That print was found on a portable object at the scene. The State makes much of the respect we must pay to the trial court's factual and credibility findings, which we acknowledge we must. But this case is about the sufficiency of credible evidence, not the credibility of sufficient evidence, and the fingerprint expert's lacks the specificity required to support Cline's conviction.
¶ 3 Tom Slowinski testified that the front and the back doors were locked when he left his apartment around 8:15 a.m. on September 1, 2015. When he returned that evening, he saw the front door was ajar and had scratches. Inside, the apartment appeared "ransacked and torn apart." He noticed items missing, including his laptop and headphones, so he called the police. At trial, Slowinski identified a photograph of a "Shore Headphone" case. When he left the apartment that morning, the headphones were in the case. When he returned, the case had been moved, and the headphones were gone. He did not know Cline and had not given Cline permission to be inside his apartment. During cross-examination, Slowinski testified that he had been out of town the week before the incident and had given a house key to a friend. He did not know whether the friend knew Cline.
¶ 4 Testimony revealed that a Chicago Police Department evidence technician processed the headphone case, and identified a "fingerprint ridge impression," which he "lifted" with clear plastic contact paper. At a police station, a department aide fingerprinted Cline, and after apprising Cline of the Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ), a detective asked Cline if he would have reason to be at Slowinski's address or inside an apartment there. Cline said "he would not be over in that area."
¶ 5 Daniel Dennewitz testified that for about eight years he had worked in the Chicago Police Department latent prints unit, analyzing and comparing latent fingerprints, and had done fingerprint analysis for "[j]ust over a year or so." Dennewitz received training in fingerprint identification and examination and had been qualified as an expert in the area of fingerprint examination and identification on five occasions. After Cline's counsel declined to question Dennewitz about his qualifications, the trial court found Dennewitz qualified to testify as an expert in the area of fingerprint identification.
¶ 6 Dennewitz explained that identifications involve a side-by-side comparison of the unknown fingerprint to a "known print" at three different levels of detail. The first level of detail includes "the actual ridge pads, the flow of the ridges, [and] the pattern." But, with level one, a fingerprint only can be excluded rather than identified. Level two spots the uniqueness in the "detail within the ridge pads" themselves, such as "a ridge end, a bifurcation of the friction ridge pads, and a dot." The analyst looks at the positioning of these details, or their "pattern," and if they coincide then the two prints came from the same source.
¶ 7 Dennewitz identified State's exhibit number 5, the fingerprint lift. There were four latent prints on the lift. Dennewitz determined "A2" was suitable for comparison. He chose this print because it had a "sufficient amount of detail" from which he could form an opinion. Dennewitz compared A2 to a known print of Cline's right middle finger and concluded that they came from the same source. Dennewitz identified the State's exhibit number 7, which was a "demonstration" of the comparison. Of the about 20 points of comparison, 9 points were diagramed on the exhibit. He then did a second comparison of Cline's right middle finger, "using the same identification procedure," and concluded, within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty based on his experience, training, and education, that the two prints came from the same source.
¶ 8 During cross-examination, Dennewitz acknowledged that the latent print only showed one side of the finger—"the core[,] which is the middle of the print." Dennewitz explained that he marked nine points on the recovered print, three points from the left, three from the bottom, and three from the right of the "core." Because the latent fingerprint was incomplete, Dennewitz had to assume that what was not captured in the partial print would be the same as those areas in Cline's known print.
¶ 9 Cline did not present evidence.
¶ 10 In finding Cline guilty of residential burglary, the trial court said that Slowinski did not give Cline permission to be in the apartment and, although Cline denied it, his fingerprint was identified on a headphone case inside the apartment, placing Cline there.
¶ 11 Cline obtained posttrial counsel, who filed a motion and supplemental motion for a new trial, alleging, in part, that trial counsel did not examine Dennewitz to undermine his conclusion that the recovered fingerprint belonged to Cline. At the hearing on Cline's motion, trial counsel testified that his strategy was twofold. First, he sought to convince the court that Dennewitz assumed "the other part of the fingerprint" belonged to Cline and thus hadn't made a "positive identification." To achieve that goal, he asked Dennewitz whether he had assumed the missing part of the print belonged to Cline. Counsel did not ask the court to look at the fingerprint evidence and draw a conclusion, as Dennewitz was an expert and had testified five times before. Second, in any event, the State failed to prove that Cline was not a guest of Slowinski's friend who had his house keys, and it was impossible to determine when Cline's fingerprint appeared on the headphone case.
¶ 12 In denying Cline a new trial, the trial court noted that trial counsel could have retained an independent fingerprint analyst to review Dennewitz's analysis. The court also noted Dennewitz had found at least 20 points of comparison and no evidence indicated that Dennewitz was incompetent. Cline received a sentence of eight years in prison.
¶ 14 Cline contends the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when (i) the only evidence tying him to the offense consisted of a single, partial fingerprint on a "portable object" and (ii) Dennewitz's testimony regarding that partial fingerprint was incomplete. We agree.
¶ 15 When a defendant challenges his or her conviction based on the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown , 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48, 377 Ill.Dec. 1, 1 N.E.3d 888. We make all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the State. People v. Lloyd , 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42, 369 Ill.Dec. 759, 987 N.E.2d 386. The trier of fact resolves conflicts in the testimony, weighs the evidence, and draws reasonable inferences from the facts. Brown , 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48, 377 Ill.Dec. 1, 1 N.E.3d 888. In a bench trial, we owe "great deference" to the trial judge, but we are not "a mindless rubber stamp on every bench trial guilty verdict." People v. Hernandez , 312 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1037, 246 Ill.Dec. 65, 729 N.E.2d 65 (2000). Our constitutional responsibility includes "examin[ing] the record for a lack of evidence linking the defendant to the crime charged." Id. We do so here and find the evidence wanting.
¶ 16 A person commits residential burglary when he or she knowingly and without authority enters or remains in the dwelling of another with the intent to commit a felony or theft there. 720 ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2014). No one disputes that someone went into Slowinski's apartment without his permission and took things. Cline disputes that he was that person.
¶ 17 To sustain a conviction based "solely on fingerprint evidence," the fingerprint must have been found in the immediate vicinity of the crime and under circumstances establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprint was made at the time of the offense. People v. Rhodes , 85 Ill. 2d 241, 249, 52 Ill.Dec. 603, 422 N.E.2d 605 (1981). The particular location of the evidence or the surrounding "attendant circumstances" may establish the fingerprint having been left at the time of the offense. People v. Campbell , 146 Ill. 2d 363, 387, 166 Ill.Dec. 932, 586 N.E.2d 1261 (1992). Of paramount importance, even above the considerations of location and timing, however, is that the evidence must allow a reasonable fact finder to conclude that the fingerprint found at the scene corresponds to defendant's known fingerprint. Rhodes , 85 Ill. 2d at 249, 52 Ill.Dec. 603, 422 N.E.2d 605.
¶ 18 We begin with the fingerprint expert's failure to follow standard analytical procedure for matching prints. This court has recognized, citing a wealth of precedent, that "ACE-V" is the accepted method for fingerprint comparison. People v. Luna , 2013 IL App (1st) 072253, ¶¶ 60-84, 371 Ill.Dec. 65, 989 N.E.2d 655. This method requires four steps: (i) Analysis , during which the examiner determines whether there is sufficient ridge detail to make a comparison between the latent fingerprint and the exemplar fingerprint; (ii) Comparison , during which the examiner does a visual measurement or comparison of the unique details of the prints; (iii) Evaluation , during which the examiner determines whether a "sufficient quantity and quality of friction ridge detail is in agreement between...
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