People v. Close

• Decision Date: 01 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 3-08-0357.,3-08-0357.
• Citation: 905 N.E.2d 985,329 Ill.Dec. 147
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marc A. CLOSE, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

905 N.E.2d 985

329 Ill.Dec. 147

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marc A. CLOSE, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3-08-0357.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District.

April 1, 2009.

Terry A. Mertel, Deputy Director, Judith Z. Kelly (argued), State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Brian Towne, State's Attorney, Ottawa, for the People.

Douglas B. Olivero (argued), Louis E. Olivero & Associates, Peru, for Marc A. Close.

Justice WRIGHT delivered the opinion of the court:

A grand jury of LaSalle County issued a bill of indictment charging defendant, Marc A. Close, with one count of felony driving while license revoked. Following a hearing on April 18, 2008, the trial court granted defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The State filed a certificate of substantial impairment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.2d R. 604(a)(1)) and appeals the trial court's ruling.

FACTS

On August 7, 2007, a grand jury of LaSalle County issued a bill of indictment charging defendant with one count of felony driving while license revoked. The indictment alleged that on or about June 24, 2007, defendant knowingly drove a 1987 Chevrolet upon a public highway, Argyle Street, at a time when defendant's driver's license was revoked for a conviction for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol and the defendant had been previously convicted of the offense of driving while license revoked.

On December 5, 2007, defendant filed a "motion to quash and suppress" alleging in part that defendant's conduct did not give rise to probable cause. Defendant sought the suppression of any statements or physical evidence obtained as a result of defendant's arrest and the dismissal of the charges.

After multiple continuances, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to quash and suppress on April 18, 2008. Defense counsel called Thomas Belski to testify. Belski, a sergeant with the LaSalle police department, testified that he had been employed with the department for four years. Prior to that, he worked as a deputy with the Bureau County sheriff's department for eight years.

On June 24, 2007, he conducted routine patrol in the city of LaSalle. At approximately 7:13 p.m., he performed a registration check on a motor vehicle with license plate 12293P, while he followed the vehicle on a roadway. The registration check revealed that the driving privileges of the registered owner of the vehicle were revoked. From the registration check, he also learned that the registered owner had been issued a restricted driving permit, but he did not know the terms of the permit. Belski explained that he used the computer equipment in his squad car to retrieve a photograph of the registered owner, Marc A. Close. He believed Marc A. Close to be the driver of the vehicle after comparing the photograph to the face of the driver he observed operating the vehicle.

Belski stopped the motor vehicle without witnessing the driver commit any violations of the vehicle code. When asked by defense counsel if he stopped the vehicle because he "had a hunch" that the driver was not complying with the terms of his restricted driving permit, Belski stated, "That's correct."

Upon further questioning, Belski stated that he stopped the vehicle based upon his observations of the driver, his clothing, the day of the week, and the time. He further stated that the stop occurred on Sunday, and he knew from prior experience that restricted driving permits were issued for work purposes or hardship issues only. After stopping the vehicle, Belski approached the driver and inquired about the driver's driving privileges. Upon learning that the driver's privileges were revoked, Belski arrested the driver.

At that time, the trial court interjected about a recent case on the issue. Defense counsel provided the court with a copy of a case entitled People v. Johnson, but failed to offer a citation on the record. Defense counsel then continued his questioning of Belski. Belski indicated that the traffic stop occurred in a residential area of LaSalle. Belski explained that he observed the driver wearing a baseball cap, sunglasses, and a tank top.

Defense did not call any other witnesses. The State did not offer any evidence. At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel again argued the relevance of the case of People v. Donnell Johnson, without reference to the citation. Defense counsel further argued that the officer lacked an adequate basis to stop the vehicle.

The State argued that the special needs doctrine allowed the officer to stop the driver to determine compliance with the restricted driving permit. The State also argued that the doctrine of inevitable discovery also applied. The State explained that if the officer had not stopped the vehicle, the officer could have later determined the terms of the restricted driving permit. Based upon the officer's observations, he could still issue a ticket and warrant for defendant, if deemed appropriate.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to quash and certified the question for review by the appellate court. The trial court indicated that it "would like some instruction [from the appellate court] because I can understand why they [law enforcement] believe they could do that."

On April 30, 2008, the State filed a certificate of substantial impairment pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). On May 16, 2008, the trial court entered an order granting the certificate of impairment and directing the clerk of the court to prepare a notice of appeal. Pursuant to the order, the clerk of the court filed a notice of appeal on May 16, 2008. Following leave of the court, the State filed an amended notice of appeal on June 13, 2008.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the State asserts People v. Johnson, 379 Ill.App.3d 710, 319 Ill.Dec. 87, 885 N.E.2d 358 (2008), was incorrectly decided, and consequently, this court should not follow the Second District's decision. Alternatively, the State argues that the additional circumstances considered by the officer in this case are readily distinguishable from those facts relied upon by the court in Johnson. In addition, the State suggests the special needs doctrine applies and requires reversal of the trial court's ruling on defendant's motion to suppress.

At issue in this case is the officer's basis for a traffic stop to investigate whether a driver, reasonably suspected to be the registered owner of the vehicle, was driving while his license was revoked. The ultimate question of whether the evidence should be suppressed requires de novo review. People v. Lee, 214 Ill.2d 476, 483-84, 293 Ill.Dec. 267, 828 N.E.2d 237 (2005); People v. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d 502, 512, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004); People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill.2d 425, 430-31, 256 Ill. Dec. 836, 752 N.E.2d 1078 (2001).

The standards for a lawful investigative traffic stop evolved from case law developed after the United States Supreme Court's landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Based on Terry, a police officer may temporarily stop and approach a person for the purposes of investigating suspected criminal behavior, even though the officer acts on less information than is necessary to support probable cause to make an arrest. People v. Moore, 378 Ill.App.3d 41, 46, 316 Ill.Dec. 751, 880 N.E.2d 229 (2007). Hunches are not enough to support a Terry stop. People v. Sparks, 315 Ill.App.3d 786, 792, 248 Ill.Dec. 508, 734 N.E.2d 216 (2000). An officer must have specific knowledge such that the officer is able to articulate sufficient facts present at the time of the encounter to justify the officer's reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed or is about to commit a crime. People v. Moore, 378 Ill.App.3d at 46, 316 Ill.Dec. 751, 880 N.E.2d 229; People v. Chavez, 327 Ill.App.3d 18, 32, 260 Ill.Dec. 894, 762 N.E.2d 553 (2001); People v. Sparks, 315 Ill.App.3d at 792, 248 Ill.Dec. 508, 734 N.E.2d 216.

It is well established that an officer can lawfully conduct a Terry stop of a vehicle after learning or receiving information that the license of the registered owner of the vehicle is revoked or suspended. See People v. Blankenship, 353 Ill.App.3d 322, 325, 289 Ill.Dec. 137, 819 N.E.2d 49 (2004); Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 227 Ill.App.3d 351, 352-53, 169 Ill. Dec. 351, 591 N.E.2d 524 (1992). The purpose of the stop is to allow the officer to check the status of the operator's privilege to drive. Village of Lake in the Hills v. Lloyd, 227 Ill.App.3d at 353, 169 Ill.Dec. 351, 591 N.E.2d 524, citing People v. Barnes, 152 Ill.App.3d 1004, 1006, 106 Ill. Dec. 121, 505 N.E.2d 427 (1987).

In this case, the officer learned from reliable law enforcement records that the registered owner of the vehicle had a revoked driver's license. Additionally, the officer also learned from the same reliable records that the registered owner had been issued a valid restricted driving permit (RDP).

Consequently, we are called upon to determine whether the existence of an RDP demands an added layer of information before an officer develops a sound articulable basis to stop a suspected revoked driver. The issue is whether an officer, knowing the suspected driver has been issued an RDP, may initiate a traffic stop based solely on the knowledge that the suspected driver's license has been revoked; or whether the officer must delay stopping a suspected revoked driver, known to have received an RDP, until the officer considers additional information that excludes a reasonable possibility that the driver may be operating the automobile within the scope of the restricted permit. The answer can be found in the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2006)) and existing case law.

The case law provides that once a "person's privilege to drive has been revoked the restoration of that privilege...