People v. Coefield

• Citation: 236 P.2d 570,37 Cal.2d 865
• Decision Date: 26 October 1951
• Docket Number: Cr. 5198
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: PEOPLE v. COEFIELD.

Page 570

236 P.2d 570

37 Cal.2d 865

PEOPLE v. COEFIELD.

Cr. 5198.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Oct. 26, 1951.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 1951.

Robert H. Kroninger, Oakland, and Harold C. Faulkner, San Francisco, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., Clarence A. Linn, Deputy Atty. Gen., J. F. Coakley, Dist. Atty., Folger Emerson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Vernon L. Goodin, Deputy Dist. Atty., all of Oakland, for respondent.

GIBSON, Chief Justice.

Defendant was charged by information with the murder of Melvin Tokus. A jury found him guilty of murder of the first degree and made no recommendation as to punishment. See Pen.Code, § 190. Defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was withdrawn, his motion for a new trial was denied, and the death penalty was imposed. This appeal is automatic under section 1239(b) of the Penal Code.

On the evening of October 7, 1949, defendant and two other men, Jolby and Anderson, met and agreed to rob the Three Point Liquor Store in Oakland and planned the part each of them was to play. Defendant and Jolby, who were both armed, entered the store shortly after midnight when no customers were on the premises. Anderson remained outside temporarily, apparently acting as lookout, and then followed his companions into the store. In the meantime, defendant asked for two bottles of wine and when they were brought by Tokus, the clerk, defendant announced that it was a 'stickup' and directed Tokus to place the store's money in a paper bag and give it to Anderson. Jolby disarmed the store's watchman and Tokus and the watchman were then ordered into a back room and robbed of their wallets. To aid in making an escape, defendant struck Tokus on the head with his gun and knocked him to the floor, and Jolby struck the watchman several blows on the head with his gun. Tokus started to rise, and defendant struck him again on the head. At that moment the gun discharged, and the bullet entered Tokus' brain, causing his death. After the shot, defendant removed a wristwatch from Tokus' arm, and the robbers left the store and drove to San Francisco, where they divided the proceeds of the robbery.

Defendant took the stand in his own behalf and admitted that he entered the store with a gun for the purpose of robbery and told the clerk it was a 'stickup,' that he and Jolby forced Tokus and the watchman into the back room where he took Tokus' wallet, that he struck Tokus on the head with his gun, knocking him down, and struck him again when he started to rise, and that he hit Tokus on the head for the purpose of 'knocking him out' to permit escape after the robbery, and took the wristwatch after the shooting. Defendant stated that he heard a shot when he struck Tokus the second time but did not know he had shot Tokus, that he was holding the gun by the handle but his finger was not on the trigger and he did not pull it, and that he did not intend to discharge the gun or kill anybody.

The evidence is clearly sufficient to support the verdict of murder in the first degree in view of the provisions of section 189 of the Penal Code that 'All murder * * * which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or mayhem, is murder of the first degree.' Defendant argues that it must first be shown that there was a murder, not merely a killing, and that to have a murder there must be a malicious killing and an intent to kill. See Pen.Code, § 187. It has been held, however, that when one enters a place with a deadly weapon for the purpose of committing robbery, malice is shown by the nature of the attempted crime, and the law fixes upon the offender the intent which makes any killing in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate the robbery a murder of the first degree. People v. Bostic, 167 Cal. 754, 760-761, 141 P. 380; see People v. Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 171-172, 78 P. 549; People v. Olsen, 80 Cal. 122, 126-127, 22 P. 125. Other cases have pointed out that such a killing is murder of the first degree by force of section 189 of the Penal Code, regardless of whether it was intentional or accidental. People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 135, 169 P.2d 1; People v. Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, 791, 161 P.2d 627; People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249, 290 P. 881; People v. Denman, 179 Cal. 497, 498, 177 P. 461. Here, as we have seen, the evidence, including defendant's own testimony, shows that the killing was committed in connection with conduct intended to facilitate escape after the robbery and as part of one continuous transaction; accordingly, it constituted murder of the first degree by the terms of the statute. See People v. Chavez, 37 Cal.2d 656, 234 P.2d 632; People v. Rye, 33 Cal.2d 688, 692-693, 203 P.2d 748; People v. Boss, supra, 210 Cal. at pages 250-252, 290 P. 881. In such a case the jury has no option but to return a verdict of murder of the first degree, whether the killing was done intentionally or accidently. People v. Perry, 195 Cal. 623, 638, 234 P. 890; People v. Witt, 170 Cal. 104, 108, 148 P. 928. It follows that it was not error to instruct the jury that the only criminal intent which the prosecution had to show was a specific intent to rob Tokus and that it was not required to prove a deliberate or premeditated killing or to prove any intent to kill. People v. Milton, 145 Cal. 169, 169-172, 78 P. 549; See People v. Denman, 179 Cal. 497, 498-499, 177 P. 461; People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 249-250, 290 P. 881.

The prosecution was permitted to present evidence that defendant had participated in three other liquor store robberies within a month of the homicide. There was testimony that on two prior occasions defendant and an accomplice robbed a certain liquor store in Emeryville at about two o'clock in the morning. In both instances the clerk was ordered into a back room where defendant hit him on the head with a gun. The third robbery took place in Sacramento on the night after the homicide. The owner testified that defendant, Jolby and Anderson entered his store, took his money and told him to go to the basement, that Jolby struck him two or three times on the head with a gun, and that the gun then discharged and the bullet went through Jolby's hand and the witness' knee. Defendant complaints that the evidence was not admissible because it related to crimes for which he was not on trial.

It is well settled that if evidence in a criminal case tends logically, naturally and by reasonable inference to establish any fact material for the people, or to overcome any material matter sought to be proved by the defense, it is admissible whether it embraces the commission of another crime or not and whether it be part of a single design or not. People v. McMonigle, 29 Cal.2d 730, 742, 177 P.2d 745; People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 315, 169 P.2d 924; People v. Sanders, 114 Cal. 216, 230, 46 P. 153. As stated in People v. Albertson, 23 Cal.2d 550, 576, 145 P.2d 7, 20; 'The general rule, universally recognized, is that in a criminal prosecution the defendant can be tried for no other offense than that which he is charged in the indictment or information; evidence of collateral independent crimes is not admissible. (Citations.) The equally well-recognized exceptions to this rule are clearly defined. Evidence of other crimes may be admitted when it tends directly to establish the crime charged by proving a material fact, where it is part of the...