People v. Cole

Citation172 N.W.2d 354,382 Mich. 695
Decision Date02 December 1969
Docket NumberNo. 14,14
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Johnie L. COLE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Michigan

Milliken & Magee, Flint, for defendant-appellant.

Robert F. Leonard, Pros. Atty., Genesee County, by Donald A. Kuebler, Asst. Pros. Atty., Flint, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before The Entire Bench, except T. G. KAVANAGH, J.

T. M. KAVANAGH, Justice.

Charged with the crime of first degree murder, defendant, upon giving the required notice, interposed the defense of insanity. The jury, at the conclusion of the trial, found defendant guilty of second degree murder, and a sentence of 35 to 50 years was imposed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a split decision, affirmed the conviction. 8 Mich.App. 250, 154 N.W.2d 579. Judge Thomas G. Kavanagh dissented, for the reason that the jury should have been informed as to the disposition of the defendant if he were found not guilty by reason of insanity. 1

Defendant is here on leave granted (380 Mich. 757) and raises four questions:

1. Should the court have asked prospective jurors the proposed voir dire questions requested by defendant?

2. Was there sufficient evidence before the jury for it to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

3. Should the court have instructed the jury, as requested by the defendant, that if it found the shooting was the product of mental disease or mental defect of the defendant, the jury must return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity?

4. The fourth question is divided into three parts:

(A) Should the court have instructed the jury, as requested by the defendant, that a finding of 'not guilty by reason of insanity' means that the accused would be confined in a State hospital for the criminal insane for the remainder of his natural life or until such time as the Governor discharged him upon recommendation of the State hospital commission, based upon investigation by it and its determination that such discharge would not be harmful to other persons or their property; or until such time as the court discharged him through an investigation and a judicial determination of his sanity?

(B) Should the court have answered the following question submitted by the jury: 'Will a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity insure the defendant of immediate release without further treatment in an institution?'

(C) Should the court have allowed defendant's attorney, in his opening and closing arguments, to advise the jury as to the legal disposition of the defendant if a jury returned a verdict of 'not guilty by reason of insanity?'

The facts necessary to an understanding of the questions involved in this case are:

Defendant left his place of employment and returned to his home at approximately 1:30 in the morning. Suffering generally from pains in his back, head, side and foot, defendant attempted to relieve his general discomfort and pain by soaking in a tub of hot water until approximately 4:30 a.m., at which time he went to bed. He was awakened about 9:00 a.m., by his wife, who informed him that a man was cutting off their utilities. Defendant took a gun, which he had owned for approximately 11 years, and confronted the utility employee. Defendant asked him not to shut off the mater and requested a half hour to get the money. The utility employee told defendant that his orders were to cut off the lights and that he could not give him any more time. Thereupon, defendant shot and killed him.

At the trial defendant raised the properly-noticed defense of 'not guilty by reason of insanity.' Defendant's counsel, making his opening statement to the jury, attempted to make reference to defendant's ultimate disposition if found not guilty by reason of insanity. The prosecution objected, and the court ruled that nothing could be told the jury along this line.

During the course of the trial, the evidence introduced by defendant disclosed that he had spent considerable time in a psychiatric ward in Walter Reed Hospital in 1951--1952, his troubles apparently resulting from injuries received while in military service. After discharge from the Army in 1952 for psychiatric reasons, he received a disability pension in amounts varying from 10% To 30%. At the time of the shooting he was receiving a 10% Disability pension. He obtained a job at the Chevrolet plant in Flint in 1952 and worked steadily at his employment up to the time of the killing. He had never been disciplined at work and had no criminal record.

There was also considerable expert medical testimony introduced by defendant relating to the defense of insanity.

Dr. Steinhardt, a practicing physician specializing in psychiatry, had examined defendant at the Veterans Administration Hospital in Dearborn, Michigan, on June 5, 1964, four days before the shooting for which defendant stood trial. He testified that although defendant was in moderate remission from his schizophrenic reaction, it was his professional opinion that defendant would under stress lose control and act irrationally. He did not feel that defendant was psychotic at the time of his last examination, but concluded in his examination report, and also testified, that defendant still had residual elements of his illness.

Dr. Pollie, Assistant Professor of Psychology at the Flint branch of the University of Michigan, administered psychological tests to defendant on October 17 and 18, 1964. The psychologist testified that in his opinion the defendant was suffering from undifferentiated schizophrenic reaction, that he could not make accurate judgments in the face of stress, that his mind was preoccupied by his own fantasies many times, that he had excessive concern about things that would harm him, and that these emotional and mental difficulties were of long duration. When asked whether defendant could have been faking his mental illness, Dr. Pollie answered as follows:

'Q. Doctor, do you have any type of controls that you can use to tell whether or not an individual is faking in the answers?

'A. Well, there are tests of consistency, for example. The relationship between tests gives some idea as to whether the person is faking or not. If there is a consistent pattern from test to test, the indications would be that the individual is ginving an accurate and reliable performance. If there is a marked difference from test to test, the individual is possibly faking.

'Q. And what was your opinion from the controls that you have in this case?

'A. * * * In terms of my experience I see no evidence here of faking. If he fakes these, he is one of the best fakers I have ever encountered. I couldn't do it myself, although I have given these tests many times.'

Dr. Forrer, a doctor of medicine specializing in psychiatry, and chief of staff at Hurley Hospital in Flint, examined the defendant on two occasions after the shooting and had at his disposal the Veterans Administration records from Walter Reed Hospital and the written results of the psychological tests administered by Dr. Pollie. It was Dr. Forrer's opinion that at the time of the shooting the defendant was suffering from a schizophrenic illness and was unable to determine right from wrong, that he did not have the power to resist the impulse to shoot the deceased, and that the shooting was the result of a mental disease of defendant.

The prosecution introduced no expert witness as to the mental condition of defendant. However, the People did present five lay witnesses who related their personal observations of defendant.

Leslie Hampton, a neighbor, testified he saw nothing unusual as defendant walked down his porch steps with the revolver and walked back after the shooting.

Deputy Lloyd Goudy, the first police officer at the scene, testified that he responded to a call and went to defendant's home, and, in response to a knock, 'a colored gentleman' (defendant Cole) opened the door and,

'I asked him what had happened, and he stated that he had told the man not to shut off the gas, and he was going to do it anyway, so he shot him. Then I asked him how may times he shot, and he said he shot five or six times. * * * I went on into the house and I asked him where the gun was, and he pointed to the back of the room. There was a pistol laying on the sink. * * * I took the pistol and I put the handcuffs on Mr. Cole, and we went outside. I didn't--I didn't want to leave Mr. Hanley, because I thought perhaps there was a chance that he might come to, or something. We walked by Mr. Hanley and Mr. Cole looked down at him and stated, 'Man, that guy sure liked his job.' * * * He seemed real calm to me, sir.'

Deputy Sheriff Trier's questioning of defendant after he was transferred from Goudy's cruiser to Trier's car, follows:

'Q. Did you shoot that man?

'A. Yes.

'Q. Why did you shoot him?

'A. Because he was going to shut off my lights.

'Q. Do you mean just because he was going to shut off your lights you shot him?

'A. Yes.

'Q. How many times did you shoot, more than once, two or three times?

'A. I emptied the gun.

'Q. How many shots is in your gun?

'A. Six, I think.

'Q. Tell me in your own words what happened?

'A. Well, I was in bed, and my wife woke me up and said that a man from Consumers Power was here, and that he is going to cut the lights off. I put on my shirt and pants and got my gun and went outside. The man was at the meter with a screw driver and was screwing on the meter. I asked him to stop, and let me go get some money. He said that we had already had 40 days to do that. I asked him to give me a half an hour to get the money. He said that he was ordered to cut the lights off, and that he could not give me any more time. I took the gun out and pointed it at him. He looked at me, and I started firing. I went into the house and put the gun on the sink. I told one of the kids to call the police. * * *

'Q. Did you mean to shoot this man?

'A. Yes, he was going to shut off my...

To continue reading

Request your trial
92 cases
  • Government of Virgin Islands v. Fredericks
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)
    • June 7, 1978
    ...v. Babin, La., 319 So.2d 367, On rehearing, 319 So.2d 379 (La.1975); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1973); People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969); Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398 P.2d 251 (1965), Cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1012, 86 S.Ct. 1932, 16 L.Ed.2d 1030 (1966); State v......
  • Com. v. Mutina
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
    • February 11, 1975
    ...that such an instruction be given unless objected to by the defendant. Similarly, although in the minority, Michigan (People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354 (1969)), Alaska (Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907 (1973)), and Nevada (Kuk v. State, 80 Nev. 291, 392 P.2d 630 (1964)) all either ......
  • People v. Moore
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • March 15, 1985
    ...according to the evidence by advising them of the consequence of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity." (People v. Cole, supra, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354, 366. We conclude, as did the Michigan Supreme Court, the reasons supporting the first proposition far outweigh the dangers ......
  • Erdman v. State, 1535
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1987
    ...166 Cal.App.3d 540, 211 Cal.Rptr. 856 (1985). A similar view was once taken by the Supreme Court of Michigan. In People v. Cole, 382 Mich. 695, 172 N.W.2d 354, 366 (1969), that Court "This appeal makes it mandatory that this Court choose between: 1) the possible miscarriage of justice by im......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT