People v. Coleman
| Citation | 174 Cal.Rptr. 756,120 Cal.App.3d 530 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | Cr. 10556 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Ralph Terry COLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant. |
T. W. Condit, Sacramento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.
George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty., Arnold O. Overoye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant fatally shot his wife, son, and niece after an argument with the wife about finances and other marital problems. He also shot at his daughter. He admitted the shootings and defended on the grounds of diminished capacity and insanity. A jury convicted him of two first degree murders as to the son and niece (Pen.Code, § 187), second degree murder as to the wife (Pen.Code, § 187), and assault with intent to commit murder as to the daughter (Pen.Code, § 217). It also found he used a firearm in each of the three murders (Pen.Code, § 12022.5) and committed multiple murders (Pen.Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). His defenses were rejected. The prosecution eschewed a death penalty request and defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the murder of the son under special circumstances. Sentences on the other counts and the use findings were imposed concurrently and merged with the life sentence.
On appeal, defendant raises issues of error in jury selection and instruction, evidentiary rulings, and sentencing, through appellate counsel; he also separately and personally questions the jury selection, the conduct of both counsel, and the admission of specified psychiatric evidence.
Defendant's first contention is that the court erred in excusing two prospective jurors and an alternate for cause after they stated they could not vote for the death penalty. 1 Since his opening brief was filed, defendant's assertion that "death qualified" jurors (see Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776), are unduly prone to convict and unrepresentative has twice been rejected by our Supreme Court (Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301; People v. Harris (1980) 28 Cal.3d 935, 960, 171 Cal.Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240). The contention thus fails. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, 20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937.)
Defendant's contention that his fair trial rights were violated by exclusion of resident noncitizens from the jury venire fails for the same reason. In Rubio v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 93, 154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595, the Supreme Court considered and rejected the claim, holding that resident aliens are not a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule (at p. 100, 154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595) and that the statutes excluding them (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 198, 199) are constitutional (at p. 105, 154 Cal.Rptr. 734, 593 P.2d 595).
Defendant's personal contention of error in the jury selection is based on an assertion of prosecutorial racial discrimination. The record shows the prosecution exercised two peremptory challenges on prospective black jurors. In each case the prosecutor stated his reasons for the challenge, and in both cases the court found a sufficient basis for the challenge in the reasons stated. The challenges were based on one juror's marital difficulties and the other's contact with and attitudes toward psychiatrists. Defense counsel's objection, based on People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, was overruled on the specific finding that there was no systematic effort to exclude blacks from the jury. Wheeler disallows prosecutorial exclusion of prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias (id., at pp. 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748); it does not immunize group members from peremptory challenges based on legitimate reasons, including prosecutorial fears of bias or partiality. Appellate courts rely on trial courts to identify true cases of group discrimination via peremptory challenges (Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 281-282, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748); in this case the trial court found the challenges justified by the reasons advanced. After reviewing the record, we agree.
Two black potential jurors were excused for cause. Since it was the trial judge, not the prosecutor, who initiated their removal, any claim of prosecutorial discrimination as to them is not viable.
Defendant next challenges the admission into evidence of a tape recording of a jail conversation he had with a visitor, the contents of a letter written by his wife to her mother in 1976, a letter she wrote in 1977 "To Whoever Should Read This," the records of an Ohio mental health center he visited in 1974 and 1975, and the testimony of a psychiatrist who observed him testify in court but never interviewed him. 2
The tape recording of a jail conversation between defendant and a former co-worker was introduced by the prosecution on cross-examination to impeach the witness' testimony that defendant was nervous and upset after the murders. The existence of the tape recording was established by defense counsel on direct examination. The prosecutor also established that the witness knew at the time that the conversation was being recorded.
We reject on the merits defendant's contention that admission of the tape recording violated his rights to privacy. 3 The nature and extent of privacy rights in jailhouse conversations is an issue currently pending before our Supreme Court. 4 Meanwhile, existing authority treats jailhouse communications differently from those of persons in a free setting. (People v. Rodriguez (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 961, 968, 168 Cal.Rptr. 920, hg. den. Feb. 5, 1981. A person detained in jail cannot reasonably expect to enjoy the privacy afforded a person in free society; this lack of privacy is a necessary adjunct to imprisonment. (Ibid.; North v. Superior Court (1972) 8 Cal.3d 301, 309, 104 Cal.Rptr. 833, 502 P.2d 1305.) Except in limited circumstances involving a special relationship, an incarcerated person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in ordinary jailhouse conversations. (See People v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 764-765, 117 Cal.Rptr. 393, 528 P.2d 1, and North v. Superior Court, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 308-309, 104 Cal.Rptr. 833, 502 P.2d 1305.) Reported appellate decisions since the passage of the California Constitutional privacy provision have assumed that privacy and Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections are coextensive. (See People v. Owens (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 441, 448-449 169 Cal.Rptr. 359 and cases there cited.) We decline defendant's invitation to reconsider the issue and find no error in the admission of the tape recording for the limited purpose of challenging the credibility of the defense witness.
Two letters written by defendant's wife describing their marital difficulties and defendant's previous threats to kill his family were read to the jury after the failure of defense efforts to exclude them before and during trial. Limited cross-examination of defendant was permitted on one of the letters he admitted he had recognized as his wife's and looked at at some point before the shootings, after a limiting instruction to the jury to disregard stricken answers and not speculate on unanswered questions. The court also permitted the prosecution to question a defense psychologist and psychiatrist who used the letters in forming opinions on defendant's mental states before, during, and after the shootings. Psychological testimony of both defense and prosecution experts who reviewed the letters in connection with their assessments of defendant was accompanied by limiting instructions to the jury to consider the contents of the letters only in weighing the expert testimony and not as proof of the truth of the statements made. The prosecutor referred to the letters in closing arguments to the jury in attempting to discredit expert testimony on defendant's mental state. Early in his argument the limiting instruction was again read to the jury after a defense objection to the reading of excerpts.
Defendant contends the letters were prejudicial and not probative, and it was an abuse of discretion to allow the jury to hear them or to admit them for any purpose. We disagree.
Defendant testified that he found an envelope on which his wife had written "To Whom it May Concern, Open in Case of my Death," scanned the letter inside, never looked at it again, never asked his wife about it, and did not think about it any more. In light of his defense of diminished capacity and insanity by virtue of the "insidious development of a chronic and unshakable paranoid delusional system" and the contents of the letter (including an account of his wife's intimacies with other men, her attempts to remedy the couple's "situation" in California during the previous two years, defendant's "many" threats to kill her and the children, and her feelings that defendant was being prevented from obtaining good employment by the actions of others), his testimony was suspect. Since credibility is always an issue in any testimony, the prosecution was properly permitted to challenge defendant's by asking why he didn't read the letter. Objections to all specific references to the contents of the letter during cross-examination of defendant were sustained, and the jury was repeatedly admonished to disregard the questions. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the probative value of the letter was not substantially outweighed by the probability of undue prejudice (Evid. Code, § 352) in this context.
Introduction of the contents of the two letters in cross-examination of expert witnesses on defendant's mental state was also proper. Evidence Code section 721 provides, inter...
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