People v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 03 April 1975
• Docket Number: Cr. 17822
• Citation: People v. Coleman, 13 Cal.3d 867, 120 Cal.Rptr. 384, 533 P.2d 1024 (Cal. 1975)
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John W. COLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant.

13 Cal. 3d 867

533 P.2d 1024

120 Cal. Rptr. 384

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. JOHN W. COLEMAN, Defendant and Appellant

Crim. No. 17822

Supreme Court of California

April 3, 1975

SUMMARY:

CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS SUMMARY

In proceedings having the same basis as independent criminal charges on which defendant, a probationer, had been held to answer but which had not yet been tried, his probation was revoked. (Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, No. 83327, John A. Ertola, Judge.)

The Supreme Court reversed the order revoking probation and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. Defendant contended that revocation of his probation in advance of trial on the criminal charges denied him procedural due process by forcing him to forego his opportunity to testify on his own behalf at the revocation hearing in order to avoid incriminating himself at the pending criminal trial. Although the court saw no need to adjudicate this constitutional claim, it did hold that the choice forced on him at the revocation hearing was unnecessarily inconsistent with constitutional values. And in recognition of the tension between a probationer's constitutional right to speak in his own behalf at his probation revocation hearing and his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the court fashioned an exclusionary rule for application to situations such as that faced by the defendant in the case at bench. The court declared as a judicial rule of evidence that henceforth on timely objection, the testimony of a probationer given at a formal, dispositive probation revocation hearing held prior to disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation of probation conditions, and any evidence derived from such testimony, is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges, save for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal in cases where his revocation hearing testimony or evidence derived there from and his testimony on direct examination at the criminal proceeding are so clearly inconsistent as to warrant the trial court's admission of the revocation hearing testimony or its fruits in order to reveal to the trier of fact the probability that the probationer has committed perjury at either the trial or the revocation hearing. However, it was held that in the interest of the sound administration of justice, the rule is to be given prospective effect only, except for the instant case. (Opinion by Wright, C. J., expressing the unanimous view of the court.)

HEADNOTES

CALIFORNIA OFFICIAL REPORTS HEADNOTES

Classified to California Digest of Official Reports, 3d Series

CA(1)(1) Criminal Law § 638--Appealable Judgments and Orders--Revoking Probation. --An order revoking probation is appealable under Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. 2, as an order made after judgment affecting a defendant's substantial rights.

CA(2)(2) Criminal Law § 507--Probation--Revocation--Right to Hearing. --A fundamental requisite of due process is the meaningful opportunity to be heard and to explain one's actions, and this right is one of the minimum requirements of due process which must be accorded an individual at a probation revocation hearing. Moreover, a probationer is not limited to denying or defending against a charged violation of the conditions of his probation. Even where a violation is proven or admitted, he has a due process right to explain any mitigating circumstances and to argue that the ends of justice do not warrant revocation.

CA(3)(3) Criminal Law § 507--Probation--Revocation--Right to Be Heard. --The principal policy underlying a probationer's right to an opportunity to be heard at his revocation hearing is to assure informed, intelligent and just revocation decisions. Another broad policy objective of the constitutional guarantee of an opportunity to testify at such hearing is to enhance the chance of rehabilitation.

CA(4)(4) Criminal Law § 507--Probation--Revocation--Right to Hearing. --Policies served by the due process guarantee of an opportunity for a probationer to be heard at his probation revocation hearing are impinged where he declines to avail himself of this chance for fear of self-incrimination. Constitutional values are similarly disserved where he resolves the conflict in the opposite way by risking self-incrimination so as to testify at such a hearing.

CA(5)(5) Criminal Law § 50--Rights of Accused--Fair Trial--Remaining Silent. --Of the many and varied policies underlying the privilege against self-incrimination, at least two are adversely affected by permitting testimony given by a probationer at his revocation hearing to be used against him at the subsequent criminal trial for the very misconduct at issue in the revocation proceeding. First is the policy of maintaining a fair state-individual balance at the subsequent criminal trial by requiring the government, in its contest with the individual, to shoulder the entire load. Second is the unwillingness to subject those accused of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt.

CA(6)(6) Witnesses § 6--Duty to Testify--Self-incrimination. --A person liable to criminal prosecution who undertakes himself to litigate related issues as a plaintiff in a civil suit is entitled to no relief from the peril of self-incrimination.

CA(7a)(7a) CA(7a)(7b) CA(7a)(7c) Criminal Law § 285--Evidence--Admissibility--Defendant's Probation Revocation Hearing Testimony. --On timely objection, the testimony of a probationer given at a formal, dispositive probation revocation hearing held prior to disposition of criminal charges arising out of the alleged violation of probation conditions, and any evidence derived from such testimony, is inadmissible against the probationer during subsequent proceedings on the related criminal charges, save for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal in cases where his revocation hearing testimony or evidence derived therefrom and his testimony on direct examination at the criminal proceeding are so clearly inconsistent as to warrant the trial court's admission of the revocation hearing testimony or its fruits in order to reveal to the trier of fact the probability that the probationer has committed perjury at either the trial or the revocation hearing. Except for the instant case, this rule will be given prospective effect only.

CA(8)(8) Criminal Law § 285--Evidence--Admissibility--Defendant's Probation Revocation Hearing Testimony. --A probationer who, in criminal proceedings, objects to the admission of testimony he gave at his probation revocation hearing must meet the initial burden of producing evidence that the charges against him are related to the circumstances in issue at the revocation hearing. Once this is established, if the evidence is to be admitted, the prosecution must either prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his revocation hearing testimony is not so related, or establish that it is nevertheless admissible for impeachment or rebuttal purposes.

CA(9)(9) Criminal Law § 285--Evidence--Admissibility--Defendant's Probation Revocation Hearing Testimony. --A probationer who, in criminal proceedings, objects to the admission of evidence which he contends is the fruit of his revocation hearing testimony, must meet the burden of producing evidence not only of a relationship between his probation revocation proceeding and the criminal charges against him, but also of a relationship between his revocation hearing testimony and the allegedly derivative evidence to which he has objected. Once these prima facie showings have been made, the objection must be sustained unless the prosecution either proves by a preponderance of the evidence the lack of any relationship between the criminal charges and the issues in the revocation proceeding, proves by a preponderance of the evidence the lack of any impermissible relationship between the testimony at the revocation proceeding and the evidence offered in the criminal proceeding, or establishes that the evidence is nevertheless admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment or rebuttal.

CA(10)(10) Criminal Law § 50--Rights of Accused--Fair Trial--Remaining Silent. --Although the privilege against self-incrimination does assure an accused of the right to remain silent at his trial, it does not encompass a right to lie in his own behalf at trial.

CA(11)(11) Criminal Law § 505--Probation--Revocation--Nature of Proceeding. --Probation revocation, unlike parole revocation, is a judicial proceeding with concomitant procedural benefits for a probationer at all stages of the revocation process.

COUNSEL: Richard O. Stevens, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edward T. Mancuso, Public Defender, Gordon H. Armstrong, Deputy Public Defender, Richard A. Bancroft, Ann M. Chargin, Ephraim Margolin, Michael Lewton, Charles C. Marson, Joseph Remcho, Peter E. Sheehan, Alice Daniel, Deborah Hinkel and Paul N. Halvonik as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien, Assistant Attorney General, John T. Murphy, Kenneth C. Young and James M. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Joseph P. Busch, District Attorney, Harry B. Sondheim and Jay J. Becker, Deputy District Attorneys, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

JUDGES: In Bank. Opinion by Wright, C. J., expressing the unanimous view of the court. McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Sullivan, J., Clark, J., and Burke, J., * concurred.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.

OPINION BY: WRIGHT

OPINION

CA(1)(1) (See fn. 1.) Defendant appeals from an order revoking probation granted after the imposition of sentence upon a plea of guilty to a charge of grand theft from the person. ( ...