People v. Coleman

• Decision Date: 07 September 1990
• Docket Number: No. 1-88-0300,1-88-0300
• Citation: 203 Ill.App.3d 83,560 N.E.2d 991
• Parties: , 148 Ill.Dec. 394 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jefferson COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 991

560 N.E.2d 991

203 Ill.App.3d 83, 148 Ill.Dec. 394

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jefferson COLEMAN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 1-88-0300.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Sixth Division.

Sept. 7, 1990.

Rehearings Denied Oct. 9, 1990.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender (Mitchell Katten, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Cecil A. Partee, State's Atty. of Cook County (Renee Goldfarb, Gael O'Brien, Chicago, and Kenneth W. Goff, Homewood, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Justice EGAN delivered the opinion of the court:

A jury convicted the defendant, Jefferson Coleman, of two counts of armed robbery, two counts of unlawful restraint and one count of residential burglary. The convictions for unlawful restraint and armed robbery were merged, and the defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 60 years for armed robbery and 15 years for residential burglary.

The defendant first contends that he was not proved guilty of residential burglary beyond a reasonable doubt. The two principal witnesses for the State were Charles Brown (Brown) and his wife Frederica. They testified that on May 11 at approximately 10:15 p.m., they were returning to their home from a Mother's Day celebration. When they reached the door to their garden apartment at 2112 North Bissell in Chicago, they heard someone say, "Stop, don't move." Turning toward the speaker, they noticed a man pointing a handgun at them. The area was lighted by a street light 30 to 40 feet away. They repeatedly asked the man what he wanted, and the man repeatedly demanded that they open their door. Brown asked his wife to give the man his wallet which she had in her purse. The man took the wallet, placed it in his coat pocket and continued to demand that they open their door. He then told them that he would shoot if they had not opened the door by the time he counted to three.

Frederica unlocked the door by the count of two and immediately turned on the lights inside the apartment. The man forcibly moved them into the apartment. They continued to ask him what he wanted. The man then told them to lie face down on the floor. He ripped an extension cord out of the wall and used the cord to tie Brown's hands back to his ankles as he faced the floor. While he was tying Brown up, his gun discharged.

After the man had secured Brown, he asked Frederica the location of the bedroom; he told her to stand up and then pushed her with his gun toward the bedroom. Upon entering the bedroom, she immediately turned on the light. The man turned her around and sat her on the bed. He suddenly turned and left the room.

While the man was leading Frederica to the bedroom, Brown had been able to hop to the entrance-way of the apartment which was out of the defendant's sight. While Brown was attempting to free his feet, he heard the man run down the hallway. The two men struggled. Brown grabbed the man's left hand which was holding the gun and tried to point it towards the ceiling. With his feet still tied, he fell over. The man continued to point his gun at Brown, and Brown continued to reach up to grab it. The man eventually put the gun in his belt and fled from the apartment.

Frederica sat dazed for about thirty seconds after the man left the bedroom. While the man and her husband struggled, she locked the bedroom door and called the police. The police arrived within minutes. Brown estimated that the entire episode lasted about five to seven minutes.

Both Brown and his wife gave the police a description of the man. Because their description was a joint effort, Brown could not remember exactly what he had told the police that night. He remembered describing the man as being 5' 10"'' or 5'11"' tall but he did not specifically remember how he had described the defendant's shirt.

Frederica specifically described the man as a black male, wearing a dark jacket, dark pants and shoes that had leather weaving on top, approximately 30 to 35 years old, 5'10"' to 5'11"', with black hair, brown eyes, medium complexion, pock-marked face and a pointed jaw. At trial, she explained that when she said that he had a pock-marked face she meant that he appeared unshaven; he did not have a clean-kept face but had "short, curly hairs sort of not closely spaced over his cheeks fairly high on his face."

Officer Stanley Obos responded to a radio call of a robbery at 2112 North Bissell. He met Brown and his wife who were very nervous and upset. Together, the two described the offender as a male black with black hair, pointed jaw, pock-marked faced, 5'10"' to 5'11"' tall and 150 to 160 pounds. They also said that the man was wearing a short leather jacket, dark shirt and pants and brown shoes with a mesh weave.

The wallet taken from Frederica contained various types of identification of Brown including a driver's license, some credit cards, an attorney registration or bar association card, a gun registration card, an Illinois State Firearm's Owner's identification card, a couple of blank checks, a check made out to Brown and perhaps some cash.

Two days later Officers John Waterloo and Robert Lanning received an assignment concerning a forgery at the Continental Bank at 1165 North Clark Street. The officers arrested the defendant near the bank and subsequently booked him for forgery. A search of the defendant uncovered a brown wallet containing identification cards, credit cards and checks belonging to Brown. Lanning contacted Brown regarding the recovery of his wallet and asked him to come to the station. Brown then contacted his wife, and they each went to the 18th District police station. Brown later identified his wallet at trial, the gun registration card, the Illinois driver's license and the Illinois State Firearm Owner's Identification card. The defendant's photograph had been placed over Brown's on the driver's license and firearms' identification card.

Detective O'Leary conducted a lineup which included the defendant. The defendant chose his own position in the lineup; he stood second from the left. O'Leary had Brown and his wife view the lineup separately. They did not meet or talk to each other during the lineup. After initially viewing the lineup, Brown asked for a voice-identification. Brown turned his back to the lineup, and after O'Leary changed the order of the participants, each participant was required to say, "I am going to count to three, one, two, three." After hearing the participants speak, Brown identified the defendant. Frederica viewed the lineup first and also identified the defendant. Both Brown and his wife identified the defendant in court as the man who had robbed them. However, Frederica admitted that the defendant looked about 20 pounds heavier at trial than he did at the time of the incident; his body was much more developed, and he was clean-shaven.

The indictment charged the defendant with the offense of residential burglary in that he entered the dwelling place of Brown and his wife "with the intent to commit therein a theft." The defendant first maintains that the evidence failed to establish that he entered the Brown's residence with the intent to commit theft.

We believe that the State adequately proved both an unlawful entry and the requisite intent to sustain the defendant's conviction of residential burglary. Absent inconsistent circumstances, a fact-finder may infer the requisite intent to commit theft from proof of an unlawful breaking and entering into a building when it contains personal property that could be the subject of larceny. (People v. Johnson (1963), 28 Ill.2d 441, 192 N.E.2d 864.) The defendant argues that his act of entering the bedroom with Frederica rather than the living room or dining room was inconsistent with an intent to commit theft because, he maintains, objects of theft would more likely be found in the living room or dining room. This somewhat novel argument is similar to that made and rejected in People v. Sehr (1986), 150 Ill.App.3d 118, 103 Ill.Dec. 531, 501 N.E.2d 848. In Sehr, the court noted that a "master bedroom seems a likely cache for such portable and desirable items as jewelry and currency." (150 Ill.App.3d at 124, 103 Ill.Dec. 531, 501 N.E.2d 848.) It is more likely that Frederica would know the location of jewelry than would her husband. We reject the defendant's additional argument that an intent to commit theft may not be inferred because nothing was taken. (See People v. Ybarra (1987), 156 Ill.App.3d 996, 109 Ill.Dec. 501, 510 N.E.2d 122.) It is reasonable to infer that events such as the discharge of the gun and the struggle with Brown prompted the defendant's flight before he was able to seize any property.

The facts clearly justify an inference that the defendant entered the Browns' apartment attempting to commit theft. He confronted the Browns at gunpoint on their doorstep at 10:00 on a Sunday night. He entered their residence forcibly. Having received Brown's wallet upon Brown's own initiative, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the defendant recognized the Browns as easy victims and that he wanted more money or other valuables. It is also reasonable to conclude that the defendant tied-up Brown to remove him as a threat and then took Frederica into the bedroom to aid him in locating easily transportable valuables. We conclude that the relevant surrounding circumstances including the time, place and manner of entry into the premises, the defendant's activity within the premises and the lack of any alternative explanation indicate that the defendant intended to commit a theft when he entered the apartment. People v. Richardson (1984), 104 Ill.2d 8, 83 Ill.Dec. 604, 470 N.E.2d 1024.

The defendant next contends that reversible error occurred at the hearing on his motion to suppress the identifications. During the cross-examination of the Browns the judge sustained objections to...