People v. Collins

Decision Date02 August 2001
Docket NumberNo. S075232.,S075232.
Citation27 P.3d 726,109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836,26 Cal.4th 297
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesThe PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Damani COLLINS, Defendant and Appellant.

Randy Baker, Berkeley, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Ronald A. Bass, Assistant Attorney General, Laurence K. Sullivan and Gregory A. Ott, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

GEORGE, C.J.

In this case we must determine the validity of a criminal defendant's waiver of a jury trial, when the trial court, in advising the defendant before accepting the waiver, informed him that he would receive "some benefit" if he waived his right to a jury trial, although the court could not specify what the benefit would be. The Court of Appeal, in a divided decision, determined that the jury waiver obtained under these circumstances was valid. We conclude that the waiver of a jury trial obtained by a trial court's assurance of an unspecified benefit is not a valid waiver, and that this error compels reversal of defendant's conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.

I

On January 29, 1997, an information was filed against defendant Damani Collins, alleging that he had committed five forcible acts of lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under the age of 14 years (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (b)), or five acts of lewd or lascivious conduct on a child under that age without the use of force (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (a)), based upon the same five acts. The information alleged that four of the acts in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (b), were committed by defendant's use of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, and that three of the acts in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivisions (a) and (b), involved substantial sexual conduct (Pen. Code, § 1203.066, subd. (a)(1), (8)), precluding any grant of probation, suspension of the sentence, or striking of those findings. On April 10, 1997, the information was amended to allege additionally that defendant had suffered prior convictions (Pen.Code, § 4532, subd. (b); Health & Saf.Code, § 11351.5) and previously had served a prison term (Pen.Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)).1

On June 10, 1997, the matter was called for trial, and jury selection was scheduled to commence. Prior to the entrance of the first group of prospective jurors, defense counsel informed the trial court that counsel had discussed with defendant the possibility of his waiving a jury trial.

We set forth in some detail the trial court's communication with defendant on the subject of his waiver of a jury trial, in order to provide an adequate factual context in which to understand the determinations made by the trial court and, subsequently, by the Court of Appeal.

The trial court inquired of defendant whether he wished to "waive jury" or not, and defendant responded "waive." The trial court again asked whether defendant wished to proceed with having jurors brought into court or instead have a trial without a jury, and defendant responded, "without a jury." The trial court stated that defendant was entitled to have his case tried before a jury, observing that defense counsel had spoken with defendant about giving up his right to a jury trial and having the trial take place solely before a judge. The trial court inquired of defendant whether that was what he wished to do. Defendant responded that he would follow defense counsel's recommendation and waive jury trial.

The trial court then asked whether defendant understood that he was entitled to have a trial by jury; that if he had a trial by jury, a jury of 12 individuals would be selected to decide his case; that in order to return a verdict of guilty, all 12 jurors would have to agree to the verdict; that if he did not have a jury trial, the court would hear the evidence in the case; that the trial judge in effect would be the jury in the case and would make the determination of guilty or not guilty; that the prosecution's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would be the same whether the trial was by a jury or by the court; that defendant would retain his rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to compel the attendance of witnesses on his own behalf, to present evidence on his own behalf, and to remain silent or choose to testify; that defendant would relinquish solely his right to trial by jury and would retain all his other rights; and that his maximum potential punishment was the same whether his trial was before a jury or before the court. Defendant responded in the affirmative to these questions.

The trial court then inquired whether defendant understood that by waiving a trial by jury, he was not "gaining any promises of leniency or anything else relative to the waiver." At this point, defendant responded in the negative. The trial court asked whether defendant understood that the trial court would hear the evidence and make decisions based upon the evidence presented and consistent with the law. Defendant responded in the affirmative.

The following exchange then occurred:

"THE COURT: Okay. And do you understand that I'm not promising you anything just to get you to waive jury? ... Do you understand that?

"DEFENDANT: J was told that it would—that it was some reassurance or some type of benefit.

"THE COURT: Okay. I think that—I think what [defense counsel] may have been referring to is that I indicated to counsel when somebody mentioned that this issue is going to be discussed with you that there might well be a benefit in it. Just by having waived jury, that has some effect on the court. Do you understand that? By not taking up two weeks' time to try the case, but rather giving—just having it in front of a judge alone.... Do you understand that?

"DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: Is that your understanding as well? Let me ask you that.

"DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: I didn't specify and I'm not specifying that there's any particular benefit, but that by waiving jury, you are getting some benefit, but I can't tell you what that is because I don't know yet. Understood?

"DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: Okay. Is that agreeable to you?

"DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: Do you have any questions about waiving jury?

"DEFENDANT: No.

"THE COURT: Okay. Has anybody made any threats or promises to you to get you to waive jury?

"DEFENDANT: No.

"THE COURT: Okay, I'll find that Mr. Collins has made a free, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to a jury trial."

In response to the prosecutor's inquiry, defendant acknowledged he understood that the prosecutor's earlier offer concerning a negotiated plea no longer was available and that defendant faced a maximum potential sentence of 41 years in prison. The trial court again asked defendant whether anyone had made a representation or promise in order to induce him to waive trial by jury, and defendant responded in the negative. The trial court determined that defendant had made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to jury trial. The trial court then obtained the prosecutor's and defense counsel's agreement to waive trial by jury. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.)

The case proceeded to trial before the court. The trial court found defendant guilty of three counts of forcible and five counts of nonforcible lewd or lascivious acts upon a child under the age of 14 years. (§ 288, subds.(a), (b)(1).) The trial court found true the allegations that defendant committed three of the acts by force or fear and that two of the acts involved substantial sexual conduct (§ 1203.066, subd. (a)(1), (8)), and that defendant had served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 24 years in prison, consisting of the upper term of eight years, and two consecutive terms of six years each, for the three violations of section 288, subdivision (b), and two consecutive terms of two years each for the two violations of section 288, subdivision (a). The trial court stayed the sentences on the three remaining violations of section 288, subdivision (a), as well as the enhancement for the service of a prior prison term.

Defendant appealed on the sole ground that his waiver of the right to trial by jury was induced by the trial court's offer of a benefit, and therefore under the federal and state Constitutions was not made voluntarily. The Court of Appeal, determining that this issue was analogous to the question of the "sufficiency" of a defendant's waiver of the right to trial considered in People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175-1178, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315 (Howard),

and employing the standard of review enunciated in that decision, decided in a split decision that under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's waiver of his right to trial by jury was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and therefore valid. The dissenting justice, employing the same standard of review, concluded that defendant's waiver of his right to jury trial was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

We granted defendant's petition for review.

II
A

Defendant contends the trial court's statement that defendant would receive "some benefit"—of a nature that would be determined at a later date if defendant waived his right to a trial by jury— amounted to an improper inducement to waive that right, and that defendant's waiver of a jury trial in response to that inducement may not be deemed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Defendant urges that consequently his right to due process of law under both the federal and state Constitutions was violated. As explained, we conclude that defendant's contention has merit.

Our consideration of the issue requires a brief review of the nature of the constitutional right at stake and the procedural protections that must accompany...

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