People v. Collins

• Decision Date: 13 July 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2-02-1134.,2-02-1134.
• Citation: 351 Ill. App.3d 175,286 Ill.Dec. 228,813 N.E.2d 285
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jamel L. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

813 N.E.2d 285

351 Ill. App.3d 175

286 Ill.Dec. 228

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jamel L. COLLINS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 2-02-1134.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

July 13, 2004.

G. Joseph Weller, Deputy Defender (Court-appointed), Kathleen J. Hamill (Court-appointed), Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for Jamel L. Collins.

Michael J. Waller, Lake County State's Attorney, Waukegan, Martin P. Moltz, Deputy Director, David A. Bernhard, State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, Elgin, for the People.

Justice GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Lake County, defendant, Jamel L. Collins, was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2000)). Defendant was sentenced to 35 years' imprisonment. He now appeals, challenging both his conviction and his sentence. Defendant raises four issues. First, he contends that he was prejudiced when a juror visited the crime scene during the trial. Second, he alleges error in the trial court's decision to permit the introduction of certain hearsay testimony. Third, he asserts that his trial was unfairly prejudicial because (a) the court referred to the jurors by number rather than name and (b) certain comments the State made during argument fell outside the bounds of proper argumentation. Finally, he argues that his sentence is excessive. We agree with the first contention; thus, we reverse and remand for a new trial. As the second two issues raised by defendant are likely to recur on retrial, we will also address them. However, our disposition makes it unnecessary to address defendant's argument regarding sentencing. The facts are relatively discrete as they relate to the issues, and we will address them in the context of defendant's various arguments.

I. The Jury Foreman's Independent Investigation Of The Crime Scene

Defendant first claims he was prejudiced when the foreman of the jury visited the crime scene during the first day of testimony. Defendant raised this issue in a posttrial motion, and the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. During the hearing, a juror, Andrew Sawicki, testified that he was the foreman of the jury. As foreman, he led discussions in the jury room, but he denied using any knowledge he gained from visiting the scene in doing so. During the hearing, the judge asked Sawicki, "Did your visit to the crime scene on the second day of trial aid you in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant?" Sawicki replied, "I would have to say yes." Sawicki then added, "Yes, it did aid my — it didn't help me sway one way or the other, it just helped me." The court then inquired as to how the visit helped him, and he stated:

"The first day of the trial — I had never been in this experience before. And I'm just watching people being brought up. They're telling their story about this event that occurred in about, you know, half a block. And all it's going to be is this — what it looked like to me was an endless parade of people saying I was here, I did this, I was on the east side of that, then I went over to the west side of that. And I was trying to write it down and did not understand. I could not collect that data from what they were telling me. And I was afraid, because — this was a big decision that I was asked to make. If I just knew what it looked like. And then after that when people started talking, because I didn't know — I thought the defense was going to have another parade of people coming on saying I was here, you were there. And I was afraid of that, and I just wanted to know what the stage was.

So I walked — I walked out, down the street, looked at it, and said fine, great, now I know where it is. When people say I was on here [sic], I know where it is and I'm — and the second day it was much more helpful for me because I can understand what — where people were on the scene."

The court then asked, "Did that help you in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant with respect to the murder charge?" Sawicki answered, "Yes, it did." The State asked whether Sawicki had viewed photographs of the scene during the trial. He said, "No, I found them difficult to view." Regarding an aerial photograph that was given to the jury during deliberations, Sawicki stated that it would not have been helpful while he was listening to witnesses and trying to remember what they said.

Defendant objected to this entire line of questioning as an impermissible inquiry into the mental processes of the jury. The trial court overruled the objection. The State did not object, and, in fact, posed the question, "[H]ow is [the impact of the extraneous information to be assessed] if jurors cannot be questioned as to their exact deliberation process?" On appeal, the State now reverses its course and argues that "Sawicki's statement should not have been before the trial court." Defendant does not contest the trial court's decision to overrule his objection.

The rule that precludes the inquiry into the mental processes of a jury is a rule of evidence rather than a substantive limitation on how a verdict can be impeached. See, e.g., People v. Holmes, 69 Ill.2d 507, 511-16, 14 Ill.Dec. 460, 372 N.E.2d 656 (1978) (citing both Professor Wigmore's treatise on the rules of evidence (8 J. Wigmore, Evidence 696 (McNaughten rev. ed.1961)) and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) (Fed.R.Evid.606(b))). As we will explain below, the trial court erred in admitting this evidence. However, it is well established that, absent an objection, otherwise inadmissible evidence is to be given its full probative effect. Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor, 105 Ill.2d 501, 508, 86 Ill.Dec. 500, 475 N.E.2d 879 (1985) ("It is well established that when hearsay evidence is admitted without an objection, it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect"); People v. Marcotte, 337 Ill.App.3d 798, 803, 272 Ill.Dec. 554, 787 N.E.2d 369 (2003) ("The defendant, however, did not object to Kunce's statement as hearsay, or on any other grounds, either in court or in her posttrial motion. Because the defendant did not object to its admission, Kunce's assertion that DCFS received the call could be considered by the judge and given its natural probative effect"); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Doherty, 305 Ill.App.3d 141, 149, 238 Ill.Dec. 412, 711 N.E.2d 799 (1999) ("Hearsay evidence admitted without objection may be considered and given its natural probative effect"). Moreover, the State argued that the trial court should consider Sawicki's testimony, and it is thus precluded from arguing that this evidence was improperly admitted. See McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill.2d 251, 256, 246 Ill.Dec. 321, 730 N.E.2d 1 (2000) ("After inviting the trial court to rule on the admissibility of the evidence based on Rule 220, plaintiff is precluded from complaining now that the circuit court's ruling was erroneous based on some other evidentiary rule").

In Holmes, 69 Ill.2d at 511, 14 Ill.Dec. 460, 372 N.E.2d 656, the supreme court considered the rule that "a jury cannot impeach its verdict by either affidavit or testimony." It identified two general categories into which an attempt to impeach a verdict could fall. The first category involves instances where the attempt is based on the motives, methods, or processes the jury used to reach its conclusion. Holmes, 69 Ill.2d at 511, 14 Ill.Dec. 460, 372 N.E.2d 656. The second involves attempts to show that some outside conditions or events have been brought to the attention of the jury. Holmes, 69 Ill.2d at 512, 14 Ill.Dec. 460, 372 N.E.2d 656. Evidence of the first sort is inadmissible; evidence of the second type may be used to impeach a verdict. Holmes, 69 Ill.2d at 511-12, 14 Ill.Dec. 460, 372 N.E.2d 656; see also People v. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d 404, 458, 231 Ill.Dec. 321, 696 N.E.2d 313 (1998) ("In order to demonstrate such prejudice, jurors may testify as to the nature of outside influences or communications, but evidence relating to the effect of such influences on the mental processes of the jurors is inadmissible").

Not every instance in which extraneous information reaches the jury constitutes reversible error. People v. Palmer, 125 Ill.App.3d 703, 712, 81 Ill.Dec. 54, 466 N.E.2d 640 (1984). When such information reaches the jury, however, it is presumptively prejudicial (People v. Mitchell, 152 Ill.2d 274, 341, 178 Ill.Dec. 354, 604 N.E.2d 877 (1992)), and a defendant need show only that the information relates directly to something at issue in the case and that it may have influenced the verdict (Birch v. Township of Drummer, 139 Ill.App.3d 397, 409, 94 Ill.Dec. 41, 487 N.E.2d 798 (1985)). The burden then shifts to the State to demonstrate that the incident is harmless. People v. Harris, 123 Ill.2d 113, 132, 122 Ill.Dec. 76, 526 N.E.2d 335 (1988); Birch 139 Ill.App.3d at 409, 94 Ill.Dec. 41, 487 N.E.2d 798. A verdict may stand only if it is "obvious" that no prejudice accrued to the defendant. Hobley, 182 Ill.2d at 462,231 Ill.Dec. 321,696 N.E.2d 313.

Generally, the inquiry focuses on the relationship between the extraneous information and the issues at trial in a rather abstract sense. The Holmes court observed, "`Because the actual effect of the conduct on the minds of the jury cannot be proved, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the standard to be applied is whether the "conduct involved `such a probability that prejudice will result that it is [to be] deemed inherently lacking in due process.' [Citation.]" [Citation.]'" Holmes, 69 Ill.2d at 514, 14 Ill.Dec. 460, 372 N.E.2d 656, quoting United States ex rel. Tobe v. Bensinger, 492 F.2d 232, 237 (7th Cir.1974).

However, in this case, we are presented with a rather unusual circumstance. Evidence concerning the effect of Sawicki's visit on his determination was admitted into evidence without objection by, and with the...