People v. Collins

• Decision Date: 16 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1–13–1145.,1–13–1145.
• Citation: 42 N.E.3d 1
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Charles COLLINS, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

42 N.E.3d 1

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee
v.
Charles COLLINS, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–13–1145.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division.

Sept. 16, 2015.

42 N.E.3d 3

Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Rebecca I. Levy, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Yvette Loizon, and Kathleen Warnick, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice LAVIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Charles Collins was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and was sentenced as a habitual criminal to natural life in prison. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence procured as a result of a warrantless search because he did not consent to the search and his mandatory supervised release status (MSR) did not otherwise justify the search.¹ Defendant also asserts that the Habitual Criminal Act (730 ILCS 5/5–4.5–95(a) (West 2010)) is unconstitutional. In addition, both parties agree that defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled substance must be vacated as a lesser-included offense. We vacate that conviction and affirm the judgment in all other respects.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 A. Pretrial Proceedings

¶ 4 While on MSR, defendant was arrested after 809.8 grams of cocaine were found in the trunk of the car defendant was driving. He was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Before trial, defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. In support of defendant's motion, counsel argued that defendant knew cocaine was in the trunk and did not consent to a search of the car.

¶ 5 During the hearing on his motion, defendant testified that he was driving his girlfriend's blue Cadillac Eldorado when Officers Trevarthen and Clark² stopped him for alleged traffic violations. Defendant denied changing lanes without signaling and testified that he was not aware he had been speeding. When Officer Trevarthen

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asked defendant, who was unfamiliar with the area, for his route, defendant said he was driving from Elgin to Calumet Park, the latter being east of Elgin. Defendant explained that he exited the highway because his car was overheating. He did not say he was looking for a gas station, although he was, in fact, trying to get to a mechanic. In addition, defendant wanted to bypass some traffic on Interstate Route 290 (I–290) by driving west through Bellwood and re-entering I–290 in order to get on the Indiana Tollway, although that would mean traveling westbound instead of eastbound.

¶ 6 Defendant further testified that Officer Trevarthen requested defendant's license and proof of insurance. Upon returning to the Cadillac, Officer Trevarthen also asked defendant if he was on MSR, to which defendant replied affirmatively. Officer Trevarthen then asked defendant to exit the car, but he said no. When asked again, defendant sought the reason for the request but Officer Trevarthen did not provide it and, instead, moved toward defendant's door handle. Defendant then agreed to exit the car, at which point Officer Trevarthen conducted a weapons pat down. In addition, Officer Trevarthen sought permission to search the car, but defendant, who knew that cocaine was in the trunk, said no. Defendant testified that if Officer Trevarthen had given him permission to leave, he would have done so. Furthermore, defendant testified that he could not recall signing his MSR agreement or agreeing to consent to searches per the agreement. Despite the lack of consent, Officer Trevarthen searched the vehicle, finding cocaine in the process. Defendant denied telling the police that he let them search the car because he was on MSR.

¶ 7 The State presented a somewhat different version of events. Officer Trevarthen, the State's only witness at this hearing, testified that he had been on duty with his partner, Officer Clark, wearing plainclothes and driving an unmarked car. After pulling defendant over, Officer Trevarthen asked him why he was traveling fast and “weaving in and out of traffic.” Defendant responded that his car was overheating and he was trying to get to a gas station. This did not seem plausible, however, as defendant had passed two gas stations. Defendant proceeded to describe an implausible shortcut that involved traveling eight miles to avoid less than a mile of I–290. After taking defendant's license back to the police vehicle, Officer Trevarthen learned that defendant was on MSR. Officer Trevarthen also knew that people on MSR had to submit to a search by a police officer.

¶ 8 When Officer Trevarthen returned to defendant and asked him to exit his car, he complied without protest. In addition, Officer Trevarthen said he was going to conduct a pat-down search for weapons. He also asked defendant if he was on MSR, whether he had narcotics in the vehicle and whether Officer Trevarthen could search the vehicle, despite the officer's belief that defendant could not object. Furthermore, Officer Trevarthen told defendant he was free to leave but had not returned his license. Defendant also confirmed that he was on MSR based on a possession of cocaine conviction and consented to the search. Defendant also denied having drugs in his car, but Officer Trevarthen opened the trunk and found approximately 809 grams of cocaine.

¶ 9 The State submitted a certified copy of defendant's MSR agreement, which states, “You shall consent to a search of your person, property, or residence under your control.” The agreement also warned that violating the agreement may lead to revocation of MSR. Furthermore,

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defendant's signature appeared below an acknowledgment to having read and understood the contents of the agreement.

¶ 10 The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding, in pertinent part, that Officer Trevarthen's testimony was credible based on his demeanor and logic. After observing traffic violations and receiving illogical information from defendant, Officer Trevarthen learned that defendant was on MSR. Officer Trevarthen also knew that defendant had to allow such a search. Furthermore, the trial court expressly rejected defendant's contention that it was not logical to believe that defendant would have agreed to the search. The court found the officer's testimony that defendant consented was credible because defendant was on MSR and knew that the MSR agreement required him to allow a search.

¶ 11 B. Trial

¶ 12 At trial, Officer Trevarthen's testimony substantially corroborated his testimony from the pretrial hearing. Officer Trevarthen added that after he relayed defendant's statements to Officer Clark and learned defendant was on MSR, a third officer, Officer Bresnehan, arrived and Officer Trevarthen apprised him of the situation. In addition, Officer Trevarthen testified that he asked to search defendant's car due to MSR conditions and defendant's explanation for his conduct. Defendant ultimately told police that the cocaine was his. Defendant further stated that while he purchased the cocaine for $22,000, he could sell it for $30,000.

¶ 13 Officer Clark testified that before looking up defendant's information, Officer Trevarthen said defendant's story “was not adding up.” In addition, Officer Clark knew that defendant was on MSR prior to the search. Officer Clark also understood that MSR conditions prohibited defendants from refusing to consent to searches by law enforcement. After conducting a pat-down search of defendant at the rear of the Cadillac, Officer Trevarthen conversed with him regarding discrepancies in his story. Officer Clark also heard Officer Trevarthen ask for and receive permission to search defendant's car, but Officer Clark could not recall, or could not hear, whether Officer Trevarthen informed defendant he was free to leave. Had defendant not consented to a search, the two officers would have had to determine whether to inform defendant's MSR officer of defendant's refusal to submit to a search of the car or release him at the scene. Defendant ultimately admitted that the cocaine belonged to him and that he intended to sell it.

¶ 14 Officer Bresnehan testified that when he arrived at the scene, Officers Trevarthen and Clark explained why they stopped defendant, but Officer Bresnehan did not learn that defendant was on MSR until after the encounter. Officer Bresnehan also saw Officer Trevarthen speak with defendant, pat him down, and search the car, but Officer Bresnehan was not able to hear what words were exchanged. Officer Bresnehan further testified, however, that he heard Officer Trevarthen ask for consent to search the vehicle, heard Officer Trevarthen tell defendant he was free to leave and heard defendant consent.

¶ 15 In contrast to his pretrial strategy, defendant's strategy at trial was to disclaim ownership of the cocaine. Natoma Doss, defendant's girlfriend, testified that she lent him her Cadillac on the day of the incident but that...