People v. Conat, Docket No. 218204
| Decision Date | 25 January 2000 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 219258.,Docket No. 219259,Docket No. 218204,Docket No. 219958 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael CONAT, Defendant-Appellee. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Sarah Plumb, Defendant-Appellee. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Derek F. Schroeder, Defendant-Appellee. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stephen Raines, a/k/a Stephen Rains, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, and Marilyn J. Day, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the People in Docket Nos. 218204, 219258, and 219259.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the People in Docket No. 219958.
Peralta, Johnston & Karam (by Dennis A. Johnston), for Michael Conat. St. Clair Shores.
Robyn B. Frankel, for Sarah Plumb. Bloomfield Hills.
State Appellate Defender (by Jennifer A. Pilette and Debra Gutierrez-McGuire), for Derek Schroeder. Detroit.
Culpepper, Kinney (by Robert F. Kinney and Ronnie E. Cromer, Jr.), for Stephen Raines. Detroit.
Elwood Brown, President, John D. O'Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, County of Wayne, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Jeffrey Caminsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, amicus curiae, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan. Detroit.
Daniel M. McGuire, Michael J. Steinberg, and Kary L. Moss, amicus curiae, for American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan and Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan. Detroit.
Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and O'CONNELL and R.J. DANHOF1, JJ.
In these consolidated appeals, the prosecutors appeal from four lower court orders declaring that M.C.L. § 769.1; MSA 28.1072 (hereinafter § 1), 1996 PA 247, is unconstitutional. The amended statute requires the circuit court to sentence certain juvenile offenders as adults. We hold that the statute is constitutional, and we accordingly reverse the orders of the trial courts and remand for trial.
Generally, the family division of the circuit court (family court) has exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles under seventeen years of age who commit criminal offenses. MCL 712A.1(1)(c); MSA 27.3178(598.1(1)(c), M.C.L. § 712A.2(a)(1); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(a)(1).2 The "traditional-waiver" process allows the judge of the family court, on motion of the prosecutor, to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile at least fourteen years of age who "is accused of an act that if committed by an adult would be a felony...." MCL 712A.4(1); MSA 27.3178(598.4)(1). In determining whether to waive jurisdiction so that the juvenile may be tried in the circuit court as an adult, the court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by granting a waiver of jurisdiction. MCL 712A.4(3) and (4); MSA 27.3178(598.4)(3) and (4). The judge must consider the following statutory factors: the seriousness of the alleged offense, the culpability of the juvenile, the prior record of the juvenile, the history of the juvenile in participating in available programs, the adequacy of both punishment and programs available in the juvenile system, and the dispositional options available for the juvenile. MCL 712A.4(4)(a)—(f); MSA 27.3178(598.4)(4)(a)—(f).
Alternatively, an "automatic waiver" process exists whereby prosecutors may choose to "waive" certain juvenile offenders into the circuit court to be tried as adults. MCL 764.1f(1); MSA 28.860(6)(1) provides:
If the prosecuting attorney has reason to believe that a juvenile 14 years of age or older but less than 17 years of age has committed a specified juvenile violation, the prosecuting attorney may authorize the filing of a complaint and warrant on the charge with a magistrate concerning the juvenile.
A "specified juvenile violation" is defined as any of the following offenses:
(1) arson of a dwelling, M.C.L. § 750.72; MSA 28.267;
(2) assault with intent to commit murder, M.C.L. § 750.83; MSA 28.278;
(3) assault with intent to maim, M.C.L. § 750.86; MSA 28.281;
(4) assault with intent to rob and steal while armed, M.C.L. § 750.89; MSA 28.284;
(5) attempted murder, M.C.L. § 750.91; MSA 28.286;
(6) first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316; MSA 28.548;
(7) second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317; MSA 28.549;
(8) kidnapping, M.C.L. § 750.349; MSA 28.581;
(9) first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. § 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2);
(10) armed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.529; MSA 28.797;
(11) carjacking, M.C.L. § 750.529a; MSA 28.797(a);
(12) bank, safe, or vault robbery, M.C.L. § 750.531; MSA 28.799;
(13) assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, M.C.L. § 750.84; MSA 28.279, if armed with a dangerous weapon;
(14) home invasion, M.C.L. § 750.110a; MSA 28.305(a), if armed with a dangerous weapon;
(15) escape from certain higher-security juvenile facilities, M.C.L. § 750.186a; MSA 28.383a;
(16) manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of a controlled substance, M.C.L. § 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i);
(17) possession of over 650 grams of a controlled substance, M.C.L. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(i);
(18) an attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, or solicitation to commit any of the above offenses; and
(19) any lesser-included offenses or other offenses arising out of the same transaction, if the juvenile is charged with one of the above offenses. See M.C.L. § 764.1f(2); MSA 28.860(6)(2).
The circuit court is given jurisdiction over juveniles at least fourteen years of age who commit any of the "specified juvenile violations," so that it may hear the automatic waiver cases where the prosecutor charges the juvenile as an adult. MCL 600.606; MSA 27A.606. Correspondingly, the normally exclusive jurisdiction of the family court over juveniles is limited in cases where a juvenile at least fourteen years of age is charged with any of the "specified juvenile violations," so that the family court only has jurisdiction if the prosecutor chooses to file a petition in the family court instead of authorizing a complaint and warrant to proceed against the juvenile as an adult. MCL 712A.2(a)(1); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(a)(1). The effect of these automatic waiver provisions is that the prosecutor has discretion whether to charge a juvenile at least fourteen years of age who commits specified serious felonies as an adult or as a juvenile. Under the automatic waiver provisions, no hearing is held to determine whether the juvenile should be tried as an adult.
Before 1996, M.C.L. § 769.1; MSA 28.1072 provided in part as follows:
(3) A judge of a court having jurisdiction over a juvenile shall conduct a hearing at the juvenile's sentencing to determine if the best interests of the juvenile and the public would be served by placing the juvenile on probation and committing the juvenile to a state institution or agency ... or by imposing any other sentence provided by law for an adult offender.
Thus, if the prosecutor charged a juvenile as an adult under the automatic waiver provisions and the juvenile was convicted, the circuit court was required to conduct a hearing to determine whether to sentence the juvenile as a juvenile or as an adult. The court was to consider various factors, set forth by § 1, such as the prior record and character of the juvenile, the seriousness of the offense, the juvenile's potential for rehabilitation, and the dangerousness of the juvenile to the public.
In 1996, the Legislature amended § 1 to require the circuit court to sentence juveniles convicted of certain offenses as adults. Subsection 1(1), M.C.L. § 769.1(1); MSA 28.1072(1), now provides in part as follows:
A judge of a court having jurisdiction may pronounce judgment against and pass sentence upon a person convicted of an offense in that court. The sentence shall not exceed the sentence prescribed by law. The court shall sentence a juvenile convicted of any of the following crimes in the same manner as an adult:
(a) Arson of a dwelling [MCL 750.72; MSA 28.267].
Although every crime that requires an adult sentence is one of the "specified juvenile violations" for which a juvenile may be automatically waived into the circuit court by the prosecutor under M.C.L. § 764.1f; MSA 28.860(6), not every "specified juvenile violation" requires an adult sentence under § 1. If an adult sentence is not required, the circuit court must conduct a hearing to determine whether to sentence the juvenile as a juvenile or as an adult. MCL 769.1(3); MSA 28.1072(3). The effect of the 1996 amendment is that, if the prosecutor charges a juvenile as an adult with one of the offenses for which an adult sentence is required, the prosecutor's charging decision determines that the juvenile will face an adult sentence if convicted. Previously, the statute gave the circuit court discretion to determine whether the convicted...
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