People v. Conethan

• Decision Date: 12 May 1986
• Citation: 502 N.Y.S.2d 79,120 A.D.2d 604
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. William CONETHAN, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 79

502 N.Y.S.2d 79

120 A.D.2d 604

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. William CONETHAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.

May 12, 1986.

Philip L. Weinstein, New York City (Jonathan Kratter, of counsel; Dawn Martin, on brief), for appellant.

Elizabeth Holtzman, Dist. Atty., Brooklyn (Barbara D. Underwood and Anthea H. Bruffee, of counsel; Glenn I. Levin, on brief), for respondent.

Before MOLLEN, P.J., and LAZER, MANGANO and THOMPSON, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Broomer, J.), rendered April 27, 1984, convicting him of robbery in the third degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and assault in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Judgment affirmed.

The several remarks by the prosecutor in summation which were objected to were a fair response to defense counsel's summation (see, People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 77, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465, 160 N.E.2d 26, cert. denied sub nom. Marks v. New York, 362 U.S. 912, 80 S.Ct. 662, 4 L.Ed.2d 620; People v. Jones, 89 A.D.2d 875, 453 N.Y.S.2d 231; People v. Blackman, 88 A.D.2d 620, 450 N.Y.S.2d 38). In any event there was overwhelming proof of the defendant's guilt (see, People v. Roopchand, 107 A.D.2d 35, 485 N.Y.S.2d 332, affd. 65 N.Y.2d 837, 493 N.Y.S.2d 128, 482 N.E.2d 924; People v. Galloway, 54 N.Y.2d 396, 446 N.Y.S.2d 9, 430 N.E.2d 885; People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254, 344 N.Y.S.2d 900, 298 N.E.2d 78). We also find that the reasonable doubt charge, taken as a whole, adequately conveyed the appropriate law to the jury (see, People v. Blackshear, 112 A.D.2d 1044, 493 N.Y.S.2d 32; People v. Harvey, 111 A.D.2d 185, 488 N.Y.S.2d 814). Lastly, there is no basis for modification of the sentence imposed. The trial court did not act improperly in imposing consecutive sentences since the sentences were imposed for two separate crimes (see, e.g., People v. Brathwaite, 63 N.Y.2d 839, 482 N.Y.S.2d 253, 472 N.E.2d 29; People v. King, 115 A.D.2d 563, 496 N.Y.S.2d 84; People v. Counts, 97 A.D.2d 772, 468 N.Y.S.2d 407; People v. Dorsey, 79 A.D.2d 611, 433 N.Y.S.2d 486).