People v. O'Connor
Decision Date | 01 March 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 86-1939,86-1939 |
Parties | , 117 Ill.Dec. 730 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John O'CONNOR, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago, Thomas V. Gainer, Jr., Penelope Moutoussamy, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel, for plaintiff-appellant.
Edward T. Graney, Robert Carrillo, Chicago, of counsel, for defendant-appellee.
The trial court sustained the motion of defendant, John O'Connor, to quash his arrest and to suppress the evidence seized as a result of his arrest. The State appeals contending that the arrest was valid. We reverse and remand.
At 1:22 a.m. on March 21, 1986, Officer Taylor of the Palos Park Police Department was using radar equipment to monitor the flow of traffic on Route 45 located within Palos Park. His point of observation was a parking lot located on the west side of Route 45. Although Palos Park police were responsible for north and southbound traffic control on Route 45, Officer Taylor's vantage point was located in an unincorporated area which was the responsibility of the Cook County sheriff's police. From his observation point Officer Taylor saw the defendant speeding southbound on Route 45 within the jurisdiction of Palos Park. Officer Taylor then drove into Palos Park, and pursuant to his direction defendant stopped his vehicle. Defendant was then arrested in Palos Park and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, speeding and having a blood-alcohol content greater than .10.
At the hearing on the motion to quash and suppress, defendant elicited testimony that Officer Taylor conducted his radar surveillance from a point just across the Palos Park border. The trial court granted defendant's motion on the ground that Officer Taylor was not within Palos Park when he observed defendant speeding and driving under the influence of alcohol.
The issue is whether an intraterritorial arrest is invalidated because of the arresting officer's extraterritorial location when he observed defendant speeding and driving while intoxicated within the officer's jurisdiction (Palos Park). The State contends that decisions upholding extraterritorial arrests establish the propriety of the instant intraterritorial arrest either because Officer Taylor properly exercised extraterritorial statutory authority conferred by sections 7-4-7 and 7-4-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 24, pars. 7-4-7; 7-4-8) or by section 107-5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 107-5(c)) or was authorized to make a citizen's arrest pursuant to section 107-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 38, par. 107-3). For the following reasons, defendant contends that the authority cited by the State is inapplicable to the instant arrest: sections 7-4-7 and 7-4-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code cannot sustain the arrest because Officer Taylor positioned himself in an adjoining unincorporated area rather than an adjoining municipality; section 107-5(c), while authorizing arrests throughout the State, does not support the instant arrest because Officer Taylor left his jurisdiction to set up an extraterritorial radar site without knowing whether any violations would occur; and section 107-3 does not authorize a citizen's arrest because police, not private citizens, use radar to monitor traffic.
Sections 7-4-7 and 7-4-8 of the Illinois Municipal Code provide that adjoining municipalities within a county form a police district and that the police of any municipality within the district may go throughout the district to preserve the peace and safeguard the lives, rights and property of citizens. Extraterritorial arrests have been upheld pursuant to these provisions where officers while in adjoining municipalities observed the commission of offenses. (People v. Bains (1987), 152 Ill.App.3d 951, 105 Ill.Dec. 887, 505 N.E.2d 13 ( ); People v. Lawson (1976), 36 Ill.App.3d 767, 345 N.E.2d 41 ( ).) These provisions mandate the cooperation of adjoining municipalities within a county to promote cohesive law enforcement in emergency situations regardless of whether interjurisdictional agreements for this purpose exist. (People v. Lawson.) No specific provision was made by the legislature for municipal and county cooperation with regard to adjoining unincorporated areas. Thus, had the instant arrest been made outside of Officer Taylor's jurisdiction, it could not be sustained pursuant to sections 7-4-7 or 7-4-8. See People v. Gupton (1985), 139 Ill.App.3d 530, 94 Ill.Dec. 183, 487 N.E.2d 1060.
Section 107-5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, however, is broader in scope and provides that arrests may be made anywhere within the State. Extraterritorial arrests have been upheld pursuant to this provision where the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed an offense within the officer's jurisdiction. (People v. Aldridge (1981), 101 Ill.App.3d 181, 56 Ill.Dec. 596, 427 N.E.2d 1001 ( ); People v. Durham (1979), 71 Ill.App.3d 725, 28 Ill.Dec. 350, 390 N.E.2d 517; (arrest in Alexander County by Union County Sheriff's office for aggravated assault, armed violence, unlawful use of weapons and criminal damage to property valued less than $150).) The common-law "hot pursuit" doctrine similarly upholds extraterritorial arrests in which the police from the jurisdiction where the offense took place immediately pursue the fleeing perpetrators into another jurisdiction. (People v. Clark (1977), 46 Ill.App.3d 240, 4 Ill.Dec. 785, 360 N.E.2d 1160 ( ).) Defendant contends that in each case where the arrest was upheld pursuant to section 107-5(c), the officer had some knowledge, if not probable cause to believe, that the accused had committed an offense within his jurisdiction prior to leaving it and that such authority cannot sustain the arrest here because Officer Taylor had no basis to believe any offense would be committed prior to leaving his jurisdiction. These decisions address circumstances where the authority to make an extraterritorial arrest is at issue. In such circumstances the basis upon which the accused was pursued into another jurisdiction is a relevant consideration. Here, however, a radar sweep was conducted on a roadway within Officer Taylor's jurisdiction. Going to an adjoining jurisdiction under such circumstances does not, in our opinion, operate to prohibit the officer from acting intraterritorially based on his extraterritorial observation of the commission of an offense.
Section 107-3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes a private citizen to make an arrest when he has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being committed. Extraterritorial arrests by police officers have been upheld as citizen's arrests where the offense was committed in the officer's presence. (People v. Gupton (1985), 139 Ill.App.3d 530, 94 Ill.Dec. 183, 487 N.E.2d 1060 ( ); People v. Rowe (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 721, 84 Ill.Dec. 49, 471 N.E.2d 578 ( ); People v. Marino (1980), 80 Ill.App.3d 657, 36 Ill.Dec. 71, 400 N.E.2d 491 ( ).) In Illinois, extraterritorial arrests are not invalidated because they are made under color of authority. (People v. Gupton; People v. Rowe; People v. Marino.) Moreover, the results of a breathalyzer test, which was requested under color of law in association with a citizen's arrest, have been held to be admissible. People v. Gupton; People v. Rowe. Both sections 107-3 and 107-5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been held to authorize...
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