People v. Contreraz
Citation | 267 Cal.Rptr.3d 914,53 Cal.App.5th 965 |
Decision Date | 21 August 2020 |
Docket Number | H045787 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alberto Salvador CONTRERAZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence Senior, Assistant Attorney General, René A. Chacon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Julia Y. Je, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff/Respondent.
Lori A. Quick, Under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant/Appellant.
In September 2017, defendant Alberto Salvador Contreraz1 was sentenced to 10 years in state prison, execution suspended, and granted three years' probation. In May 2018, following a contested hearing, the trial court found that Contreraz violated his probation. The trial court terminated probation and ordered execution of the previously-imposed prison sentence.
In our prior opinion in this matter, People v. Contreraz (Dec. 5, 2019, H045787 [nonpub. opn.] ), 2019 WL 6727570, we rejected Contreraz's argument that he is entitled to the retroactive benefit of Senate Bill No. 620 (Reg. Sess. 2017-2018) (Sen. Bill 620) which amended Penal Code 2 sections 12022.5, subdivision (c) and 12022.53, subdivision (h), effective January 1, 2018, and affirmed the judgment. This case is before us again after the California Supreme Court granted review, deferred briefing, and transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25 ( McKenzie ). Neither Contreraz nor the Attorney General submitted supplemental briefs following transfer from the Supreme Court. ( Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.200(b) & 8.528(f).)
As directed by the California Supreme Court, we hereby vacate our prior decision and, upon reconsideration, we conclude that Contreraz is entitled to the benefit of Sen. Bill 620. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion in deciding whether to strike the firearm enhancement pursuant to sections 12022.5, subdivision (c) and 12022.53, subdivision (h), as amended. Further, as discussed in our prior (now vacated) opinion, the trial court has stricken the criminal street gang sentencing enhancement, thus rendering that argument moot.
On June 2, 2016, Contreraz was charged by information with second degree robbery (§ 211; count 1), participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22. subd. (a); count 2), carrying a concealed firearm (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2); count 3), and resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a); count 4). The information further alleged that, in connection with the robbery, Contreraz was personally armed with a firearm ( §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subd. (b) ) and committed the offense for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
On September 13, 2017, as part of a negotiated disposition, Contreraz pleaded guilty to one count of felony second degree robbery (§ 211; count 1) and one count of felony assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 5).3 Contreraz also admitted the firearm and gang enhancement allegations ( §§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 186.22, subd. (b)(1) ) in connection with the robbery offense. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court dismissed counts 2, 3, and 4, and deleted the reference to section 12022.53, subdivision (b) from the firearm enhancement. The trial court then sentenced Contreraz to a total term of 10 years, consisting of the upper term of five years on count 1, with a consecutive four-year enhancement for personal use of a firearm ( § 12022.5, subd. (a) ) plus a consecutive one-year middle term sentence on count 5 (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)). The trial court also imposed and stayed a 10-year sentence on the criminal street gang allegation ( § 186.22, subd. (b)(1) ).4 The trial court ordered execution of sentence suspended, and placed Contreraz on three years' formal probation. Contreraz did not appeal.
On February 20, 2018, the Santa Cruz County Probation Department filed a petition alleging that Contreraz had violated his probation by failing to report, failing to participate in an educational/vocational/therapeutic program, failing to pay fines and fees, and failing to pay restitution. The trial court held a contested hearing on the petition on May 3, 2018 and found that Contreraz violated his probation. Accordingly, the trial court terminated probation and executed the previously imposed prison sentence of 10 years.
Following transfer from the California Supreme Court, the parties did not submit any supplemental briefing ( Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.200(b) & 8.528(f) ), so we briefly reiterate the arguments raised in the original briefing.
Contreraz argued Sen. Bill 620, which amended section 12022.5, subdivision (c) to give trial court's discretion to strike firearm sentence enhancements, retroactively applies to his case, relying on In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ), and we should remand the matter to the trial court to exercise that discretion. The Attorney General argued that Contreraz is not entitled to the retroactive application of the amendment made by Sen. Bill 620 because the judgment against him was final before that amendment came into effect.
In 2017, the Legislature amended section 12022.5, subdivision (c) to read: The amendment took effect on January 1, 2018. (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2, p. 5104.) Prior to its enactment, trial courts did not have the discretion to strike or dismiss firearm enhancements imposed under section 12022.5.
Under the Estrada rule, ’ ( People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 881-882, 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 84, 422 P.3d 531.)
In McKenzie , the California Supreme Court considered "whether a convicted defendant who is placed on probation after imposition of sentence is suspended, and who does not timely appeal from the order granting probation, may take advantage of ameliorative statutory amendments that take effect during a later appeal from a judgment revoking probation and imposing sentence." ( McKenzie, supra , 9 Cal.5th at p. 43, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25.) Even though the time to appeal the order granting probation had lapsed, the court held that the ameliorative statutory amendments applied retroactively because "when the revisions to section 11370.2 took effect, defendant's ‘ "criminal proceeding ... ha[d] not yet reached final disposition in the highest court authorized to review it." ’ " ( Id. at p. 45, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25.) Although the McKenzie court was not confronted with the situation raised by this case—the finality of a judgment where sentence is imposed but execution of the sentence is suspended while the defendant is on probation—we find its reasoning to be dispositive here as well.
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed in McKenzie that " ‘ ’ " ( McKenzie, supra , 9 Cal.5th at p. 45, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25.) The court determined that in the situation before it, where the statutory amendments became effective during the defendant's appeal of the trial court's revocation of probation and imposition of sentence, "[i]t [could not] be said that this criminal prosecution or proceeding concluded before the ameliorative legislation took effect." ( Id. at p. 46, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25.) Because the amendments "occurred long after the court ordered probation and the time for direct appeal lapsed[,] ... defendant could not have raised this issue during a direct appeal from the probation order." ( Id. at p. 50, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25.)
The same logic applies here. Contreraz was ordered to probation in September 2017, and Sen. Bill 160 took effect on January 1, 2018, "after the court ordered probation and the time for direct appeal lapsed." ( McKenzie, supra , 9 Cal.5th at p. 50, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25.) Contreraz could not have argued on direct appeal that the trial court would, in the future, have the...
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