People v. Cook

• Decision Date: 19 December 2019
• Docket Number: No. 107,107
• Citation: 34 N.Y.3d 412,143 N.E.3d 1065,121 N.Y.S.3d 187
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Tyrell COOK, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

34 N.Y.3d 412

143 N.E.3d 1065

121 N.Y.S.3d 187

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Tyrell COOK, Appellant.

No. 107

Court of Appeals of New York.

December 19, 2019

OPINION OF THE COURT

GARCIA, J.

Defendant moved to suppress evidence and a hearing was held. After argument but before the court rendered a decision, the People were granted permission to reopen the hearing and present additional testimony. The court then denied defendant's motion. We must decide whether the hearing court had discretion to reopen a suppression hearing at this stage of the proceedings – after the People had rested but before rendering a decision – and, if it did, whether it was an abuse of that discretion to do so here. Because we hold that Supreme Court had, and did not abuse, the discretion to reopen the suppression hearing, we affirm.

I.

Late one night in September 2013, the victim, a taxi driver, picked up a passenger in the Bronx. A few minutes into the ride, the passenger, who was in the backseat, pulled out a knife and demanded money. The assailant cut the victim's neck with the knife, a struggle ensued, and the victim crashed his taxi. The assailant fled. Police officers arrived on the scene almost immediately, obtaining and broadcasting a description of the suspect. A few minutes later, two other officers observed defendant, who matched the description provided by the victim, on a subway platform two blocks from the crash. Defendant appeared to be trying to conceal himself from view. Soon after spotting him, police detained defendant. A police sergeant brought the victim from the crash site to the arrest scene where he identified defendant as his assailant. Defendant was arrested and charged with, among other things, attempted robbery and assault.

Defendant moved to suppress the identification made by the victim on the night of the assault, arguing that the identification procedures had been unduly suggestive and that his initial detention at the subway station had been without reasonable suspicion. A hearing was held. The People called one witness, the police sergeant, who testified as to the victim's account of the incident and description of the assailant, the sergeant's observations of defendant upon the sergeant's arrival at the subway station four to five minutes after responding to the crash scene – including that defendant appeared out of breath and was sweating – and the steps taken to obtain the initial police-arranged show-up identification. Defendant presented no evidence.

Oral argument on the motion followed, during which defense counsel asserted that the People had not demonstrated reasonable suspicion to support detaining defendant, namely that the sergeant's testimony that he had witnessed defendant sweating and out of breath after he was detained did not support a finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to detain him. The court appeared to agree that the testimony concerning defendant's physical state after his detention was of limited relevance. The People responded that they had other witnesses available to testify, but the court stated that this was impermissible because the People had rested.

The next morning, after reviewing Appellate Division precedent provided by the People, the court changed course and determined that it did in fact have discretion to reopen the suppression hearing but did not immediately do so. Rather, the court explained that it would not continue with argument on the merits of the suppression motion if the People were going to make a motion to reopen, as "tipping [its] hand" or "telling [the People] what [its] feeling [wa]s ... would be inappropriate." The People then formally requested to reopen the hearing and described the additional proof they planned to offer. Defense counsel responded and, after argument, the court granted the People's request. The court assured defense counsel that she would be afforded as much time as she needed to cross–examine on whether the additional testimony was tailored to the issues raised at the previous argument on the merits of the motion to suppress.

Upon reopening, the People called one of the officers who had first spotted defendant on the subway platform. That officer – who did not describe whether defendant was out of breath or sweating prior to being stopped – testified that approximately five people were on the platform at the time he observed defendant, that defendant was the only one matching the description provided by the victim, and that defendant appeared to be hiding. Based on the testimony of both officers, Supreme Court denied defendant's suppression motion. A jury found defendant guilty of attempted first-degree robbery with a dangerous instrument and second-degree assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding that Supreme Court "providently exercised its discretion in reopening a suppression hearing, before rendering a decision, in order to permit the People to call an officer with additional information tending to establish reasonable suspicion for defendant's detention" ( People v. Cook, 161 A.D.3d 708, 708, 78 N.Y.S.3d 314 [1st Dept. 2018] ). A Judge of this court granted defendant leave to appeal.

II.

Defendant, relying on this Court's decisions in People v. Havelka, 45 N.Y.2d 636, 412 N.Y.S.2d 345, 384 N.E.2d 1269 (1978) and People v. Kevin W., 22 N.Y.3d 287, 980 N.Y.S.2d 873, 3 N.E.3d 1121 (2013), argues that the hearing court did not have discretion, absent exceptional circumstances not present here, to reopen the suppression hearing once the People had rested. The People, in turn, argue that the court had broad authority to reopen at this stage, grounded in the court's common law power to alter the order of proof in its discretion, citing as authority our decision in People v. Whipple, 97 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 734 N.Y.S.2d 549, 760 N.E.2d 337 (2001) ; see People v. Brujan, 104 A.D.3d 481, 960 N.Y.S.2d 421 [1st Dept. 2013] ). We will not extend the Havelka / Kevin W. rule to situations where the court has not yet ruled on the suppression motion; rather, decisions to grant a request to present additional evidence at this stage of the proceedings should be reviewed under our traditional abuse of discretion standard.

A.

This Court has, in certain circumstances, placed strict limits on a court's discretion to reopen a suppression hearing. In Havelka, we considered whether an appellate court could hold an appeal in abeyance and remit a case for a second hearing after finding "the evidence offered at the initial hearing insufficient to justify the challenged police action" ( 45 N.Y.2d at 639, 412 N.Y.S.2d 345, 384 N.E.2d 1269 ). We disagreed with the Appellate Division's decision to do so, explaining that "there is no justification to afford the People a second chance to succeed where once they had tried and failed," potentially subjecting defendants to multiple hearings on the same issue on which they had prevailed ( id. at 643, 412 N.Y.S.2d 345, 384 N.E.2d 1269 ). In addition, a remand under these circumstances could lead to impermissible "tailoring" of testimony to overcome defects in the People's proof identified in the Appellate Division decision ( id. at 643–644, 412 N.Y.S.2d 345, 384 N.E.2d 1269 ). We held that "where no contention is made that the People have not had a full opportunity to present evidence[,] there is no justification" to remit for a second suppression hearing ( id. at 643, 412 N.Y.S.2d 345, 384 N.E.2d 1269 ).

In Kevin W. we extended the "one full opportunity" rule from Havelka to a suppression court's decision to reopen a hearing after a formal decision on the merits. Almost two months after granting suppression, the People in Kevin W. moved to reargue and four months after that, the court reopened the suppression proceedings to allow the People to call another witness (22 N.Y.3d at 292–293, 980 N.Y.S.2d 873, 3 N.E.3d 1121 ). Based on the additional testimony, the court reversed course and denied the suppression motion ( id. at 293–294, 980 N.Y.S.2d 873, 3 N.E.3d 1121 ). We affirmed the Appellate Division order reversing the denial of the suppression motion and dismissing the indictment. Relying on the reasoning in Havelka, we held that a judge in these circumstances was precluded "from reopening a suppression hearing to give the People an opportunity to shore up their evidentiary or legal position absent a showing that they were deprived of a full and fair opportunity to be heard" ( id. at 289, 980 N.Y.S.2d 873, 3 N.E.3d 1121 ).¹ In doing so, we noted that:

"The truth-seeking function of a suppression hearing is critical, and there is a strong public policy interest in holding culpable individuals responsible and protecting legitimate police conduct. Finality is important, too, and parties are expected to be prepared for relevant proceedings with their best evidence. Our rule in Havelka balances these sometimes competing considerations, which are as evident in the pretrial context as they are on the appeal of a suppression court's decision." ( id. at 296, 980 N.Y.S.2d 873, 3 N.E.3d 1121).

We must again decide where to strike that balance between "sometimes competing considerations." In Havelka, we applied the "one full opportunity" rule to a holding by an appellate court overturning the decision of the suppression court. In Kevin W. we applied the same rule to the suppression court's decision to reopen the hearing after its ruling on the merits of the motion. Defendant now asks us to apply the rule at a point still earlier in the process, similarly restricting the suppression court's discretion before any decision is made. This we decline to do.

A basic concern underlying both Havelka and Kevin W. is finality, described as the "haunt[ing] ... specter of renewed proceedings" after the defendant initially has prevailed ( Havelka, 45 N.Y.2d at 643, 412 N.Y.S.2d 345, 384 N.E.2d 1269 ). We explained in Havelka that allowing the People to present...