People v. Coolidge

• Decision Date: 01 February 1963
• Docket Number: No. 35786,35786
• Citation: People v. Coolidge, 187 N.E.2d 694, 26 Ill.2d 533 (Ill. 1963)
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Calvin COOLIDGE, Plaintiff in Error.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 694

187 N.E.2d 694

26 Ill.2d 533

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Calvin COOLIDGE, Plaintiff in Error.

No. 35786.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 1, 1963.

Stanley M. Cahn, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago (Fred G. Leach and E. Michael O'Brien, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Edward J. Hladis, and Matthew J. Moran, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for defendant in error.

DAILY, Justice.

An indictment returned to the criminal court of Cook County charged the defendant, Calvin Coolidge, with the crime of assault with intent to commit robbery in one count, and with the crime of assault with intent to commit murder in another. After waiving a jury and submitting to a bench trial he was found guilty as charged in both counts. A sentence of imprisonment for a term of 10 to 14 years was imposed under the first count, while a concurrent sentence of imprisonment for a term of 15 to 20 years was imposed under the second. Defendant prosecutes this writ of error for review asserting that the incompetency of his appointed counsel and certain trial errors require a reversal of both convictions, or, alternatively, that the conviction of assault with intent to commit murder must be reversed due to the failure of the evidence to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Essential facts show that on August 1, 1959, about 9:30 A.M., defendant entered a grocery store operated by Clarence Tucker and made a small purchase of groceries. He returned about fifteen minutes later, ordered more groceries then drew a knife and pointed it at Tucker and announced that it was a 'stick-up.' It is agreed that Tucker started screaming and grappling with defendant, but there is some conflict as to the use and whereabouts of the knife. Defendant testified the knife was knocked from his hand at the beginning of the struggle and that it remained on the floor until the police arrived some minutes later. Tucker, however, related that defendant retained and continued to wield the knife and that he, Tucker, sustained a cut which severed the tendons in the fingers of one hand when he sought to push the knife away.

Returning to the details of the struggle, Tucker testified that defendant knocked him to the floor, held him down by the neck, then grabbed a bottle and struck him over the head three or four times, inflicting wounds which damaged an eye and required sixteen stitches. He said defendant pushed him into a back room, demanded to know where all the money was kept, then started to tie him up after he had answered that the only money was in the cash register.

Officer James McDonald, who came to the store in response to a radio call, testified that he heard noises in the back room and that, upon going there, he saw defendant kneeling over Tucker and punching him. The officer said that he placed defendant under arrest, that he found a bread knife with a 10 or 12-inch blade protruding from defendant's rear pocket, that defendant said he needed money because his wife was pregnant, and that Tucker was covered with blood from head to foot. Another officer, James Walsh, testified the knife had a 12-inch blade and that defendant had admitted purchasing it the morning of the robbery.

At the trial, defendant admitted the attempt to rob Tucker, but, as proviously noted, stated that the knife had been knocked from his hand and expressly denied that he had ever intended to kill the complaining witness. He said he had hit Tucker with the bottle only after the latter had tried to hit him with a bottle, and that they had thereafter used only their fists.

It is tacitly conceded that this evidence is sufficient to support defendant's conviction of assault with intent to commit robbery, and wel shall consider first whether it was likewise sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt his guilt of the crime of assault with intent to murder.

The gist or essence of the crime of assault with intent to murder is a specific intent to take life and such intent must be proved as charged beyond a reasonable doubt. However, since intent is a state of mind, and, if not admitted, can be shown only by surrounding circumstances, it has come to be recognized that an intent to take life may be inferred from the character of the assault, the use of a deadly weapon and other circumstances. (People v. Shields, 6 Ill.2d 200, 127 N.E.2d 440; People v. Bashic, 306 Ill. 341, 137 N.E. 809.) It is not requisite or necessary that the party charged should have brooded over the intent, or entertained it for any considerable time, but it is enough if at the instant of the assault he intended to kill the party assaulted, or it will be enough if he is actuated in making the assault by wanton and reckless disregard of human life that denotes malice, and the assault is made under such circumstances that, if death had ensued, the killing would have been murder. (People v. Carter, 410 Ill. 462, 102 N.E.2d 312; Crowell v. People, 190 Ill. 508, 60 N.E. 872.) As was pointed out in both People v. Shields, 6 Ill.2d 200, 127 N.E.2d 440, and Weaver v. People, 132 Ill. 536, 24 N.E. 571, since every sane man is presumed to intend all the natural and probable conseuqences flowing from his own deliberate act, it follows that if one wilfully does an act the direct and natural tendency of which is to destroy another's life, the natural and irresistible conclusion, in the absence of qualifying facts, is that the destruction of such other person's life was intended. And while some writers and early cases cited to us by defendant (e. g., Perkins on Criminal Law, chap. 6, sec. 7; 61 Col.L.Rev. 571; Scott v. State (1886), 49 Ark. 156, 4 S.W. 750; White v. State (1882), 13 Tex.App. 259), have been critical of the view which permits specific intent to be inferred from the presumption that a man intended the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary act, this court, where the facts have justified its application, has consistently aligned itself with those jurisdictions adhering to the doctrine. People v. Hawes, 8 Ill.2d 501, 134 N.E.2d 781; People v. Shields, 6 Ill.2d 200, 127 N.E.2d 440; People v. Carter, 410 Ill. 462, 102 N.E.2d 312; People v. Herbert, 340 Ill. 320, 172 N.E. 740; People v. Haskins, 337 Ill. 131, 169 N.E. 18; People v. Bashic, 306 Ill. 341, 137 N.E. 809; Crowell v. People, 190 Ill. 508, 60 N.E. 872; Crosby v. People, 137 Ill. 325, 27 N.E. 49; Weaver v. People, 132 Ill. 536, 24 N.E. 571.

Under the facts before us it is also to be noted that although there may be an intent to commit one crime, such as robbery, there may be an alternative or concurrent intent to take life, necessary to the crime of assault with intent to commit murder. People v. Bashic, 306 Ill. 341, 137 N.E. 309; People v. Connors, 253 Ill. 266, 97 N.E. 643, 39 L.R.A., N.S., 143; Hamilton v. People, 113 Ill. 34.

Measuring by these established doctrines it emerges clearly that the record here presents sufficient and satisfactory evidence to prove all elements of the charge of assault with intent to murder, and that the jury was justified in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances show that defendant invaded the premises of the complaining witness for a criminal purpose, and that he deliberately and purposely armed himself with a dangerous weapon, thus manifesting knowledge that his venture could result in violence endangering life and limb, as it actually did. In considering defendant's preparations, we think significance may also be attached to his testimony that he used to trade at the store 'all the time,' and that he had been employed at a lounge a block away. Once inside the store, there is credible testimony that defendant attempted to stab Tucker with the knife and admitted proof that he struck his victim over the head with a bottle three or four times. Either weapon, in the manner used, was capable of producing death so that the crime would have been murder had death in fact ensued. Considering the viciousness of the assault, the weapons used, the fact that the blows with the bottle were directed to an extremely vital and vulnerable part of the human body, and the other circumstances showing a malicious heart and mind, we are satisfied that defendant was actuated by such wanton and reckless disregard of human life that his intent to take life may be clearly inferred.

We are not impressed with defendant's argument that the evidence shows he intended to do no more than to inflict bodily injury on Tucker, and that his desistance from killing Tucker, once the latter was subdued, shows a lack of intent to commit murder. While defendant's choice of weapons, and the manner of their use, does much to detract from the vitality of his first contention, the fact that the wounds inflicted did not cause death was not...