People v. Cooper

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: RUBIN, J.
• Decision Date: 15 November 2016
• Docket Number: B263191
• Citation: People v. Cooper, B263191 (Cal. App. Nov 15, 2016)
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EVAN COOPER, Defendant and Appellant.

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EVAN COOPER, Defendant and Appellant.

B263191

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION EIGHT

November 15, 2016

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. YA089313)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Eric C. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Correen Ferrentino, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Abtin Amir, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________ Defendant and appellant Evan Cooper was sitting in a parked car, under suspicious circumstances, when he was detained by police. He refused to answer most of the officers' questions, which resulted in his arrest and the ultimate discovery of heroin in his possession. Defendant's appeal of his eventual conviction of drug and resisting arrest charges questions solely whether the officer who initially detained him had reasonable suspicion to do so. The issue was presented both to the trial court in the form of a Penal Code section 1538.5 motion, and to the jury in terms of the lawfulness of the police conduct that led to resisting arrest charges. We conclude that the evidence supports the court's, and the jury's, respective findings of reasonable suspicion. Accordingly, we find no error in defendant's subsequent conviction. However, we remand for resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 11, 2014, sometime after 11:00 p.m., Redondo Beach Police Officer Patrick Knox spotted defendant's car in a small parking area, off an alley, behind several businesses. Defendant was parked behind the businesses although none of the establishments was open. The area was known to Officer Knox for narcotics and burglaries, both commercial and vehicle. Defendant's car was parked in an extremely dark area; there were streetlights, but they were not working. Defendant was alone, in the driver's seat of the car. His car was idling, but no headlights or brake lights were on.

Officer Knox was driving down the alley, patrolling the area. The headlights of his patrol car were off. When he spotted defendant's vehicle, he turned on his headlights, and saw defendant in the car. He pulled up directly behind defendant's car and activated his emergency lights.

Officer Knox approached defendant on foot; the driver's side window of defendant's car was halfway open. Officer Knox identified himself and told defendant he was being detained. He asked defendant for his driver's license; defendant said he did not have one. Shortly afterward he was arrested.

Given that the remainder of the post-detention facts are at best tangential to the resolution of the appeal, we discuss them only briefly. After defendant told Officer Knox he had no driver's license, Officer Knox asked if defendant had any other form ofidentification; defendant said he had a California ID card, but declined to give it to Officer Knox. Officer Knox radioed for backup and asked for a sergeant to render assistance. Officer Knox continued his attempt to identify defendant, and defendant continued to refuse to cooperate and rolled his window up. When Sergeant Michael Strosnider arrived on the scene, he identified himself as the sergeant in charge, explained that it was important that the police obtain defendant's identification, and requested that defendant roll down the window. Defendant refused to comply. At one point, defendant spoke on his mobile phone to his father. Then, Sergeant Strosnider asked to speak to defendant's father through the phone's speaker. Defendant agreed, rolled down his window less than two inches and held his phone up to the gap. Sergeant Strosnider took advantage of the opportunity to wedge his flashlight into the opening to prevent defendant from rolling the window up again. After Sergeant Strosnider spoke to defendant's father, defendant refused multiple opportunities to comply with police requests that he identify himself and step out of the car. The officers forcibly removed him from the vehicle. One officer sprayed pepper spray through the window gap. When defendant shielded his eyes with his jacket, officers broke the car window. Three officers pulled defendant, who was struggling against them, from the car and placed him on the ground. Defendant was arrested and taken to jail. When being booked into jail, Officer Knox advised him that it was a crime to bring narcotics into jail. Defendant claimed he had no drugs on him. A search revealed heroin hidden in a piece of plastic inside the waistband of defendant's boxers.

Defendant was charged by amended information with possession of heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)); two counts of resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)); and bringing a controlled substance into jail (Pen. Code, § 4573, subd. (a)). All charges except for bringing heroin into a jail were misdemeanors.

Before trial, defendant moved under Penal Code section 1538.5 to suppress the heroin, on the theory that it was the product of a search which was itself the result of anillegal detention; the motion was denied.¹ The case proceeded to jury trial; at the close of the prosecution's case, defendant moved for acquittal of all charges under section 1118.1, again challenging the legality of the detention; this too was denied. Defendant was found guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced to the midterm of three years on the felony heroin possession; the trial court stayed sentencing on the three misdemeanors under section 654.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and denying his motion for acquittal of the resisting counts. He also argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of resisting. Although defendant frames three separate arguments on appeal, each is based on the premise that Officer Knox lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. We first address the law of reasonable suspicion, then turn to defendant's challenges.

1. Reasonable Suspicion to Detain

"It is well established that certain temporary seizures short of arrest based upon probable cause are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment where the officer subjectively has a reasonable and articulable suspicion based upon objective facts that the person to be detained is involved in crime which has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. [Citations.]" (People v. Wilkins (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 804, 808.) An investigative stop is valid if " 'the circumstances known or apparent to the officer . . . include specific and articulable facts causing him to suspect that (1) some activity relating to crime has taken place or is occurring or about to occur, and (2) the person he intends to stop or detain is involved in that activity.' [Citation.]" (People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228, 233.)

Preliminarily, we conclude defendant was detained by Officer Knox when Officer Knox activated his emergency lights, pulled up behind defendant's car and told defendant he was detained. An officer's activation of emergency lights "in close proximity to aparked car" does not always constitute a detention, although it often does, depending on the circumstances. (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 980 (Brown).) Here, Officer Knox activated his emergency lights and told defendant he was being detained.

Defendant's subsequent admission that he had no driver's license, although his car was running at the time, strongly suggested that he was in violation of Vehicle Code section 12500, which prohibits driving without a license, even in a private parking lot. It is therefore not disputed that, after defendant's admission, Officer Knox was well within the law to continue his questioning of defendant. The sole issue on appeal is whether Officer Knox had sufficient reasonable suspicion at the outset when he detained defendant and first asked for his license.

In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we do not consider individual facts in isolation. Instead, we consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting wrongdoing. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4^th at p. 980.) "In reviewing the propriety of an officer's conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. [Citation.]" (Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124-125.)

That said, case law has established that certain factors are relevant to the analysis. "An area's reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in assessing whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. [Citations.]" (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 240.) "The time of night is another pertinent factor in assessing the validity of a detention." (Id. at p. 241.) However, reasonable suspicion cannot be based only on factors unrelated to the defendant, such as criminal activity in the area. (People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 838.)

The possibility of an innocent explanation for the defendant's conduct does not defeat an officer's reasonable suspicion. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 985.) Indeed, the...