People v. Cooper
Decision Date | 10 February 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 3,Docket No. 17387,3 |
Citation | 58 Mich.App. 284,227 N.W.2d 319 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee. v. Marx Ernest COOPER, Defendant-Appellant |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Marx Ernest Cooper, in pro per.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Stanley Everett, Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before BRONSON, P.J., and HOLBROOK and V. J. BRENNAN, JJ.
Defendant Marx Ernest Cooper was convicted by a jury of the crimes of (1) attempted murder, M.C.L.A. § 750.91; M.S.A. § 28.286; (2) bank robbery, M.C.L.A. § 750.531; M.S.A. § 28.799; and, (3) assault with intent to rob being armed, M.C.L.A. § 750.89; M.S.A. § 28.284. He was sentenced on October 1, 1971, on each count to three identical terms of 5 to 25 years in prison, same to run concurrently. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial and amended the same three times. This was heard by the trial court and after the filing of briefs on March 28, 1973, an order denying the motion for new trial was filed May 4, 1973. Defendant appeals as of right from the denial of his motion for a new trial.
Two issues are presented for determination in this appeal.
Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the attempted murder count (one) of the information when that count was based on M.C.L.A. § 750.91; M.S.A. § 28.286?
In pertinent part the applicable statute reads as follows: 'Any person who shall attempt to commit the crime of murder by poisoning, drowning, or strangling another person, or by any means not constituting the crime of assault with intent to murder * * *'. The trial court and both the people and the defendant agree that if an assault was committed in the attempt to commit the crime, that a verdict of guilty to count 1 would not be proper.
The trial court charged the jury in this regard as follows:
To resolve this issue we turn to the facts. On December 18, 1970, defendant entered the Michigan National Bank at Battle Creek, Michigan. Under the pretext of having business to transact with the bank he persuaded Harold Dickson to take him into a private office. After arriving in the private room, defendant proceeded to give Dickson pretyped messages an placed certain objects on the desk. The pertinent testimony is as follows:
'Q. (by Mr. Everett, prosecuting attorney): After handing you this, or before, or at any time, did he remove anything from his case?
'A. (by Mr. Dickson): Yes. During presentation to me of the printed instructions he also removed from his luggage certain items, placing them on the table between us.
'Mr. Everett: I am going to read from People's Exhibit 4, which is also typewritten. It says:
Defendant also gave him a card demanding $375,000. Mr. Dickson was able to alert the bank employees and while Dickson was on the errand to get the money, four policemen arrived. Lt. Robert Houghtaling and Detective Savage entered the room where defendant was sitting, subdued him and took the bomb away from him. At the time the police entered the room, defendant grabbed the bomb from the nearby table. Defendant testified and gave an account of planning the bank robbery with the bomb and using a complicated made up telephone to convince the bank officer that he had an accomplice which was untrue. Defendant said that when the police entered the room he had the bomb in his hands, that he had full control of it and that he was going to plunge the red button, then thought of his son and said, 'I am sorry'. By that time the officers had gained control of the bomb. There is no question concerning the fact that this bomb was an actual bomb, made of a detonator and dynamite.
This first issue is a close question. We turn to the information in the case. Count 1 reads as follows:
'One Marx Ernest Cooper, at the City of Battle Creek, did then and there feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, attempt to kill and murder one Robert Houghtaling, by attempting to detonate an explosive device, but the said Marx Ernest Cooper was then and there intercepted and prevented in the execution of such attempted murder.'
The trial judge's definition of assault was proper, and for further light we turn to the definition of assault in the case of People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 525--526, 5 N.W. 982, 985 (1880).
It appears to the Court that there was a beginning (inchoate) violence to the person of another. The offer of violence was complete when the defendant took the bomb in his hands and was in the process of detonating it. There was no question about the capability of the bomb to harm not only those in the room, but also those who were some distance away.
We find it illogical to interpret the crime charged in the information under the facts present as containing less than an assault. We therefore find that count 1 was improperly brought and the conviction in count 1 is reversed and dismissed.
Was defendant 'twice put in jeopardy' in violation of the U.S.Const. Am. V and Am. XIV, and Michigan Const.1963, art. 1, § 15 by being brought to trial in the state court after his acquittal of similar charges, based upon the same transaction, in the United States District Court?
Defendant prior to being brought to trial in our state court in the instant case was acquitted in a United States District Court criminal trial wherein he was charged with bank robbery.
Defendant did not raise this issue before or at trial. Our Supreme Court has ruled that a claim of double jeopardy must be raised before or during trial or it is waived. People v. Powers, 272 Mich. 303, 261 N.W. 543 (1935), and People v. McDonald, 306 Mich. 65, 10 N.W.2d 309 (1943).
Defendant has presented a very comprehensive brief on this issue and because of the importance of this question, we proceed to consider and decide it. In the case of In re Illova, 351 Mich. 204, 88 N.W.2d 589 (1958), it was ruled that a defendant who had violated both State and Federal laws was liable to each sovereign and subject to prosecution by each.
It has long been the law that a person may be liable to punishment for infraction of law of the United States and of a state for the same act. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 43 S.Ct. 141, 67 L.Ed. 314 (1922); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 47 S.Ct. 103, 71 L.Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102 (1926); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 63 S.Ct. 483, 87 L.Ed. 640 (1943), cert. den. 317 U.S. 606, 63 S.Ct. 62, 87 L.Ed. 492 (1943), and Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959). A near duplicate of the instant case was considered and decided in Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959), reh. den. 360 U.S. 907, 79 S.Ct. 1283, 3 L.Ed.2d 1258 (1959). There, the defendant was charged with bank robbery, was acquitted in the Federal court, and was later tried and convicted in the state court. The majority of the Supreme Court held that this did not constitute double jeopardy and the conviction was affirmed. The defendant asserts that we should rule contrary to the decisions in Bartkus and Illova, supra; further, that we should consider applying the doctrine given in the ruling in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). In answer to this assertion we adopt the recent ruling on this issue in another duplicate of the instant case found in Martin v. Rose, 481 F.2d 658, 659--660 (CA 6, 1973), cert den. 1973, 414 U.S. 876, 94 S.Ct. 86, 38 L.Ed.2d 121 (1974), wherein it is stated:
'Appellant urges that Bartkus no longer has continuing validity, particularly in view of recent Supreme Court decisions in such cases a...
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