People v. Cooper, Docket No. 1–11–3030.
| Decision Date | 04 June 2013 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 1–11–3030. |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Christopher COOPER, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Arnstein & Lehr LLP, of Chicago (Ronald D. Menaker and Julie A. Meyer, of counsel), for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Tasha-Marie Kelly, and Koula A. Fournier, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
[372 Ill.Dec. 303]¶ 1 Following a jury trial, defendant Christopher Cooper was found guilty of four counts of criminal sexual assault and four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault. At sentencing, the court merged defendant's convictions and sentenced him to consecutive terms of 8 years' imprisonment on the four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault, for an aggregate term of 32 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the extent of his neurological and cognitive impairments and their effect on his ability to knowingly and competently waive his Miranda rights; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a meaningful pretrial challenge to the voluntariness of his confession; (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call available witnesses(4) he was denied a fair trial when the State was allowed to present evidence that the complaining witness was forced to undergo an abortion; (5) he was denied a fair trial when the State inferred to the jury that he sexually abused other adopted siblings; and (6) the trial court erred in giving a pattern jury instruction in its modified form. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 The record shows, in relevant part, that defendant was charged with four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault and four counts of criminal sexual assault in connection with his sexual abuse of R.C., his younger adopted sister, over the course of many years. Prior to trial, he filed a motion to suppress a statement he gave to police admitting the abuse on the grounds that it was involuntarily given. He alleged, inter alia, that his “will was overborne in that it is clear from the transcript that the Detectives clearly tried to create a position of trust by stating he knew [defendant's] father,” and that “the Detectives appeared to coerce [him] into making a confession by stating he was a victim of circumstance.” He further alleged that he “has an IQ of 79, is diagnosed with ADHD, had a traumatic brain injury [at] birth, learning disability, as well as restricted reading and spelling abilities with low intellectual functioning.”
¶ 4 At the hearing on defendant's motion, Rosemont police detective Jeff Caldwell testified that on August 21, 2008, he arrested defendant in Lombard for criminal sexual offenses. He then returned to the Rosemont police station and called the assistant State's Attorney (ASA). Prior to the ASA's arrival, an attorney appeared on defendant's behalf and was allowed to speak with him, and when he came out of the room, he said, “I don't want my client to talk to you guys.” No one had attempted to speak with defendant beforehand, and no one attempted to speak with him thereafter.
¶ 5 Detective Caldwell next saw defendant on the afternoon of August 22. About 1 p.m., he removed defendant from his cell to bring him to a bond hearing. He first brought him into a booking room where Detective Richmond and Detective Muich were present, and the detectives instructed him to change into his street clothes and handcuffed him. At that point, defendant asked whether he would receive bond and how long he would have to remain in jail, and Detective Caldwell responded that he would not get bond and that he did not know how long he would remain in jail. Defendant then said, Detective Caldwell told defendant “not to say anything else; that we had to do some paperwork, and we would be back to talk,” and defendant told them that he wanted to speak to them “without his lawyer present.”
¶ 6 That same afternoon, Detective Caldwell read defendant his Miranda rights and obtained his signature on a Miranda rights form. He then took defendant's statement in the presence of Detective Muich, who tape recorded it. During their conversation, Detective Caldwell told defendant that he would get him some help, but only after defendant said that he needed it. He did not tell defendant to “man up” before reading him his Miranda rights.
¶ 7 Rosemont detective Ronald Muich testified that on August 21, 2009, he accompanied Detective Caldwell, Detective Richmond, and Lieutenant Hasselberger to Lombard where defendant was taken into custody. Defendant and Lieutenant Hasselberger rode in his squad car back to Rosemont, and he did not have any conversation with defendant during the ride. When they arrived at the Rosemont police station, defendant was brought into a holding room, and Detective Muich stayed with him for about two hours and engaged in “ [v]ery minimal conversation” with him. When asked what he discussed with defendant, Detective Muich testified that “it was just some small talk about his father, and he was telling me how much he missed his dad and really just about his dad.” Detective Muich testified that he told defendant that he knew his father, and that “he was a real nice man, and, you know, I'm sorry that he passed away and that was pretty much it.”
¶ 8 The following day, about 1 p.m., Detective Muich saw defendant again when he was taken out of his cell for a bond hearing and brought to a holding room where he, Detective Caldwell, and Detective Richmond were present. Defendant changed into his own clothes and was eventually handcuffed, and Detective Caldwell explained the bond hearing procedure to him. Although defendant mentioned his bond, nobody told him what it would be. Detective Muich did not recall defendant asking how long he would have to remain in jail. At some point, defendant, who was in handcuffs, turned to him and Detective Caldwell and said, Detective Caldwell then put up his hand and asked, “Christopher, are you reinitiating conversation with us,” and defendant replied, “yes, I am.”
¶ 9 Thereafter, Detective Caldwell read defendant his Miranda rights, and defendant was advised that his statement was going to be tape recorded, which he said was “fine.” Detective Muich asked several times whether defendant was willing to reinitiate conversation without his attorney, and defendant responded, “yes, I am.” After defendant was Mirandized, something about “help” came up, and the detectives said they When counsel asked Detective Muich whether he recalled having a conversation with defendant involving the statement “your father's looking down on you from heaven,” Detective Muich testified that he “never brought up the word heaven.” He also testified that he never used the phrase “man up.”
¶ 10 Detective Muich testified that he knew defendant prior to arresting him. Defendant worked at Allstate Arena in maintenance, and whenever he saw Detective Muich, he would approach him and say “hi,” and Detective Muich would say “hi” back. Detective Muich testified that he knew defendant's family as well, stating: “As an auxillary officer for Rosemont, I used to follow the school bus, and that's when I used to talk to Mr. [C.] a lot and he used to bring [defendant] and some of the other children to school so that's how I kind of knew the family.”
¶ 11 The defense entered into evidence a copy of the Miranda waiver executed by defendant. The parties also stipulated that defendant has an intelligence quotient of 79. Counsel then argued that defendant's statement was not voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. Referring to his IQ, counsel noted that defendant “does not have such a low IQ where we are alleging any kind of mental retardation but it is the susceptibility that he had.” He also noted that Detective Caldwell told defendant that he would not receive bond, that the Detectives specifically promised him that they were going to help him, and that it was “undignified being told to change in a holding area or booking room with people walking around.” Ultimately, the court denied defendant's motion to suppress, finding, inter alia, that “[t]he waiver was knowingly and intelligently corroborated by his not only signing but initialing various phases of the written Miranda Warnings.”
¶ 12 The State subsequently filed a motion to permit the use of other crimes evidence, citing defendant's sexual abuse of another sibling, but the memorandum of orders reflects that the motion was withdrawn. Thereafter, on the day of jury selection, the topic of defendant's other victims came up when the parties and the court discussed the editing of defendant's audiotaped statement. At that time, counsel indicated to the court that defendant's statement had been redacted, and the State clarified that the “confession that was taken isn't only in relation to this victim,” and that “[a]ny reference to anyone else other than this victim, [R.C.], was redacted from the audiotape, as well as from the transcript.” The court, at that point, noted, “I want to be very certain that there is not even a hint of any other alleged victim, not even—so it becomes important, and I'm sure [defense counsel] has listened to it very carefully, to begin that redaction prior to any intimation that there might be someone else.”
¶ 13 That same day, counsel also made an oral motion in limine “to bar the State from asking questions about pregnancy or abortion, unless they are in a position...
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