People v. Cooper

• Citation: 326 Mich. 514,40 N.W.2d 708
• Decision Date: 09 January 1950
• Docket Number: No. 67,67
• Parties: PEOPLE v. COOPER.
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Page 708

40 N.W.2d 708

326 Mich. 514

PEOPLE v. COOPER.

No. 67.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Jan. 9, 1950.

Stephen J. Roth, Attorney General, Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor General, Lansing, Daniel J. O'Hara, Assistant Attorney General, Richard B. Foster, Special Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Lansing, for plaintiff-appellee.

Isadore Levin, Chris M. Youngjohn, Henry H. Sills, Butzel, Levin, Winston, Youngjohn & Quint, Detroit, for defendant and appellant, Cooper.

Before the Entire Bench, except DETHMERS, BUTZEL and CARR, JJ.

BOYLES, Chief Justice.

Appellant Abraham Cooper is one of the defendants referred to in People v. Hancock, Mich., 40 N.W.2d 689. Appellant Cooper, together with other defendants, was tried before a jury and convicted on an information charging them with a conspiracy to influence the State legislature and its members by the giving and receiving of bribes. After conviction the defendants were each sentenced to be confined in State prison, and 16 of them are here prosecuting their appeals on a single consolidated record. Some of said defendants, including Cooper, are represented by separate counsel and have filed separate briefs. Part of the grounds relied upon by appellant Cooper for reversal, including claims of error in selecting the jury, in the conduct of the special prosecutor, and in the court's charge to the jury have been settled in People v. Hancock, supra. Others require separate consideration.

Abraham Cooper is one of the five 'finance defendants' referred to in the Hancock case, supra, three of whom were convicted--Hancock, Omacht and Cooper. Most of the essential facts relating to Cooper's connection with the alleged conspiracy are stated in the Hancock opinion.

Counsel for Cooper in their brief claim that the facts and circumstances as shown by the record do not establish his guilt as a party to the conspiracy. As stated by counsel, the claim is that the verdict of the jury, as to Cooper, was 'against the great weight of the evidence.' In that connection the evidence must be considered in its entirety, having in mind the cumulative probative value which must be afforded to the testimony as it applies to an individual who is charged with having conspired with many others. It must be remembered that this is not a charge against Cooper alone. In all, five 'finance' defendants and 17 legislators were brought before the jury charged with a conspiracy to influence the 1939 legislature and its members by the giving and receiving of bribes.

'A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.' United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608, 31 S.Ct. 124, 126, 54 L.Ed. 1168.

'There is no such thing as a one man conspiracy.' People v. Heidt, 312 Mich. 629, 642, 20 N.W.2d 751, 756.

Counsel for Cooper in their statement of facts have carefully condensed 2,400 pages of testimony and exhibits received in the course of 9 weeks consumed by this trial into approximately 100 pages in their brief. We have given careful consideration to a review of the evidence as it applies to Cooper. Much of the record refers to the acts of Hemans, who was the key witness for the prosecution. Conviction unquestionably depended upon the weight to be given by the jury to his testimony. As to that, its credibility was for the jury, and not for the court.

An annual meeting of the 'American Finance Conference' was held in Chicago in November, 1938, just prior to the biennial session of the State legislature beginning in January, 1939. Cooper, as a director of a finance company, attended. Originally, the concern of Cooper, and others present, was directed to a proposed Small Loan Bill, later introduced as senate bill No. 41. Cooper had an indirect interest therein as a director of a small loan company. At the close of the Chicago meeting he called a general meeting of finance company representatives, which was held in Detroit on December 1, with upwards of 25 finance companies' executives present. In calling the meeting, Cooper wrote the various finance company executives as follows:

'It has come to the attention of finance companies that legislation detrimental to their interests was to be introduced in the next session in Lansing. A meeting to discuss this problem was held in Chicago on November 11th during the American Finance Conference session. In accordance with the unanimous suggestions of all of those in attendance, another meeting is being called for Thursday evening, December 1, 1938, at 6 p. m. to be held at the Statler Hotel, Detroit, Michigan.

'The purpose is to discuss fully the proposed legislation and to decide on a program of action.'

Cooper presided at that meeting. Those present decided to appoint a legislative committee to raise funds, by assessing the finance companies various amounts, and to retain a 'legislative agent' or lobbyist in Lansing. The smaller finance companies were to contribute $50 each, and the larger companies $100, to be 'paid to Cooper direct.' Later, Cooper called a meeting of Michigan finance companies for January 12, after the legislative session began, to discuss the position of finance companies in relation to legislation. There was testimony adduced at the trial that some one at that meeting suggested that the lobbyist was to buy votes if necessary. However truthful that may or may not be, Cooper from then on took the lead in raising funds for the lobbyist, was a member of the legislative committee which met in Cooper's office in Detriot and selected Hemans, with Cooper, Hancock and Omacht present. Hemans was to be paid a 'retainer' of $500. His 'fee' was to be $2,500 net to him, and $250 per month 'for expenses.' If the finance group introduced a bill, his minimum fee was to be $3,500.

Cooper claims that his activities, of which the foregoing was only the beginning, were solely in connection with a Small Loan Bill, later introduced as senate bill No. 41. That may have been true in the beginning. However, his activities on behalf of the finance companies were later broadened to include senate bills No. 85 and No. 166, in which finance companies had a direct interest. Hemans used the money thus raised on behalf of finance companies to bribe members of the legislature in connection with those bills. Cooper wrote many letters, and attended the at which he presided as chairman of the legislative committee. At its last meeting held after the legislature had adjourned and senate bill No. 166 (on which the conspiracy charge in part was based) had been passed, another assessment was levied on the finance companies through Cooper, and Hemans was paid up for his services. The funds raised by the legislative committee of which Cooper was the active chairman, which were turned over to Hemans by its treasurer Hancock, amounted to more than $8,000 and were paid to Hemans for his services and expenses on behalf of the finance companies in connection with legislation in the 1939 session, in which Cooper and the finance companies were directly interested.

A person may be a party to a continuing conspiracy by knowingly cooperating to further the object thereof. People v. Heidt, supra. It is not necessary to a conviction for conspiracy that each defendant have knowledge of all its ramifications. People v. DeLano, 318 Mich. 557, 28 N.W.2d 909. Nor is it necessary that one conspirator should know all of the conspirators or participate in all of the objects of the conspiracy. People v. Garska, 303 Mich. 313, 6 N.W.2d 527. In a recent decision of the United States supreme court handed down April 18, 1949, several defendants had been charged in the first count of the indictment with a criminal conspiracy and in the six succeeding counts with separate acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. The defendants were convicted on all seven counts. In affirming the convictions and sentences on the six subsequent counts, as well as on the count for conspiracy, the court said: 'The case was submitted to the jury on the basis of a single conspiracy throughout the period alleged in the indictment. * * * Each of the six substantive counts charged the presentation of a separate false invoice. The evidence showed the presentation of eleven other false invoices. This was part of the evidence received in support of the conspiracy count. * * * The trial court charged that one 'Who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures the commission of an act is as responsible for that act as if he committed it directly.' That theory is well engrained in the law. See § 332 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 550; United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 518, 63 S.Ct. 1233, 1240, 87 L.Ed. 1546; United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281, 64 S.Ct. 134, 136, 88 L.Ed. 48. In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant 'in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed.' L. Hand, J., in United States v. Peoni, 2 Cir., 100 F.2d 401, 402. * * * We see therefore no reason to exculpate him (Moncharsh) as an aider and abettor. * * * Aiding and abetting has a broader application. It makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act whether or not there is a conspiracy. And if a conspiracy is also charged, it makes no difference so far as aiding and betting is concerned whether the substantive offense is done pursuant to the conspiracy.' Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769.

Our attention has been directed by counsel for defendant to the recent case of State v....