People v. Cordray
| Decision Date | 27 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4-20-0203,4-20-0075 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JASON CORDRAY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Livingston County Nos. 18CF242 19CC11 Honorable Jennifer H. Bauknecht, Judge Presiding.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court erred in failing to conduct a proper preliminary Krankel inquiry after defendant claimed trial counsel was ineffective.
¶ 2 In August 2018, the State charged defendant, Jason Cordray with criminal trespass to a residence. In August 2019, a jury found defendant guilty and the trial court set the matter for sentencing.
¶ 3 That same month, defendant filed a pro se motion requesting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively, a new trial. In the motion, defendant claimed trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court denied the motion and set the case for sentencing. During defendant's statement in allocution, defendant made a series of rambling, incoherent statements, and his speech was "thick tongued," which led the court to believe he was under the influence of something. The court ordered defendant to undergo drug testing and continued the sentencing hearing two weeks later.
¶ 4 Defendant's drug test came back positive for alcohol, methamphetamine, and cocaine. In November 2019, defendant was sentenced to three years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). Because defendant appeared at the previous hearing under the influence of drugs, the trial court sentenced him to 180 days for being in direct criminal contempt of court, to be served consecutive to his 3-year DOC sentence.
¶ 6 In August 2018, the State charged defendant with one count of criminal trespass to a residence, a Class 4 felony (720 ILCS 5/19-4(a)(2), (b)(2) (West 2018)). Due to his prior criminal record, defendant was extended-term eligible (730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a) (West 2018)).
¶ 7 In August 2019, after a one-day jury trial, defendant was found guilty, and the matter was set for sentencing in September. Before the sentencing hearing date, defendant filed a pro se "motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict and motion for a new trial." In his motion, defendant outlined 12 reasons why he believed he was entitled to relief. Although the motion was based primarily on the deficiencies of counsel, his allegations numbered 11 and 12 specifically complained of his counsel's inadequate representation during the trial. Number 11 stated defendant "was not competently represented by [trial counsel] as no attempt was made by him to prove that [defendant] had a right to be present at the subject premises despite evidence tendered to him." Number 12 similarly complained defendant "was not competently represented by [trial counsel] as no argument was presented to the jury that parole release to the subject address included a determination that defendant had a right to be in the premises."
¶ 8 The trial court reminded defendant he was still represented by counsel and could not file pro se motions. Upon hearing this, defendant indicated he wanted to proceed pro se, and the trial court admonished defendant about his right to waive counsel under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984). After finding defendant's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, the court released defense counsel from the proceedings.
¶ 9 Defendant then attempted to introduce exhibits he claimed entitled him to live at the residence and alleged this information was provided to his trial counsel, who never offered it as evidence during trial. The trial court denied its admission and refused to consider it because, the court said, new evidence could not be introduced during a hearing on a motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court allowed the State to argue against defendant's motion before ultimately denying it. It found, in part, defendant received competent representation at trial, there was nothing to suggest trial counsel was ineffective, and even if these documents were provided to trial counsel, he is "entitled to the benefit of the doubt with regards to trial strategy decisions." At no point did the trial court further question defendant on the specifics of how defense counsel was ineffective, nor did it seek input or a response to defendant's allegations from defense counsel, who had only moments before left the courtroom. The sentencing remained set for late September.
¶ 10 At sentencing, defendant asked for the public defender to be reappointed. The trial court granted his request and reset the case for sentencing in October. During defendant's statement of allocution at the later sentencing hearing, defendant made several rambling and incoherent statements, prompting the trial court to inquire whether he was under the influence of something. Upon further questioning, the court decided to continue the sentencing hearing, revoke defendant's bond, and order defendant to be drug tested. At the next hearing, it was revealed defendant tested positive for cocaine, methamphetamine, and alcohol. The court sentenced defendant to 3 years DOC for the underlying criminal conviction of criminal trespass to a residence and 180 days for direct contempt of court for appearing at the sentencing hearing intoxicated.
¶ 11 This appeal followed.
¶ 13 Defendant's brief sets forth several arguments, but we find it necessary to address only defendant's claim the trial court failed to conduct a proper Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill.2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984)). Because we agree with defendant, we remand for further proceedings.
¶ 14 As our supreme court said in People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 11, 88 N.E.3d 732," [t]he common-law procedure, which has evolved from our decision in Krankel, is triggered when a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Once raised, the trial court is required to conduct "some type of inquiry into the underlying factual basis, if any, of a defendant's pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." People v. Moore, 207 Ill.2d 68, 79, 797 N.E.2d 631, 638 (2003). "[A] pro se defendant is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial court's attention." Moore, 207 Ill.2d at 79. The Ayres court found a defendant's "clear claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, either orally or in writing, *** is sufficient to trigger the trial court's duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry." Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 18; see also People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 150815, ¶ 26, 93 N.E.3d 664 (). The inquiry must be sufficient to determine the factual basis of the claim. See People v. Banks, 237 Ill.2d 154, 213, 934 N.E.2d 435, 468 (2010). "[T]he primary purpose of the preliminary inquiry is to give the defendant an opportunity to flesh out his claim of ineffective assistance so the court can determine whether appointment of new counsel is necessary." Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 20.
¶ 15 On appeal, "[t]he operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant's pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel." Moore, 207 Ill.2d at 78. In assessing the adequacy of the trial court's inquiry, we may consider such things as "(1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the [allegations of ineffective] representation (2) the sufficiency of defendant's pro se allegations of ineffective assistance, and (3) the trial court's knowledge of defense counsel's performance at trial and the sufficiency of the defendant's allegations on their face." People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71, 145 N.E.3d 544. This would, in all likelihood, include the trial court briefly discussing the allegations with the defendant. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 12. "The applicable standard of review depends on whether the trial court did or did not determine the merits of the defendant's pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel." People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98, 162 N.E.3d 223. Our concern is with the adequacy of the trial court's inquiry into defendant's allegations. Moore, 207 Ill.2d at 78. Whether the trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry presents a legal question that we review de novo. People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 33, 161 N.E.3d 173. "However, if the trial court has properly conducted a Krankel inquiry and has reached a determination on the merits of the defendant's Krankel motion, we will reverse only if the trial court's action was manifestly erroneous." Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. "Manifest error is error that is clearly evident, plain, and indisputable." Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. "When a defendant triggers the Krankel procedure by making a pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the circuit court fails to conduct the initial Krankel inquiry, the appropriate remedy on appeal is a remand to the circuit court for the Krankel procedure to take place." In re Johnathan T., 2021 IL App (5th) 200247, ¶ 20 (citing Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶¶ 24-26).
¶ 16 In ...
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